How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

[Tukhachevskii]

...of my days at Uni came flooding back after reading some of the above posts (I had a particular fondness for Soviet Military Thought; hence my moniker). I understand, wholly, the confusion around the Operational level of war; even my lecturers had trouble defining this one. Personally, I prefer Svechin's definition because of its pragmatic rather than dogmatic/doctrinal bent;

"tactics makes the steps of which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path"

In Soviet military science and strategic thought any physical combat between units of any size was defined as a "tactical action" regarding boi (combat /fighting in the literal sense). Operations loosely refered to all the competencies, manoevres, resource allocations, planning and logistics required to get a particular unit to a particular location to secure a particular objective or acheive a particular mission. Soviet Divisional, Army, Army Group and Front level forward detachments (anything from coy to Reg/Div in size) regardless of the manourvere they were conducting (tactical forward reconnaissance, seizure of a bridge, an OMG, etc) were considered to be engaged in tactics once in actual contact with the enemy.

Confusingly, Edward Luttwak defined operational art and the operational level of war as that doman within which units tasked with strategic objectives conducted "relational manouvre" prior to their units shaking out and engaging in tactical level actions to attain their missions. (I have a pdf if anyone is interested enough to bother requesting it)

The way I figure it, Operational art, concerns the unification of tactical actions and their harmonisation with strategic requirements through the campaign. Operational art, therefore, (or, at least from what I was taught) concerns campaigns (multiple battles and objectives) whereas tactics concerns singular engagements. The old school definition for what we now call the operational level was "grand tactics". I think there's a clue in there somewhere.

Anyway, here are some other texts which may help/hinder/cloud further understanding;

David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Art of War: Part I" and "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part 2" in Parameters, 1987.

J. J. Schnieder, "Origins of Operational Art" in Parameters, 1987.

John Kiszely, "Thinking about the Operational Level", RUSI.

Col. M. R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art".

See also, Martin Dunn, "Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels?", who defines operational art as ...

...The Operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. it is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

This has probably confused things terribly but then again, in the spirit of my namesake, why not?

[GI Zhou]

In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24, Simpkin wrote that

operational art is manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.

My refences are:

Svechin, A.A. Strategy, East View Publications, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 68. This is a translation of his 1927 work, Strategiia, printed in Moscow by Voennyi vestnick.

Kamanev, S.S. ‘Ocherednye voennye zadachi’, (Successive military objectives), in Voprosy strategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940) , Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 149 – 152cited in Glantz, D.M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 21; and

Tukhachevsky, M.N. ‘Voina’ (War,), 1926, in Voprosystrategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940),Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 104-105, cited in Glantz, op. cit., p. 22.

Wilf, message me your email address and I will send you my PhD and book.

Secondly could someone show me how to do use the quotation boxes please.(Mod's note PM sent earlier).

Cheers,

GI Zhou 0337 hrs

[Tukhachevskii]

In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24,

IMO, this is a very problematic book. Simpkin knew his stuff, undoubtedly, but it's the use to which he put said stuff that raise numerous issues for me at least.

[Pete]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces! Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the same name! This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

[Steve Blair]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces. Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the ssame name. This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

I think it depends on whose comments and threads you follow, Pete. I (for one) have been deeply concerned by the (strong) possibility that the Army would repeat the post-Vietnam mistake of burying Small Wars training. While mine may be a minority concern, it is one that others here do share (with their own reasons and reasoning, to be sure, as well as their own takes on the situation and possible solutions). Prolific posters do not necessarily indicate a consensus opinion on this or any other forum.

[Entropy]

Wilf,

Just because you conduct "Operations," it does not follow that there is something called an "Operational Level." What we are all talking about is reaping the benefits of success at the tactical level. That is not enabled by dreaming up something called the "Operational Level." - Sherman knew how to apply tactics to fulfil his contribution to the strategy - so he conducted an operation to make sure the tactical actions were relevant to that.

I don't really have a dog in this argument about levels of war, but to play the devil's advocate, could not the "operational level" be the coordination of various bureaucratic fighting organizations toward strategy fulfillment? In other words, "joint" and "coalition" operations may constitute an "operational level" of war - the coordination of different forces which use different equipment, tactics and doctrine all toward a common purpose?

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
I don't really have a dog in this argument

Get a dog. Chap can't go wrong with a good dog!

about levels of war, but to play the devil's advocate, could not the "operational level" be the coordination of various bureaucratic fighting organizations toward strategy fulfillment? In other words, "joint" and "coalition" operations may constitute an "operational level" of war - the coordination of different forces which use different equipment, tactics and doctrine all toward a common purpose?

You could. How would it help? It would still fall foul of confusing strategy with tactics. IMO Operations assure that tactics take place in at the right time and place to fulfil the military contribution to strategy - so to get back the Falklands, Battle Group attacks had to take place, on the Falklands. -Thus you have "Operation Corporate."

[Ken White]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum.

All sorts of stuff...

