FOB Keating attack repulsed

[jcustis]

"Somewhere a True Believer is training to kill you. He is training with minimal food or water, in austere conditions, training day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon and he made his web gear. He doesn't worry about what workout to do - his ruck weighs what it weighs, his runs end when the enemy stops chasing him. This True Believer is not concerned about 'how hard it is;' he knows either he wins or dies. He doesn't go home at 17:00, he is home.
He knows only The Cause.

Still want to quit?"

[AmericanPride]

"Somewhere a True Believer is training to kill you. He is training with minimal food or water, in austere conditions, training day and night. The only thing clean on him is his weapon and he made his web gear. He doesn't worry about what workout to do - his ruck weighs what it weighs, his runs end when the enemy stops chasing him. This True Believer is not concerned about 'how hard it is;' he knows either he wins or dies. He doesn't go home at 17:00, he is home.
He knows only The Cause.

Still want to quit?"

I won't make any claims to how widespread it is, but I have experienced on multiple occasions either a complete ignorance of the capacity, resilience, and experience of the Afghan insurgency or an injurious under-estimation of their abilities. This is of course not to be confused with issues of legal or moral legitimacy, but we must recognize the fact that the insurgency has managed to effectively destroy a COP and nearly overran a vehicle patrol base (FM 3-90 defines destroy as "physically [rendering] an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted."; and for awareness, defeat is defined as "when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight" and "the defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action").

Is there difficulty in the Army/military/American culture in accepting that an enemy is capable of inflicting serious harm on us without our having made a serious or grave mistake that enables them to do so? Is the Afghan insurgency so weak that it's successes can only come from when we make mistakes? Does this affect our capacity to make accurate assessments of the situation and to craft effective COAs?

[Kiwigrunt]

Is there difficulty in the Army/military/American culture in accepting that an enemy is capable of inflicting serious harm on us without our having made a serious or grave mistake that enables them to do so? Is the Afghan insurgency so weak that it's successes can only come from when we make mistakes? Does this affect our capacity to make accurate assessments of the situation and to craft effective COAs?

Good point.
To what extent does this ‘difficulty in our culture’ allow us to only see every incident that leaves casualties on our side as a defeat or disaster, exacerbated of course by our very aversion to risk and casualties. At the tactical level, was COP Keating really that much of a defeat? Sure, 8 KIA is tragic. But the comparative statistics don’t actually look that bad given that the Taliban lost about 150. And as for the loss of the post it depends on how much value we choose to adhere to that particular piece of turf. I realise that this is looking purely at numbers but compare it to other defeats like those caused by IEDs. Look at any IED incident or combination of them where the casualty count is similar and see what damage we were able to inflict in return. (I say ‘we’ in the broadest sense; it doesn’t include yours truly from behind my laptop)

So perhaps we could even take that a step further and reverse our view on this. Given that the enemy tends to have the initiative most of the time anyway, would an increased use of these COPs not be a way to draw them out and meet them head on? And then the ‘true believers’ can do the humping with heavy weights. And when they operate in larger groups like this they should in a sense be easier to deal with as the battle becomes more ‘conventional’.
With other words, give them bait and reason to group up and take the battle to us.

Just some simplistic thoughts…

[jcustis]

Good point.
To what extent does this ‘difficulty in our culture’ allow us to only see every incident that leaves casualties on our side as a defeat or disaster, exacerbated of course by our very aversion to risk and casualties. At the tactical level, was COP Keating really that much of a defeat? Sure, 8 KIA is tragic. But the comparative statistics don’t actually look that bad given that the Taliban lost about 150. And as for the loss of the post it depends on how much value we choose to adhere to that particular piece of turf. I realise that this is looking purely at numbers but compare it to other defeats like those caused by IEDs. Look at any IED incident or combination of them where the casualty count is similar and see what damage we were able to inflict in return. (I say ‘we’ in the broadest sense; it doesn’t include yours truly from behind my laptop)

So perhaps we could even take that a step further and reverse our view on this. Given that the enemy tends to have the initiative most of the time anyway, would an increased use of these COPs not be a way to draw them out and meet them head on? And then the ‘true believers’ can do the humping with heavy weights. And when they operate in larger groups like this they should in a sense be easier to deal with as the battle becomes more ‘conventional’.
With other words, give them bait and reason to group up and take the battle to us.

Just some simplistic thoughts…

Might work...for a short while and through a few successes, but then what? I don't think the Taliban are going to continue to push a protracted strategy of trying to isolate a COP and destroy it at the risk of losing several fighters. They'd rather choke off our lines of communication and just IED the re-supply convoys.

