Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
A good question which may better frame the debate here. I would be willing to agree with LTC Gentile that at the tactical level a majority units were beginning to do COIN ops well by early 2004. Some better than others, but enough. They did have certain higher level restrictions, such as imposed ISF handoff (often too early), and consolidation on FOBs. As stated, jr. leaders learned fast, and drove change at their levels but often their successes weren't exploited into larger gain due to the operational framework not being geared to support.

Operationally, I would probably cite the "tipping" point for operational doctrine as being located somewhere between second Fallujah in Nov 2004 and August 2005 when 3ACR conducted operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar. 3ACR's model certainly influenced 1/1 AD in Tal Afar and Ramadi, and application of the operational concepts facilitated the Awakening in Anbar. Operational design was key to both campaigns - weaving tactical, lethal and nonlethal actions together to create a breakthrough . I am sure some others can be cited, but It's not far off to suggest that we got operational together at the lower levels (BCT) in 2005. I would say we didn't get higher level operational together until early 2007, which I credit to Gen P implimenting a theater wide framework which syncronized what many BCT's were already doing to create greater effects, and expanding upon the opportunities the Awakening presented..

A first draft, and I'm quite open to challenge, just forming the thoughts as I type.
With my window on BCTs coming thropugh here I would say you are pretty close to my own sensing. You do bring up a critical point, that being uniformity of approach. The CTC program has done many great things for the Army; one that perhaps has been less positive is the institutionalization of great variance in BCT operations. While I would agree that some units "got it" when we started pushing "it" here in 2003 into 2004, some units did not. COIN was not even widely spoken of unitil the COIN Academy set up in Iraq. Much of what we did here used targeted effects and stability operations as the framing ideas--we were really doing (or at least teaching) COIN.

GEN P's promotion to 4 Star and posting to theater did much to push the ideas further--and there in provided what you say--a common standard.

Best

Tom