War's Risks Include Toll on Training Values

[GorTex6]

New York Times

Military experts say that the first principle of counterinsurgency warfare, and its greatest difficulty, is to separate enemy fighters from the local population from which they draw strength. But as details emerge about the killings of Iraqi civilians in Haditha and Hamandiyah, it seems increasingly clear that some American troops have come to see the population itself as the enemy.

"In cases where you fail to defeat the insurgency, you sometimes adopt out of frustration increasingly ruthless methods to try to defeat the insurgents," said Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., a retired Army officer and a counterinsurgency expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a research group that studies military issues.

Sometimes that frustration can manifest not in sheer brutality, but in the troops operating on a hair trigger, as seemed to happen last week in Kabul. American soldiers reportedly fired shots into an angry crowd and killed four people after an American military vehicle crashed into civilian cars, prompting protests.

Separate those who refuse to "get it" from the warriors and assign permanent FOBBIT duties, like watching the ice point, checking IDs at the DEFAC/PX, or riding shotgun in the poop sucker truck. They can apply that same level of "enthusiam" on the next CSM that forgot his/her ID

[GorTex6]

Operational IEDs

The question of what operational art means in Fourth Generation war remains open. I don’t know of any general answer. The problem is that the enemy’s strategic hinges, or centers of gravity, tend to be intangible: how do you use tactical engagements or operational maneuver to strike targets such as family or clan honor, gang loyalties, ideological convictions or belief in a particular god? After World War II, the most operationally competent armies in the world were the Red Army and the IDF. Yet both lost Fourth Generation wars, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Israelis in Lebanon, because they could not figure out how to act operationally against 4GW enemies. Reduced to fighting an endless series of strategically meaningless tactical engagements, both were forced to withdraw. The U.S. military now finds itself in the same situation in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Unfortunately, it appears our Fourth Generation opponents have figured out a way to act operationally against us. I touched on this in an earlier column, but as I thought more about it, I decided that what is happening deserves fuller consideration. What our opponents are doing is brilliantly simple. By relying mostly on IEDs to attack us, they have created a situation where our troops have no one to shoot back at. That, in turn, ramps up the troops’ frustration level to the point where two things happen: our morale collapses and our troops take their frustration out on the local population. Both results have strategic significance, and at least the potential of being strategically decisive, the first because it affects American home front morale and the second because it drives the local population to identify with the insurgents instead of the government we are trying to support.

The second operational effect, getting U.S. troops to take out their frustration on the local population, was illustrated in what an officer whose unit recently came back from Iraq said to me. “We were hit 3000 times and in only fifteen of those attacks did we have anyone to shoot back at,” he told me. He quoted another officer in the battalion who had gone out on patrol many times as saying, “We are worse than the SS in the way we are treating these people,” meaning Iraqi civilians. This is a classic result of “the war of the flea:” as morale collapses, so does discipline, and poorly disciplined troops often treat local civilians badly.

[GorTex6]

The Power of Weakness, Again

The investigations of Marines for possible murders of Iraqi civilians in Haditha last November and, more recently, in Hamdaniyah, seem set to follow the usual course. If anyone is found guilty, it will be privates and sergeants. The press will reassure us that the problem was just a few “bad apples,” that higher-ups had no knowledge of what was going on, and that “99.9%” of our troops in Iraq are doing a splendid job of upholding, indeed enforcing, human rights. It’s called the “Abu Ghraib precedent.”

The fact that senior Marine and Army leaders don’t seem to know what is going on in cases like this is a sad comment on them. Far from being exceptional incidents caused by a few bad soldiers or Marines, mistreatment of civilians by the forces of an occupying power are a central element of Fourth Generation war. They are one of the main reasons why occupiers tend to lose. Haditha, Hamdaniyah and the uncountable number of incidents where U.S. troops abused Iraqi civilians less severely than by killing them are a direct product of war waged by the strong against the weak.

There are, of course, lesser causes as well, and it is on the lesser causes that we tend to focus. Poor leadership in a unit easily opens the door to misconduct. Overstretched, overtired units snap more easily. Every military service in history has included a certain percentage of criminals, and a larger percentage of bullies. The fact that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgencies are getting stronger, not weaker, generates increasing frustration among our troops: nothing they do seems to yield any real progress. The enemy’s highly effective use of IEDs leads units that have been hit often and hard to take their frustrations out on the civilian populations, since they cannot find, identify or shoot back at the people who are hitting them........

[Jedburgh]

I really hate the pseudo-intellectual sound of "4GW Warfare". It's simply age-old guerrilla warfare for Christ's sake. And "operational IED's" my ass. It's just another type of ambush, which tactic has been used by irregular forces against organized military units since time immemorial. The tactical ambush has evolved as weapons evolved, from bows-and-arrows, to matchlocks, to automatic weapons and AP mines - the IED is simply another turn on a very old coin. No need to make it out to be more than it is.

