I think Galula has achieved cult-like status in the Army because his insights resonate with our experiences. As I've written elsewhere, I did not read Galula until I returned from my first OIF tour, despite spending 2002-2004 at Fort Leavenworth in CGSC/SAMS (Trinquier--yes; Galula--no). Reading COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE in 2005 constituted a series of ephiphanies, of "Oh--that's why that worked (or didn't)." I had been privileged to be the S3 for perhaps the most gifted natural counterinsurgent I've ever encountered (I have no idea if he had read Galula or not), but had no theory to explain what I had practiced until finding this book.

Again, it's hard to understate how underprepared the Army was for this kind of fight, or at least the non-kinetic portions of it. In contrast, in the mid-intensity conflict at Najaf Cemetery, our battalion knew exactly what to do. It was what we had prepared for all our professional lives (albeit on interesting terrain and with a rather unique fire control problem). Likewise as part of the isolating/screening force for Second Fallujah. But in the "war amongst the people" in Kadhamiya and Arab Jabour, we were all "play by ear," and "trial and error."

Galula filled a gap--at least partially. And it's hard not to credit (at least partially) adoption of his general framework for the improvements of 2007. But there is still much work to do in creating a comprehensive doctrine for 21st century warfare.

Doug