French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)

[John T. Fishel]

your posts more than you intended. I certainly agree that we need to have balanced education, training and doctrine. I am not so concerned with a temporary imbalance if, when it rights itself, it does so without throwing out the baby with the bath water (to mix metaphors all over the place). My concern is that the Army has a historical tendency to overcorrect and has done so not once but many times. Still, I hope you are right but as General Sullivan put it, "Hope is Not a Method."

Cheers

JohnT

[Eden]

I always hesitate to weigh in on these Iraq-centric threads because all my operational experience was in Afghanistan, but I do have one observation on this thread and a question for those of you who served in our big small war.

First, the observation. The post-Vietnam army did forget about COIN, but not as a result of terminal absent-mindedness. The Army I joined, one faced with an actual existential threat from the Soviet Union, was still mired in the jungles of Indochina. The cavalry unit I joined -and this is in the early 80's-trained as if we were headed back to the jungle instead of the north German plain, and our leaders at the time made a conscious decision to wrench our focus back to conventional, high-intensity combat. I think this was a good thing, given the world we lived in at the time; the point is, we turned our face away from counterinsurgency on purpose.

My question relates to COIN at the operational level. I don't know when we got it right tactically in Iraq - that is, at the battalion/brigade level - but I assume our junior leaders and NCOs proved to be quick studies, as they always are. But, when did we, or have we yet, break the code at the operational level? That is, when did we learn to properly orchestrate our efforts across the entire theater in a coherent campaign? My observation in Afghanistan was that our operational concept was bankrupt; our tactical successes did not add up to operational success because they were bereft of any context. It was the Kaiserschlacht in a small war setting. Is the same true in Iraq?

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Eden--

I found your observation on the post-Vietnam Army particularly interesting especially the lag time between Dupuy's 1976 FM 100-5 doctrine and what troops in Germany were doing even into the 80s. From my perspective during that period - the schoolhouse and Southcom - we were solely focused on the Fulda Gap. COIN and all other small wars got short shrift. Sorta shows to go ya that where you stand really does depend on where you sit.

I won't even take a crack at your question - haven't been there. While I have my ideas about both places, I'll wait and see what the boots on the ground have to say.

Cheers

JohnT

[Cavguy]

My question relates to COIN at the operational level. I don't know when we got it right tactically in Iraq - that is, at the battalion/brigade level - but I assume our junior leaders and NCOs proved to be quick studies, as they always are. But, when did we, or have we yet, break the code at the operational level? That is, when did we learn to properly orchestrate our efforts across the entire theater in a coherent campaign? My observation in Afghanistan was that our operational concept was bankrupt; our tactical successes did not add up to operational success because they were bereft of any context. It was the Kaiserschlacht in a small war setting. Is the same true in Iraq?

A good question which may better frame the debate here. I would be willing to agree with LTC Gentile that at the tactical level a majority units were beginning to do COIN ops well by early 2004. Some better than others, but enough. They did have certain higher level restrictions, such as imposed ISF handoff (often too early), and consolidation on FOBs. As stated, jr. leaders learned fast, and drove change at their levels but often their successes weren't exploited into larger gain due to the operational framework not being geared to support.

Operationally, I would probably cite the "tipping" point for operational doctrine as being located somewhere between second Fallujah in Nov 2004 and August 2005 when 3ACR conducted operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar. 3ACR's model certainly influenced 1/1 AD in Tal Afar and Ramadi, and application of the operational concepts facilitated the Awakening in Anbar. Operational design was key to both campaigns - weaving tactical, lethal and nonlethal actions together to create a breakthrough . I am sure some others can be cited, but It's not far off to suggest that we got operational together at the lower levels (BCT) in 2005. I would say we didn't get higher level operational together until early 2007, which I credit to Gen P implimenting a theater wide framework which syncronized what many BCT's were already doing to create greater effects, and expanding upon the opportunities the Awakening presented..

A first draft, and I'm quite open to challenge, just forming the thoughts as I type.

[Tom Odom]

A good question which may better frame the debate here. I would be willing to agree with LTC Gentile that at the tactical level a majority units were beginning to do COIN ops well by early 2004. Some better than others, but enough. They did have certain higher level restrictions, such as imposed ISF handoff (often too early), and consolidation on FOBs. As stated, jr. leaders learned fast, and drove change at their levels but often their successes weren't exploited into larger gain due to the operational framework not being geared to support.

Operationally, I would probably cite the "tipping" point for operational doctrine as being located somewhere between second Fallujah in Nov 2004 and August 2005 when 3ACR conducted operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar. 3ACR's model certainly influenced 1/1 AD in Tal Afar and Ramadi, and application of the operational concepts facilitated the Awakening in Anbar. Operational design was key to both campaigns - weaving tactical, lethal and nonlethal actions together to create a breakthrough . I am sure some others can be cited, but It's not far off to suggest that we got operational together at the lower levels (BCT) in 2005. I would say we didn't get higher level operational together until early 2007, which I credit to Gen P implimenting a theater wide framework which syncronized what many BCT's were already doing to create greater effects, and expanding upon the opportunities the Awakening presented..

A first draft, and I'm quite open to challenge, just forming the thoughts as I type.

With my window on BCTs coming thropugh here I would say you are pretty close to my own sensing. You do bring up a critical point, that being uniformity of approach. The CTC program has done many great things for the Army; one that perhaps has been less positive is the institutionalization of great variance in BCT operations. While I would agree that some units "got it" when we started pushing "it" here in 2003 into 2004, some units did not. COIN was not even widely spoken of unitil the COIN Academy set up in Iraq. Much of what we did here used targeted effects and stability operations as the framing ideas--we were really doing (or at least teaching) COIN.

GEN P's promotion to 4 Star and posting to theater did much to push the ideas further--and there in provided what you say--a common standard.

Best

Tom