FOB Keating attack repulsed

[Infanteer]

Thus, other than continued pointless frittering away of troops in overrun outposts there are two basic options. Fewer outposts with massive backup forces a short helicopter ride away (with all the military and political problems and shortfalls that entails) or careful selection of choke points to interdict the movement of the opponent -- we and they can only do so much with given terrain -- and a whole lot of foot and light vehicle mobile hunting teams on our part.

After seeing the recent Frontline episode on Helmand (see Abu Muqawama's blog) I'm not sure that plunking down bases in the middle of villages/populated areas is such a good idea any more. The locals know that those places are mortar and RPG magnets, and move away from them. After all, would you want to raise your kids in a place where slightly off-course rockets could kill them in the middle of the night?

On the topic of FOBs/COPs/Platoon Houses, why does "troops with the locals" necessarily have to have some sort of tactical infrastructure. How about a good old laager? A fellow Platoon Commander said that an established Patrol Base would last about 72 hours before the local insurgents started to figure out what was up.

It seems plausible that moving around in a village area every 24-72 hours would offer a reasonable alternative to a COP while still maintaining a footprint in a geographic area.

[Ken White]

It seems plausible that moving around in a village area every 24-72 hours would offer a reasonable alternative to a COP while still maintaining a footprint in a geographic area.

Less than 24 will leave them unable to do a decent recon and it will also not allow your troops to get into a routine. Keeps the opponent off balance which is where we should always try to place him.

Battalion I was in during the fun and frolic in Viet Nam had several firm rules -- one was no more than 24 hours for anyone, anywhere. We never got attacked in a static position. Most of us routinely moved after 12 hours or so. Another was a quarter of strength on patrols during the day and on ambushes at night -- we never got surprised. Other than two meeting engagements and one major operation where we were supposed to be holding force at the open end of a Valley and were awaited and pounced upon by the entire 18B NVA Regiment who had pulled a neat head fake on the Intel folks, we initiated every contact while I was there -- including the one where Kelly's Platoon chased a Troop of Black Gibbons for about five kilometers before the Gibbons decided they were tired of playing and took to the trees...

It just is not that hard to do it right. It really isn't. This stuff is easy, hard physically to do it right but the brain side is easy...

[Cavguy]

From an article dated Sept 22: (emphasis mine)

At Combat Outpost Lowell, about 110 U.S. and Afghan troops regularly visit the village of Kamu, which is right outside the base and has approximately 70 men. But the troops aren't able to patrol any of the other villages in the area, some of which are less than two miles away, because the security in the area is too precarious and the terrain surrounding their base is too rugged.

U.S. and Afghan forces at Combat Outpost Keating, also in Nurestan, are even more constrained. The base is about one mile from the Taliban-controlled village of Kamdesh, but more than 100 U.S. and Afghan troops there haven't set foot in the village in more than three months. On rare occasions, the elders from the local shura, or council, will come and discuss reconstruction projects with troops at the outpost.

The troops there could be put to far better use in other regions, said George, who first developed plans to shut down the two outposts in December. "They are protecting themselves in those areas, and the bottom line is that is not enough," he said. "They don't get off the base enough because of what it takes to defend those places and the security situation up there."

And this:

It seems this is COP Keating, occupied by 3-61 Cavalry, part of TF Mountain Warrior. From surveying all the open sources, it seems the COP outside the village was overrun and set on fire prior to being re-taken, and is now mostly burnt to the ground. The overall fight lasted approx 18h. Close air support was liberally used to support the troops. I recommend ABC's website because they have a reporter in the AO and also some information I couldn't find elsewhere. Heartening story below:

http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=8754347

Exclusive: Wounded U.S. Soldiers Refused to Leave Taliban Fight
Afghan Attacks: Darkness, Smoke Forced Medevac Doctors to Work by Touch
By KAREN RUSSO

KAMDESH, Afghanistan Oct. 5, 2009—

ABC News' Karen Russo was the only reporter to get to the scene of this weekend's bloody firefight between U.S. troops and hundreds of Taliban insurgents when she went in on a MEDEVAC helicopter. Here is her report:

Flying into the besieged Afghan base

during a nighttime firefight this weekend was a harrowing mix of overwhelming noise, stomach dropping maneuvers and shadows hurrying through the gloom.

When the chopper lifted off moments later with three wounded soldiers, it left behind others who were wounded but refused to be MEDEVACED out of the combat zone so they could return to fight with their buddies.

