FOB Keating attack repulsed

[Schmedlap]

As far as resourcing goes, I'm sure we could muster 500 soldiers from the Green Beans, internet cafes, and gyms of the Big FOBs.

Not gonna happen. I made that very same appeal, in person, to my battalion and brigade commanders as we were preparing to provide security for the referendum vote on the IZ constitution. I even recommended the specific FOBs and proposed a much lower number of bodies needed. That vote was regarded as having strategic significance and the answer was not just "no" - not even "hell no" - but just a blank look that said, "are you that naive?" Nuristan is operational-level economy-of-force in a country where the FOBs are less plentiful and there are probably only 29 flavors of Baskin Robbins. Don't expect anyone to cut back on the non-essentials in order to plus up the essentials. What do you think this is, a war? We've got people getting skinny and you want to take away their fat pills.

[MikeF]

Not gonna happen. I made that very same appeal, in person, to my battalion and brigade commanders as we were preparing to provide security for the referendum vote on the IZ constitution. I even recommended the specific FOBs and proposed a much lower number of bodies needed. That vote was regarded as having strategic significance and the answer was not just "no" - not even "hell no" - but just a blank look that said, "are you that naive?" Nuristan is operational-level economy-of-force in a country where the FOBs are less plentiful and there are probably only 29 flavors of Baskin Robbins. Don't expect anyone to cut back on the non-essentials in order to plus up the essentials. What do you think this is, a war? We've got people getting skinny and you want to take away their fat pills.

Sad but true.

Along with Ken's comments on the bureacracy and institution. Take a look at the 15,000 soldiers on LSAA- pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.

Just my two cents for what it's worth.

Maybe I'm that naive...and, I haven't even seen Kabul or Khandarhar.

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

The current situation is about 50 soldiers in a patrol base in gateway for AQ from Pakistan. Is that all the soldiers we can muster of an Army of 1.5 million and a population of 350 million?

50 men to bridge the gap?

I think not.

Still, I'd rather be with those 50 men than in LSAA, Monterey, or DC.

v/r

Mike

[J.C.]

It's been a while since my last post but, I recently returned from AF. We sent elements in and around the mountianous regions on the AF/PAK border to target fighter camps. It is very unforgiving terrian and even with resources was a challanging enviroment to fight in, however we did have some good effects from going in and clearing out targeted areas where we were.

I don't belive that the COPS in this area where or will produce the desired effect they were put in place for. DA agianst fighter camps and targeted strikes would produce greater effects. If I am catching the wind right closing these isolated outpost down and pushing those forces to more populated areas to conduct a COIN mission will pay greater dividens in the long run.

Along the mountianous regoins near the AF/PAK border we will not when hearts or minds, but we may with the greater application of force be able to cut some of the supply lines and flow of FF and destroy key training nodes in the region and provide some breathing room for forces on the ground.

[Ken White]

...pimping out their shiny new HMMWVS and MRAPs. An hour or two from the fight, dwelling on college courses, the olympic sized swimming pool, open mike night, and the suf and turf night, we could have them reinforcing Nuristan in the larger fight.

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

Silly me, outside of a tourniquet and battle dressings so everyone knew where to find those, I'd have told people to put stuff where it worked best for them. Want to keep your mags in an old Canteen pouch? Go for it...

We've been in a war for nine years and people in high places are saying things that stupid? I said earlier we've forgotten how to fight on foot. Maybe we've forgotten how to fight altogether...

Sad. Scary.

[MikeF]

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

Silly me, outside of a tourniquet and battle dressings so everyone knew where to find those, I'd have told people to put stuff where it worked best for them. Want to keep your mags in an old Canteen pouch? Go for it...

We've been in a war for nine years and people in high places are saying things that stupid? I said earlier we've forgotten how to fight on foot. Maybe we've forgotten how to fight altogether...

Sad. Scary.

15,000 soldiers at LSAA in 2005. Who knows what it is now?