I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine. Instead, the U.S. Army's institutional response to the small wars situation, FM 3-24, has, along with the horse it rode in on, been thoroughly torn to pieces!

Seems to me that dissecting FM 3-24 would be totally consistent with your "address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine" comment...

I for one said it was deficient in that it was too long, too esoteric and roamed into policy matters not the Armed forces business among other things. A number of suggestions for improvement have been offered by many.

Several here got involved in getting the Army to allow comments to several new manuals in open forum here. I don't recall your contributions to that effort, so could you remind if you partook or not?

Now you guys are complaining about a 1980s version of FM 100-5, a manual that doesn't even exist anymore under the same name!

I think you missed a number of things.

- This thread started last year with a link to a monograph published by internationally respected military thinkers 16 Sep 09. That's fairly current. In that monograph, the authors contend that the US Army lost the bubble by getting wrapped around 'the operational art.' A contention with which I agree. Whats' your opinion?

- That monograph was linked and comments were solicited. Some comments did indeed address the old 100-5 but in direct reference to the Monograph . Those all ceased last October with Comment #28. None of the 27 additional comments in the current sub-thread started by ChrisJM yesterday address FM 100-5 -- except yours...

This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

Well, we could discuss WW I in greater detail I guess...

Neat thing is that participation is not mandatory.

[GI Zhou]

In 1993 my brother was in Saint Petersburg as a guest of the then new government. He was with a group of very senior officers who offered a toast. One officer offered the toast to the government. he was over ruled with the expression, (censored) the government, TO THE TSAR! My brother felt distinctly uncomfortable, as we are republicans, being our forefathers were Fenians and all. Selected by the best British judges on the first assisted migration scheme to Australia.

Lest anyone thinks that Afghanistan or Iraq were/are small wars per se, how many tens of billions and tens of thousands of soldiers have been or have set foot in country. How many soldiers are in Afghanistan now? To me that is a pretty big war.

It is on many fronts, with different players, and at stake is no less than the survival of the state. Many of the issues that faced Lenin, Trotsky et al.

Many people, well officers, grappled with what term to describe hunting small groupos of insurgents bent on causing havoc in isolated areas. Low Level Conflict was one until one is reminded the entire Australian Defence Force was deployed. All that training and doctrine paid dividends in the 1990s onwards, from East Timor onwards.

[Pete]

That monograph was linked and comments were solicited. Some comments did indeed address the old 100-5 but in direct reference to the monograph.

Ken, you and I discussed the operational level of war and its origin in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 in this thread a few months ago. (Gosh, when a first sergeant has got your number it can turn into a long, long tour of duty ... )

[Ken White]

Ken, you and I discussed the operational level of war and its origin in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 in this thread a few months ago. (Gosh, when a first sergeant has got your number it can turn into a long, long tour of duty ... )

though I'm unsure what that has to with your post in this current sub-thread.

Does that mean you and I were wrong for discussing a manual that has been several times superceded? Or does it mean that since we discussed it on one thread, no one should, especially in a different context, do so on another? Or that no one should criticize doctrinal pubs unless they offer radical and innovative suggestions for change (I can offer about 500 of those. If they have to possess a reasonable chance of being adopted, I might produce two or three).

I asked two questions; If you'd offered any suggestions for doctrinal change and I asked for your opinion on the contention that the US Army lost the bubble by getting wrapped around 'the operational art.' If you posted the link to say you'd already done that, we can differ -- all that you did in that previous discussion was provide links and a short tutorial on Air Land battle, you did not give your opinion on the issue...

You said earlier:

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine.

Several of us have stated that the 'Operational level of war' is a flaw in US doctrine and are willing to discuss that and to give our own opinions as opposed to quoting someone else. Your earlier comments were a neat tutorial and a couple of links to elsewhere but no 'Pete' opinions can be discerned, you neither panned the concept or defended it. You provide a lot of links to other Blogs -- which most of us can find on our own -- but you rarely state an opinion or engage in a discussion on the merits of an issue. I'm unsure how that addresses deficiencies in doctrine. Seems to me that if you want to discuss doctrinal deficiencies, you have an option and the ability to do that...

[William F. Owen]

Boy, was I ever wrong about the Small Wars Council forum. I thought it would be a place that sought to address the small wars deficiency in U.S. military doctrine.

I submit we do and have. It's just a bit quiet at the moment.

This place isn't reformist, it's reactionary, and really really reactionary at that, the way a discussion forum for exiled Tsarist officers would have been in the 1930s!

Huh??? How so? Do not confuse refusing to buy into the latest silly idea with clinging needlessly to the past. A lot of old stuff worked. A lot did not.

Want radical reform? If I was king, FM3-24, FM3-0 and a few others would all be torched and we'd have a "year zero back to basics," - because now you have all the young turks and some old ones buying into claptrap like "Design!"

[William F. Owen]

In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24, Simpkin wrote that

operational art is manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.

I have this book on my desk and know it well. I submit Simpkin is wrong.

Wilf, message me your email address and I will send you my PhD and book.

On way