FOB Keating attack repulsed

[PhilR]

Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.

You're correct, and I failed to make that distinction in my post. I'd add that laying out the COP itself is only one piece of the entire defensive battle, if it is conceived as such. I'd still assert that the COP specifically lends itself to some basic principles of fields of fire, observation, fortified postions, etc.

However, as you state, the defensive plan must take into account the larger context and purpose. Its here that the Duffer's Drift approach of thinking through the entire situation, and thinking about how reaction forces and reinforcements are introduced into that battle, become critical aspects. The defensive battle is much more than the COP itself and planned correctly, sets the conditions for successful offensive action (counterattack and pursuit).
s/f
Phil Ridderhof

[jcustis]

Again concur, but that may not fulfil the actual requirement for a village to a physical presence which the local population are demanding, and the formation commander wishes to address.

I think this is the precise mindset that misses the point. Are we assuming that the local population wants/needs that physical presence? Have we asked them what they want, and how the siting of a COP might influence the various cultural or economic

I'm not advocating being a Km away from the village one day, and then three villages over the next day. I'm thinking more along the lines of being on one side of the village one day, and then moving to the other side of the wadi that bisects it at dusk, and laagering on the other side during the coming night, all the while patrolling and making presence known during the witching hours.

When the Jan '09 provincial elections where occuring in Ninevah Province, we were asked by the IA commander for the area to be visible, but stay out of the towns as much as possible and allow his forces to work the issue. It was easier and tactically more sound to position LAV platoons/sections in overwatch of specific villages, where they were able to pick up and shift with very short notice. That's a very fluid and mobile capacity that you don't get with a COP, because it requires manpower to hold it if a quick reaction force has to sally forth to respond to a threat. We could have maintained influence through more aggressive patrolling if the situation warranted it, but just the perception of our presence went a long way to influencing the people to get out and vote. We do not have the boots on the ground to be COP centric, methinks, even if we are close to the towns/villages and populated areas. I believe COPs cause a cocoon effect at the worst time, and it is an effect that is more difficult to shift out of once it sets in.

Granted, this worked primarily because of the terrain that afforded good fields of fire with little effort, and the lack of a significant canal network to contend with. Infanteer and I have been exchanging PMs about his current experience in Afghanistan, since he is in a LAV-based unit as well, and things work differently for him due to the terrain. He and his troops has put the saddles away temporarily in favor of a more dismounted approach, and that works well because of many considerations he has to contend with.

I will relent that COPs are more likely required for the perceived welfare of our coalition partners who don't have the logistics, institutional memory or training, or will to stay out afield for long stretches of time. And yes, with the IA general mentioned above, you could time our joint ops with certain regularity. About 1600ish, they were packing up their inner cordon and search elements and heading home, regardless of whether the operation was completed and the entire area searched effectively.

Sorry to quibble, but this highlights a key problem area. What is a competent defensive position?

The Planning and Conduct of a defensive battle is very context dependant. Defending a COP is going to be very different from denying a river crossing to Combined Arms Battle Group, in almost every way.
What works in regular warfare, may not read across to irregular, or vice versa.

We still have not submitted these matters to any sort of rigour here, as you would say...

What are the differences? I'm still wondering, because all I see are similarities that are inherent with all defensive operations, minus perhaps the aspect of an entry control point and a less-permissive ROE, but that's it.

And to answer the rhetorical of what a competent defensive position is, my definition is any defensive preparation made with a deliberate approach that considers the desired effects of friendly weapon systems and maneuver (CATK for example) and the desired counter to enemy weapon systems or maneuver. It can be based on a checklist or SOP, or a more elaborate staff planning process, but it all comes down to making the synergy of combined arms work so that the enemy is forced to abandon a particular course of action, or take on a course of action that actually supports friendly action (like squeezing him into a kill sack).

[William F. Owen]

What are the differences? I'm still wondering, because all I see are similarities that are inherent with all defensive operations, minus perhaps the aspect of an entry control point and a less-permissive ROE, but that's it.

There are similarities taken in the broadest sense of defence.
However, I submit that with a COP and/or FOB, you have fixed site, and the enemy know where you are. Indeed they can have you under continuous observation. Routine may include base plate checks - something unique to a FOB/COP.
More over the base has to serve the purpose for which it was intended.

Defeating an enemy battle group is going to be done over several kilometres depth, and you will be trading ground to set up successive attacks on him. Under no circumstances are you going to sit in a fixed position, unless it is a very well dug-in and hidden hide, from where you will be cued into separate fire positions, to engage/ambush the enemy. If you are totally dismounted then the management and caching of stores and ammunition, also requires unique consideration, as does counter-attacking. Under no circumstances will you let the enemy detect you or sit still so he can dump the RAG on you.