Fighting raged at two remote U.S. outposts near the Pakistan border this weekend, that left eight U.S. soldiers dead and 24 wounded. The battle was fought from Friday night through Sunday as hundreds of Taliban insurgents and their allies tried to overrun the Americans.

During the fighting, the insurgents succeeded in breaching the outer defense of the base at times before being repelled with the help of attack helicopters, fighter jets and drones. It was the bloodiest battle in a year for U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

During the fight, the MEDEVAC team at a nearby base waited - with both patience and frustration. MEDEVAC teams are known for flying into some of the most deadly areas in the world
to rescue injured soldiers. MEDEVAC helicopters are unarmed so they often need supporting aircraft to protect them, and sometimes the cover of darkness is their only defense.

On Saturday night, the team finally received the go-ahead as the sun set. Within moments of receiving the call, we rushed to the helicopter and quickly sped to the outposts.

As we were flying into the attack space, the MEDEVAC team with one medic and a doctor were preparing for the oncoming patients, setting up IV's, pulling out medical equipment and making other last minute preparations.

Apache helicopter gunships escorted us as we neared the combat zone to ensure our safety as we hovered at 10,000 feet awaiting word to descend. When word came, we plummeted in a corkscrew manner, making the descent in a matter of seconds, landing in a valley at the bottom of steep mountains. It felt very vulnerable to attack.

One of the pilots said that even though he had night vision goggles and ordinarily he can see in that sort of situation, because the fighting was intense there was so much smoke it was actually fogged over and it was difficult for him to see. Fortunately he could make out the landing zone, but it was touch and go.

Doctors in MEDEVAC Chopper Work By Touch.

Once on the ground, I hopped out of the chopper, but could see little other than smoke wafting through the moonlight, likely from a fire that was burning much of the base. Then I could make out the shadows of soldiers as they carried the wounded towards the helicopter.

Any noise of the conflict was drowned out by the propellers of the helicopter. The area smelled of burned out pine trees something one solider described as "death and hell."

Three wounded soldiers, one U.S. and two Afghan, were carried down the steep incline and quickly placed on the helicopter.

Some of the injured refused to be MEDEVACED out of the combat zone and continued to fight despite their wounds, according to soldiers at the base. Soldiers told the MEDEVAC crew that troops were donating blood during the battle, so it could be transfused into wounded comrades.

Between the gloom of night and the smoke, it was too dark to see much and the roar of the chopper made it almost impossible to hear commands.

I was quickly sort of touched by a crew member to get on the flight. I hopped on and even before I was on, the medical team was already working on the wounded.

Doctors wore night vision goggles, but still found it difficult to see. One doctor said it was like working by touch.

We were on the ground for a little more than five minutes, but in the chaos of noise and darkness, it felt like it could have been anything from 30 seconds to 30 minutes.

Moments later, the chopper lifted into the air and flew to the nearest medical facility. Despite the heroism of the crew, one of the soldiers died after reaching the facility. It wasn't immediately announced whether the soldier who died was American or Afghan.

Copyright © 2009 ABC News Internet Ventures

[Bill Moore]

I just heard second hand a recent pre-command course addressed by a very senior NCO was informed that if the prospective Commanders went on a FOB and the troops were wearing their pouches and gear in other than a uniform fashion, that unit was not disciplined.

This type of stupidity is "still" much too common within our senior NCO and Officer ranks. While we have all types, I admire the senior NCOs who enforce standards that matter such as maintaining physical fitness, combat skills, and taking care of Soldiers (pay, mail, discipline [not moronic uniform regulations], advising the commander on the men's readiness/morale, etc.). There are plenty of good ones out there, don't let this idiot taint your impression of the NCO Corps. Although I agree, after 8 plus years in combat, you would have thought we would have purged these weaker links.

The troops there could be put to far better use in other regions, said George, who first developed plans to shut down the two outposts in December. "They are protecting themselves in those areas, and the bottom line is that is not enough," he said. "They don't get off the base enough because of what it takes to defend those places and the security situation up there."

Well said. I'm sure the critics will keep jumping out of the wood work over this fire fight, but it appears to me the leadership identified the problem and were in the process of fixing it. Unfortunately, it takes time to plan the logistics and the IO message to support closing the COP. While news articles can be misleading, it appears that the troops handled themselves well, and based on the amount of fire support that "apparently" was available, it doesn't sound like the rules of engagement argument has any legs (as though it ever did). It's combat and ugly stuff happens. If we repeat the same mistakes, then voice your discontent. Losing any Soldier is tragic, losing eight Soldiers in one fire fight is esceptionally painful, but we didn't lose the battle nor the war. Our men held the line, give them the credit they're due.