And there's also no need to psycho-analyze the troops - the frustration and over-reaction of conventionally trained troops to continued harassment by an amorphous enemy is also old as the hills. Given the situation, we do a bit better than previous examples because our guys are all volunteers and far better trained and equipped than the mass conscript armies that have historically been placed in such situations. But there still comes a point of breakdown - and that's at the NCO leadership level in this type of war.

Of course, if you want more hits on a website, better bullets on an OER, or just to cash in on the new popularity of UW/COIN, then keep on reinventing the wheel, and plenty of colorful new terminology to go along with it...

[SWJED]

I really hate the pseudo-intellectual sound of "4GW Warfare". It's simply age-old guerrilla warfare for Christ's sake. And "operational IED's" my ass. It's just another type of ambush, which tactic has been used by irregular forces against organized military units since time immemorial. The tactical ambush has evolved as weapons evolved, from bows-and-arrows, to matchlocks, to automatic weapons and AP mines - the IED is simply another turn on a very old coin. No need to make it out to be more than it is.

And there's also no need to psycho-analyze the troops - the frustration and over-reaction of conventionally trained troops to continued harassment by an amorphous enemy is also old as the hills. Given the situation, we do a bit better than previous examples because our guys are all volunteers and far better trained and equipped than the mass conscript armies that have historically been placed in such situations. But there still comes a point of breakdown - and that's at the NCO leadership level in this type of war.

Of course, if you want more hits on a website, better bullets on an OER, or just to cash in on the new popularity of UW/COIN, then keep on reinventing the wheel, and plenty of colorful new terminology to go along with it...

Well said and spot-on....

[slapout9]

Before I found this website I thought 4GW was a car.

[GorTex6]

I really hate the pseudo-intellectual sound of "4GW Warfare". It's simply age-old guerrilla warfare for Christ's sake. And "operational IED's" my ass. It's just another type of ambush, which tactic has been used by irregular forces against organized military units since time immemorial. The tactical ambush has evolved as weapons evolved, from bows-and-arrows, to matchlocks, to automatic weapons and AP mines - the IED is simply another turn on a very old coin. No need to make it out to be more than it is.

And there's also no need to psycho-analyze the troops - the frustration and over-reaction of conventionally trained troops to continued harassment by an amorphous enemy is also old as the hills. Given the situation, we do a bit better than previous examples because our guys are all volunteers and far better trained and equipped than the mass conscript armies that have historically been placed in such situations. But there still comes a point of breakdown - and that's at the NCO leadership level in this type of war.

Of course, if you want more hits on a website, better bullets on an OER, or just to cash in on the new popularity of UW/COIN, then keep on reinventing the wheel, and plenty of colorful new terminology to go along with it...

Is that why all the "experts" knew it all thus far? Three years ago the US military could not spell counterinsurgency. COIN? As in coin check?

[Steve Blair]

I really hate the pseudo-intellectual sound of "4GW Warfare". It's simply age-old guerrilla warfare for Christ's sake. And "operational IED's" my ass. It's just another type of ambush, which tactic has been used by irregular forces against organized military units since time immemorial. The tactical ambush has evolved as weapons evolved, from bows-and-arrows, to matchlocks, to automatic weapons and AP mines - the IED is simply another turn on a very old coin. No need to make it out to be more than it is.

I've always had that feeling about 4GW, especially when authors like to try to date its "start" as right around Mao's time. It goes back MUCH farther than that, and if anything I would see it more as a socio-political outgrowth of the much-discussed 3GW style of battle. Instead of finding physical weak points in the enemy's lines you're using different methods and weapons to find different weak points. It's just a wider take on warfare than perhaps we've seen in some time.

However, if you look back at the USMC Small Wars Manual and the actions that the army took in the Philippeans around the turn of the 19th-20th century, you see some of the same issues and awareness as we're "discovering" now. The Frontier Army between 1866 and 1891 had to deal with a hostile press, an enemy who could easily blend in with his more peaceful neighbors, and a combat strength that wasn't totally adequate to the task being asked of it. There was also a major "culture shock" for officers who'd just come out of the Civil War. In the end, only a handful really became skilled at Indian war, or what might be now called unconventional war or small wars. When you add the rampant corruption in the Indian Bureau, the folks who were handling what we might now call pacification and hearts and minds programs, the Army back then faced a pretty stacked deck. So I guess you could say that we've "been here before," just in a different time and somewhat different context. And those same officers, for the most part, later went on to the Philippeans.

[Jedburgh]

...However, if you look back at the USMC Small Wars Manual and the actions that the army took in the Philippines around the turn of the 19th-20th century, you see some of the same issues and awareness as we're "discovering" now......So I guess you could say that we've "been here before," just in a different time and somewhat different context. And those same officers, for the most part, later went on to the Philippines.

Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines 1899 - 1902

The United States topples an unsavory regime in relatively brief military action, suffering a few hundred fatalities. America then finds itself having to administer a country unaccustomed to democratic self-rule. Caught unawares by an unexpectedly robust insurgency, the United States struggles to develop and implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The ongoing US presidential campaign serves as a catalyst to polarize public opinion, as the insurrectionists step up their offensive in an unsuccessful attempt to unseat the incumbent Republican President.

