How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
How Operational Art Devoured Strategy
This is very much worth reading, but careful reading. It slaughters, or maims, a few sacred cows so emotional reactions are likely.
Having said that, I am becoming increasingly impressed with this guy Kelly. If anyone knows him, please pass it on.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Had a four-hour session with him today ... honestly he's one of the only things keeping me sane at the moment
Jas
I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:
Rwanda was not a failure of strategy. It was a failure of moral courage. Period.Recent western military exploits in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and EastTimor, all represent, if not strategic failure, at least failures of strategy.
As for the "Leavenworth Heresy", I differ on what the authors purport to have happened at CGSC. I happened to be there in Bell Hall when the discussions were underway. The 1986 version of 100-5 and the use of the operational level of war was to embed and expand the role of the Corps as a military formation.
Same for the description of the end of Gulf War I. Was there confusion? Certainly. Did the overall objective get lost in the muddle? Perhaps but not in theater; the drift into quasi-support for the southern uprising.
My bottom line: if you believe that CvC is the military oracle, you will probably like the monograph. But the use of history is weak and slanted to begin with; I give it a C.
Tom
So overall Tom, you believe that our understanding of the Operational Level of War and our sense of it's relationship to strategy is largely sound and correct?Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Why I like the monograph, - quibbles such as citing Fuller's Plan 1919 aside and quite a few other, - is it shows the largely weak foundations of what some think Operations actually are.
I'm currently reading Hamley's 1909 text on Operations (Hamley not mentioned or cited! Another quibble) and have wondered how on earth we went from there to here. - this monograph answers a lot of those questions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You are putting words in my mouth; I said the authors' depiction of how that term emerged and its intent at the time are flawed.So overall Tom, you believe that our understanding of the Operational Level of War and our sense of it's relationship to strategy is largely sound and correct?
Who is "our"? I am comfortable in my understanding and many of the leaders around me. Where I see disconnects are in the interagency process and the ever-present gap between the military and the non-military. The supposed paper and thought trail that the authors seem to want to address targets that gap and frankly they are hunting the wrong fox.
If someone is stupid enough to proclaim there are no sectarian issues in Iraq, the best understanding of CvC, Jomini, or any other theorist will not fix that. You cannot fix stupidity; you can only endure it, contain it, or maneuver around it.
Tom
I think it's a pretty good paper, Tom. Your objection on Rwanda is certainly valid
and one could argue that Bosnia and Kosovo were not strategic failures, rather the former another failure of moral courage and the latter getting schnookered and buying into a line of BS. East Timor seems to me to fall between those two poles. The rest were what they're tagged as...
I agree that your version of the US espousal of "The Operational Level of War" was the stated reason but I also suggest it was a specifically European theater and counter Soviet oriented construct which is not universally applicable -- and we have a bad tendency to make our 'doctrine' work even if all of it may not fit a given situation. There was also a flag officer space justification effort involved IIRC. I would contend that in both Afghanistan and Iraq the theater or nation IS the operational level of war. We can be pretty inflexible nowadays. Didn't use to be true, yet another bad habit we picked up post Viet Nam.
I think their principal point is summed up with this quote:The heirarchial view issue..."By taking a hierarchical view and linking discrete responsibilities to specifc levels of command, we risk degrading the intimacy of the conversation among ends, ways, and means, making it easier for strategy to make unreasonable demands; for example, in Iraq in 2003-2006, with ways overtaking ends; or in 1950, MacArthur’s precipitate pursuit to the Yalu, with tactics to taking on a life of its own. " (Pg 10 Document / Pg 18 of the .pdf... emphasis added /kw)
As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.
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