This also sounds like the strategy employed with regard to defending Khe Sanh:

"As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all he needed to know was that PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. Making the prospect even more enticing was that the Combat Base was in an unpopulated area where American firepower could be fully brought to bear without having to worry about civilian casualties. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions."

I'm not so sure that a mobile and fluid enemy such as the Taliban is too concerned with waging a war of COPs.

[Ken White]

This also sounds like the strategy employed with regard to defending Khe Sanh...

Khe Sanh and the A Shau were a couple of many attempts to coax the VC and / or the NVA -- the two were not synonymous nor always cooperating effectively -- into big battles. Never really worked. Fighting a European war in SEA.

I'm not so sure that a mobile and fluid enemy such as the Taliban is too concerned with waging a war of COPs.

That's the real 'yep' from me. They hit a target of opportunity and will when they can. Too much ado about a very small fight that didn't come off nearly as bad as too many seem to think. It's war, doo doo occurs and the bad guys will continue to do that, they'll accrue more minor successes. Likely also will accrue a better outcome than they deserve due simply to the fact it's their turf...

Pete's right, we do not do field fortifications at all well -- nor are we particularly good on defense. However, I don't think it's a good idea to train for defense other than superficially as we now do for a number of reasons -- not in our aggressive psyche and not least because 'environmental' concerns preclude real digging on most bases and posts. That digging is necessary if you want to train it properly. We don't have the patience to do it right and we fight hard enough to do an acceptable job defending most of the time.

Though we probably could stop building really stupid RPG targets:

[PhilR]

I agree that the Taliban won’t fight a “war of COPs”, but to a degree, that’s the physical reality of the ISAF/GoA fight. To get to the population, we need to be among them. Since the idea of patrols from large remote bases has been discredited as ineffective (commuting to war), what we see (I imagine if I looked at a detailed map of our forces) is a host of smaller COPs spread out across the country. From there we conduct patrols (hopefully that’s the main function/reason).

I was somewhat troubled when this story first hit the news a few months ago because some of the reasoning being used on why these outposts were where they were sounded right out of the Khe Sanh playbook—by providing attractive targets, these outposts drew insurgents away from more critical populated areas and provided an opportunity to employ our advantages in firepower. I don’t know if this was actual planning, or after-the fact rationalizing. If it was the part of a deliberate plan, it doesn’t appear that we thought it through to ensure we could actually effectively employ that firepower and ability to maneuver/mass quickly (time/space calculations).

If the COPs are a reality, I agree with Ken that we need to be prepared to lose one every now and then—not based on gross incompetence, but by the nature of risk and the fact that the goddess of war does not always smile on us. However, understanding that kind of risk and likely bad occurrence from time to time, we ought to have our PA/Information plan set, as well as expectation management. Unfortunately, we are in a situation of expectation management, especially at home, that any action of more than a few dead or wounded is seen as a gross tactical mistake worthy of investigation and fault-finding.

I’m not stating that there is or isn’t fault in this case. I think it is worthy of study and reflection for how the larger campaign design either supports these outposts having a positive function, or how it can place them in untenable positions regardless of how well or poorly the perimeter is constructed. In the end, I’d state that the lack of popular support meant the lack of meaningful intel. The question is how to garner any popular support, even if minimal, without first establishing yourself in strength?

As an addendum, on the subject ofour COIN approach, I’m guessing that there is the additional option of small teams embedded in tribes or other governing structures. That could work. I’d say that if the political/social structure of governing supports a less static and visible place of governance, then this will work. However, at some point, the GoA must establish governing facilities that both symbolize and exercise their governing power. For example, the vaunted Combined Action Platoons(CAPs) in Vietnam took two main forms. The first was the compound CAP, where the CAP located itself, with its PF platoon and usually local government officials in a compound. This was usually coordinated in with the local battlespace owner for fire support and reinforcements (QRF), when/if there was a major attack. The other type of CAP was the mobile CAP which basically was on patrol 24/7 in its area of operations. It moved around constantly, depending upon its survival through the inability of VC to accurately predict where it would be, or even find it (at night). The mobile CAP was very effective in many instances in throwing the insurgents off and taking the initiative. However useful it was from a military sense, however, it was seen a sign of weakness in the political sense. Without an identifiable place to govern from, the local GVN looked like they lived in fear of the VC (which they did). At some point, the government had to establish a visible place to govern from in order to be legitimate.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[Pete]

When I look at the image in the link below I can't imagine why TRADOC would be averse to the idea of presenting more instruction on the construction of field fortifications. If I recall correctly the original Fort Monroe was designed by a French officer of engineers who found himself unemployed after the battle of Waterloo.

http://lh5.ggpht.com/_vXzyHAWg2g8/Ry...ian+Aerial.gif