And I didn't even start with the contractors...

50 men at that patrol base.

I don't see any even coming close to right.

[82redleg]

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was ....
Sad. Scary.

The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.

[Ken White]

The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.

I totally agree. I've been both a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime in and in combat; three Bns, two Bdes. The Bde CSM is a totally wasted slot. A Bde CSM has a lot of negative influence but very little positive capability unless many factors hit just right. I had more positive influence as a Bde Ops SGM --also both in peacetime and in combat -- than I did as a Bde CSM -- and in both Bdes I was fortunate in being able to work for very fine Colonels and in both I was the Ops guy who became the CSM (that worked often for many people until the number of CSMs grew to its current proportions. I'm old... ).

A Bn Ops Sgt (I also disagree with making them SGMs) is too busy so at Bn the CSM makes sense. At Bde, with the larger (too large?) staff, the Ops SGM has adequate time to counsel COLs who are about to step on something and they can also arrange troop help stuff better than can their counterparts at Bn.

The CSMs are generally a waste at Bde; above Bde they literally have no function and some have a terrible propensity to concentrate on eyewash and little else -- except their next job...

I'll caveat all that by saying that a portion of that relative lack of merit is in many senses a function of how the guy is employed; the Army has not directed adequate responsibilities to and for the job, so in most cases, the guy or gal writes his or her own job description. Some do that better than others. Some Commanders give them far more to do and place far more trust in them than others. I have literally been directed to take command of a Company in a fire fight and OTOH, been barely listened to (in peacetime by a fair LTC who was an Aviator on a ground tour and who almost certainly had a really poor Platoon sergeant when he was a 2LT...).

It can be fixed and improved significantly. First and easiest by making those guys (and 1SGs) the unit trainers. Not responsible for training, that's the Cdr -- but trainers; doers and subordinate directors. That's still a band-aid. The entire personnel system still reflects 17th century practice and WW I methodologies. It and the pay system are in need of major overhaul. We need to be able to reward or pay people more without applying the Peter Principle and promoting them past their optimum level. That and moving them too often contribute to a lack of trust up and down the chain...

[Fuchs]

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much.

The enemy would have massed against another base instead.

Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts.

Many more outposts at double ordinary strength won't do much either (except risking to alienate more indigenous folks) - the enemy could mass against a convoy instead.

More powerful convoys don't help much because convoys are stretched by definition and always have weak spots. All those troops in-country need also more supply than today, so more convoys - or longer ones.


And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....


That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

[Kiwigrunt]

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Hmmmm, good post. And on the money me thinks.
It does appear that the unintended consequences of NATO strategy create an environment that provides the enemy with ample opportunity for initiative, while we keep struggling to figure out why we keep missing it.

[Ken White]

100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much. The enemy would have massed against another base instead.
Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts...

All true.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.

Yes...

[Michael C]

And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.

Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....

Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.

Now in Afghanistan, it obviously wouldn't be a Sunni Awakening, it would be something else. But right now, the Taliban and their ilk don't have to threaten the local populations to live off of them. They get to do so willingly. Now, if they had to attack local populations with force to survive, the population would be driven into our hands.


As to the attack at FOB Keating compared to the luxury life at BAF. Don't just look at the numbers, look at the amount of ordinance dropped. Something like 1 percent of all ordinance expended in Afghanistan occurs around BAF. Basically, when historians write the history about failure in Afghanistan it will be a history of greed, gluttony and sloth by upper leadership (division level and up).

[yamiyugikun]

When I read about the casualities, I was very sad. I saw an article in the L.A. Times about how Gen. McChrystal's strategy was meant to avoid casualities like that. I also saw on the cover of Time magazine, newest October issue at my work today, a picture of a wounded US soldier on a stretcher. Then there was a series of pictures showing the lives of US troops in Afghanistan. You folks in the military are very brave to go through such grueling living situations like having a lack of water, etc...