Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
Again I give it a C.
And it may merit a C. Since most of the contemporary writing on the "Operational level" may merit an F in my view, I think we might move forward on that basis. I posted the paper to provoke discussion, not applause.

I find this paper very annoying since it beat me to the punch on a whole bunch of stuff - but frankly as long as the stuff is out there, I care not who's name is on it.

My major concerns are that "some people" have elevated the idea of "The Operational level" way beyond it's originally intended purpose of delivering forces to battle, under the most advantageous conditions and then being able to effectively exploiting success as and when it occurs. EG: Napoleons failure to pursue and destroy Blucher at Ligny had very real strategic consequences, at Waterloo. Destroying Blucher was a strategic imperative. It was a failure of strategy, not operations.

I am not saying put the Operational Level back in the box. I am saying let's have a clear, simple and explicit understanding as to what it is, because at the moment current idea may be an obstacle to understanding. The understanding I am looking for is "what uses of force advances my strategy" (political aims)