French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)

[Ken White]

I'd forgotten how many of those I'd read...

[Shek]

Ken and Jedburgh,

Thanks for the quick replies.

[taillat]

Maybe you will be surprised to learn that the first french edition of Counter-insurgency warfare by Galula was published.... last week!!!
Indeed, Galula is not well-known in France and this publication is the result of "Galulamania" in the US military (the collection in which it is published, doctrine et stratégie is led by gen. Vincent DESPORTES, head of French Army's Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, and a specialist of US Way of warfare).
Stéphane TAILLAT
PS: i recently posted on SWJ an english version of French Doctrine on stabilization ops.

[Shek]

Maybe you will be surprised to learn that the first french edition of Counter-insurgency warfare by Galula was published.... last week!!!
Indeed, Galula is not well-known in France and this publication is the result of "Galulamania" in the US military (the collection in which it is published, doctrine et stratégie is led by gen. Vincent DESPORTES, head of French Army's Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, and a specialist of US Way of warfare).
Stéphane TAILLAT
PS: i recently posted on SWJ an english version of French Doctrine on stabilization ops.

Stephane,

Do you know why his writings weren't as popular in France?

A matter of timing, perhaps (Pacification in Algeria was published in 1963 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice was published in 1964, both of them written with how to prescriptions but about conflicts already past history for France)?

[taillat]

The main reason why Galula never was popular in French Military is because he was unknown... Note that his celebrity started in the US after his resignation from french army!
A second reason is linked with french experience on guerilla, counter-guerilla and many stabilization ops (or even intervention in West and Black Africa between 1960 and today): the lessons learned and (informal) practices we gained in this period was much more than Galula's one during his experience in Greece, China and Algeria. Others have gained more reputation. Bigeard and Massu (though they weren't using the same coin procedures as Galula) are a good example, as well as gen. DELOYEN who fought againt guerilla in Indochina, in Algeria and in Tchad. Trinquier is best known because of its role in the creation of Groupement Commando Aéroportés (anti-vietminh indigenous maquis during the first Indochina War). French experiences in Indochina and in Algeria gave birth to an original way of doing COIN which differs slightly from Galula's Pacification in Algeria. This latter book was written for US public and especially US military concerned by Vietnam. I wonder if Galula would have written it, as well as Counter-insurgency warfare the same way if it was for french readers.
Last: under De Gaulle, COIN formal Doctrine (Guerre révolutionnaire if you want, though it seems that this term refers to much more than precise procedures and principles) was abandonned because it was politically charged. In French military today, COIN does not refer to Algeria, but mainly with African Contingency or past colonial experiences (Gallieni, Lyautey...)

It appears to me that Galula is much more american than french:his principles relies on Mao's one more than on french tradition of "pacification by oil spot". Unlike french, american military establishment in the 60s lacks concrete experience in counter-guerrilla: Galula's fresh one was a good new!

Stéphane Taillat

[Ken White]

spot theory in the US Army in the early sixties and there were units in Viet Nam that used it -- until they got caught and were told to 'search and destroy' -- I happened to be lucky enough to be in one and more lucky to have a commander who told MACV to flake off, he'd fight his own war. He did and did it well.

Search and destroy techniques most on the ground knew intuitively were wrong and unworkable. However the four star commanders from late 1961 until late 1968 believed in them, therefor the staffs and subordinate generals espoused it (which is not the same thing as believing in it). Pity...

Seven long years.

[John Nagl]

Galula's influence has been far greater in the United States than in France for several reasons. One is that by the time he was writing, France was trying to forget its experience in Algeria; I would draw a parallel with the US after Vietnam. However, Galula's experience in Algeria was highly valued by Steve Hosmer at RAND (who is running an "Airpower in COIN" conference in DC next week--still engaged in intellectual leadership in COIN 45 years after the conference at which he recognized Galula's gifts!)

See http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...6/algeria.html for a brief summary of Galula's thinking, with links to the landmark 1963 study Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (with a great new intro by Bruce Hoffman) that Galula distilled into Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.

Another reason is that Galula did his best writing in English. In fact, Theory and Practice has just been published in French for the first time, with an introduction by General David Petraeus; see http://www.amazon.fr/Contre-insurrec...1344958&sr=8-1

We relied heavily on Galula's insights when writing FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.