French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)

[Mark O'Neill]

Whilst 'dipping my lid' to John's superior knowledge of the FM 3-24 drafting process, and acknowledging Doug's views regarding the resonance and or usefulness of Galula, I would contend that there is a lot more in FM 3-24 (and our current strategy) than just Galula and that people can easily overstate the case.

'Galula' themes in the FM 3-24 are readily apparent- particularly in its population centric emphasis. However, equally apparent are ideas that could easily be sheeted home to the British doctrine of the 70s and 80s. For example, there are similarities to ideas that could be attributed to Kitson and Thompson (amongst others). It may be claimed that both men were influenced by Galula (his major work came out first) but that claim will be proven spurious when you look at both men's record and read their published works. Other ideas clearly have a lineage with historical precedence in colonial activity (British and American) prior to WWII and into the 19th century. The FM also contains advice in parts that could be viewed, perhaps unkindly, but in my opinion perhaps not, as 'post 9-11, post modernist BS'.

So where does that leave us? Well, Galula has obviously had influence - but he is not alone. He is not pre-eminent in the education we are currently offering coalition troops prior to their entry into the battle space (or the ongoing dialogue we have with them in theatre). He is one of many theorists that are called upon to help understanding as people develop the COIN 'thinking' skills essential to the ongoing 'learning and adaptation' that the fight requires.

It follows that we are not accepting one 'historical' view and basing our education and strategy solely on that. We use history, where appropriate, to inform development of strategy ,options and thought. Despite the assertions of some post 9-11, and then again during the development of the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, not much of what actually occurs on the ground is turning out to be ahistorical. The counterinsurgency 'things' that are working now have worked in various ways before, in other places. And many of the insurgents are doing 'the same old thing'. If you doubt that, read Gwynn's 1934 chapter observing issues with the 'Pathans'....

I have observed that often those who attack a particular approach to the 'counterinsurgency problem' do so for seemingly one (or a combination) of three reasons: they have 'patented' an alternate view (which may or may not be a source of income/influence; they really do not have a view at all but like the attention being a critic garners; or they do not understand and attack from a position of partial or total ignorance. None of these are helpful.

Regarding Gian's concern that FM3-24 is supplanting other doctine in people's reading lists. If that is the case, US military doctrine is in desperate need of a new readership. I have been straw polling groups ( comprising E 7 and O3 upwards) of inbound BCT/ RCT and MiTT/ NPTT. If 40% of them, on average, confess to having read FM 3-24 , then we have a well informed group. The 'right' people appear to be reading it, but it seems to be fallacious to regard its reading as anywhere near universal, even at this relatively late stage of proceedings.

Galula has his place. So does history. Neither are the answer in their own right, but can be part of a sound problem solving approach to the issue of countering insurgency. Overstating Galula's acknowledged influence (on either the FM or current operational thinking) does not do much to clarify or raise understanding of current activities.

Cheers,

Mark