These events—from a century ago—share a number of striking parallels with the events of 2003 and 2004. The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was America’s first major combat operation of the 20th century. The American policy of rewarding support and punishing opposition in the Philippines, called “attraction and chastisement,” was an effective operational strategy. By eliminating insurgent resistance, the campaign successfully set the conditions necessary for achieving the desired end-state.

...and another perspective: US Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War

There is one respect in which the Iraqi insurgency differs considerably from that which unfolded in the Philippines. The insurrectos of the latter conflict had a clearly defined political agenda that they aggressively marketed to their fellow citizens. Rebel commanders distributed public letters arguing their case, appealing to sentiments of patriotism, nationalism, and self-sovereignty. Their message, quite simply, was that the Philippines should be ruled by Filipinos, without interference from an unelected colonial government.

Today, by contrast, it is the United States that is attempting to create an Iraq that is ruled by Iraqis, while it is insurgents who wish to reassert the tyranny of an unelected minority over the rest of their country. Perhaps this is why there is no political wing to the Iraqi insurgency; no Baathist equivalent to Emilio Aguinaldo or Ho Chi Minh; no videotaped messages left behind by the suicide bombers for broadcast on Al Jazeera. Their cause hides in the shadows; its only public manifestation is violence. Indeed, the most unusual feature of this insurgency is its steadfast refusal to articulate any set of principles before the world. Thus, in the face of such nihilistic terrorism, the United States has an ideological advantage absent in many “small wars” of our past. In the Iraqi counterinsurgency, a great deal of history remains to be written.

[Tom Odom]

I've always had that feeling about 4GW, especially when authors like to try to date its "start" as right around Mao's time. It goes back MUCH farther than that, and if anything I would see it more as a socio-political outgrowth of the much-discussed 3GW style of battle. Instead of finding physical weak points in the enemy's lines you're using different methods and weapons to find different weak points. It's just a wider take on warfare than perhaps we've seen in some time.

However, if you look back at the USMC Small Wars Manual and the actions that the army took in the Philippeans around the turn of the 19th-20th century, you see some of the same issues and awareness as we're "discovering" now. The Frontier Army between 1866 and 1891 had to deal with a hostile press, an enemy who could easily blend in with his more peaceful neighbors, and a combat strength that wasn't totally adequate to the task being asked of it. There was also a major "culture shock" for officers who'd just come out of the Civil War. In the end, only a handful really became skilled at Indian war, or what might be now called unconventional war or small wars. When you add the rampant corruption in the Indian Bureau, the folks who were handling what we might now call pacification and hearts and minds programs, the Army back then faced a pretty stacked deck. So I guess you could say that we've "been here before," just in a different time and somewhat different context. And those same officers, for the most part, later went on to the Philippeans.

Agree 110% (is that possible?)

Also on Lind

After World War II, the most operationally competent armies in the world were the Red Army and the IDF. Yet both lost Fourth Generation wars, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Israelis in Lebanon, because they could not figure out how to act operationally against 4GW enemies.

His references to the Red "God" of war and the IDF show a shallowness of thought process First of all holding up the Soviet Army after WWII as an operationally superior machine is a red herring (forgive me, I just can't help myself sometimes). The Red Army didn't directly fight anyone of note until Afghanistan. And despite the popularity of idolizing the Red Army during WWII by certain historians (especially Russian), the Red Army and larger Soviet Union never fought alone on the gobal battlefield. The UK did after the fall of France and in that interim until the German invasion of the USSR bore the brunt of German military power. As the Soviet machine grew in power so did its Allies with a parallel reduction of the Axis powers. Italy was essentially out of the war as a combatant in Sep 1943. The last major Japanese offensive was the Midway-Aleutians operation in June 1942; afterwards, Japan could only mount a strategic defense. Where exactly Lind gets his premise that the post-WWII Red Army was one of 2 "most operationally competent" armies is unclear.

As for the other "most operationally competent army" the IDF, give me a break. The IDF has won impressive victories no doubt but without achieving a strategic aim. 1956 was a COMBINED operation with the French and Brits. 1967 was a fisaco of the first degree--especially on the Sinai front. 1973 was a much closer run thing than the Israelis expected; the Golan very nearly collapsed and the Egyptians bloodied the IDF and especially the IAF badly. Again, Lind's claim as an argument for showing how devastating "4GW" can be that these 2 superior machines met their match on a 4GW battlefield starts weak and gets weaker.

Unconventional and conventional warfare are defined according to the era in which they take place. What is unconventional today was more or less conventional on the American frontier (at least to the American military). Queen Victoria's army fought frontier wars for decades; and despite all its quirks (and maybe because of them) the British Army was quite effective. That same Army's leaders proved disastrous in France in WWI.

Again, new "ideas" are often nothing more than new "slogans".

Personally when it comes to military thought, I adhere to the title of Sean Connery's last Bond movie: Never Say Never Again

Best
tom