How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

[Ken White]

Again. Ken, let's define who the "we" is... You just made the same leap and are like them chasing the wrong fox.

Nope. You misconstrued the initial 'we.' While I thought what I said was clear, perhaps it was not. There were two distinct items in that paragraph of mine you quoted. Here it is again:

""As I said, we tend to be awfully inflexible. We say there is an Operational Level, therefor we must have one. They also mention that we, the US, do not do the political aspect of warfare at all well. True IMO and we have not since FDR. Truman never got it, nor have any subsequent Presidents other than Eisenhower who wisely stayed out of most stupidity. I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""(emphasis added / kw)

The items in bold apply to the US Army, those underlined to the broader US government; two separate 'we's there. I agree with you on the interagency and US strategy issue. However, I still think the Army is remiss, doctrinally rigid and has a tendency to tailor its 'doctrine' to the exigencies of the day.

If there is a problem with strategic thought in the USG--and I agree whole heartedly there is--hardly any of the problem relates to the so called "leavenworth heresy". Their premise is both a red herring and a reductionist; it is the wrong argument and an over-simplification at that.

I agree but I didn't read their paper that way. Also, this:

... Somehow if we just put operational-level back in the box, strategy will emerge. Bull.

I didn't get that from it. I did get that the operational level as the US has adapted it is a distractor -- and while you may not, I totally agree with that. As I said, we're awfully inflexible. Not least because of this:

...On the other hand I could and I am sure you could cite numerous examples of the need for levels because they limit those who would become the epitome of the squad leader in the sky.

The problem being that our adaptation of levels has not stopped the squad leaders in the sky -- it has encouraged them. Now that guy doesn't even have to leave air conditioned comfort and get in a bird that can be shot down, he can simply watch a video feed while three nations away...

Again I give it a C.

That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so. ""I think the thought that heirarchial orthodoxy is inimical to good war fighting practice and our failure to adapt the political to that practice is their message -- and I'm afraid they're correct.""

The Army cannot fix the strategic issue as you say -- the Army can and should fix the issues of over centralization 'squad leader in the sky;' inflexibility; and excessive orthodoxy.

[Tom Odom]

Ken

As you said,

That's cool, give it a D even -- or an F -- but do realize the broad message I drew by not having anything to get defensive about may be correct-- dangerously so.

I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive. Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.

First from the authors:

More specifically, the misunderstanding of the role of operational art as proselytized in FM 100-5 and the creation of an “Operational Level of War”
have led to an independent layer of command that has usurped the role of strategy and thereby resistedthe role that the civilian leadership should play incampaign planning.

That is an interpretation stated as fact. I would say just the opposite. If encroachment has occured, it has been stimulated by a vacuum at the strategic and political level. Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.

Second from the authors:

In the American/NATO usage of FM-100-5, rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of war”—assumed the responsibility for campaign planning and, by reducing the political leadership to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widened the gap between politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

You cannot reduce something that is not there in the first place. The lack of strategic guidance, thought, art or even just consideration is a long standing issue, one that predated both versions of 100-5 (82 and 86). If the authors had said that 100-5 did not fix the issue of winning battles versus winning wars they would have been correct. What they said, however, was that it created the problem, as in "The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles that have not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way of war.”

In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp. I am not, however, at all sure that 100-5 added to that. Rather at the time of its publication and its implementation, the FM sought to reduce higher level meddling in favor of proper focus on relevant missions, ie deep attack and disruption of Soviet operational (there's that term again) maneuver. The only sure way to reduce (elimination is impossible) ever encroaching centralization is to limit the size and communication suite of headquarters; we are as you know doing just the opposite.

Tom

[wm]

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp. I am not, however, at all sure that 100-5 added to that. Rather at the time of its publication and its implementation, the FM sought to reduce higher level meddling in favor of proper focus on relevant missions, ie deep attack and disruption of Soviet operational (there's that term again) maneuver. The only sure way to reduce (elimination is impossible) ever encroaching centralization is to limit the size and communication suite of headquarters; we are as you know doing just the opposite.

Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.

When the only game in town is the close in fight, then of course leaders will want to watch it closely. But, because they have this manual that tells them they have to be prepared for the deep battle as well, they need to have another horde of staffers around to do that prep work too. And so grew the HQs to such a size that we now need to remove a maneuver battalion from our BCT structures to have enough folks to man the Army's staffs.

When I was an LT, I had this interesting discussion with a crusty old colonel. He told me that the Army had its leadership structure all backwards. He thought that the hardest job for an Army officer was to be a platoon leader yet the Army put the least experienced guys in that position. I suggested to him that what we had at the platoon level probably worked pretty well--the exuberance of youth could provide some "out of the box" suggestions for solving a tactical problem, but that exuberance would be tempered by the judgement and experience of a senior NCO platoon sergeant. I then suggested that maybe we ought to figure out how to get some of that youthful exuberance and willingness to try something different infused into more senior headquarters. It might break us out of being tied to mind-numbing processes rather than seeking innovative solutions. The colonel shook his head and told me I'd never make it in the Army because I had too much creative thought and the "system" broke those who tried to buck it.

[William F. Owen]

WM Excellent post!

It still leaves me confused as to see any greater point in the "Operational Level" than the manoeuvring and sustaining of forces of for tactical advantage, and that it is tactics that actually deliver the strategy.

I submit that irrelevant tactical action is only irrelevant in that it does not further strategy, and not because it does not contribute to the operation.

Where's my blind spot?

[Rob Thornton]

I've come to beleive the operational level of war is the linking of a series of objectives as they relate to a desired (strategic) end, and the arranging of resources and capabilities in time and space to achieve those objectives. The tactical actions then are those understood to be required to acheive said operational objectives, or those that occur as a result of pursuing the operational objective.

Those tactical sctions may not always be the ones you anicpated, but if there is resistance then it stands to reason that some type of tactical action will be required. I'd also note that loss of a given tactical action does not mean the end cannot be fulfilled, or even that some part of the operational objective may not be fulfilled, but tactical success does make a positive differnce (as long as it does not operationally exhaust you).

For a great example I think you could look at Grant's Wilderness campaign, and consider "Cold Harbor". Certainly a bad tactical outcome for Union Forces, however Grant was able to continue afterwards and soon secured City Point, set up a masive LOG base, and then contained Lee's Forces (as well as forcing the Confederate govt to flee Richmond. Grant also fulfilled the strategic end of destroying the Army of N. Virginia, occupying the Conf. capital and getting Lee to surrender.

If all of Grant's tactical actions had ended in failure that halted his operational momentum, or allowed Lee's army to escape, a subsequent campaign may have been required.

ref. the article Wilf brought up, I think its great for discussion. I think there can be a real danger in it happening, but historically it seems most likely when strategic concepts and defined policy end are absent or ambiguous (it could be we just don't really know what we want, or prefer to keep options open) - however, we tend to be action oriented, and there also seems to be some basis for expectations for us to be so.

Best, Rob

[Tom Odom]

Tom,
FM 100-5 did not directly cause the problem, but it certainly was a significant contributor IMHO. My take on the Army's method of implementing the "deep battle" fight advocated in the 80's versions of FM 100-5 is that it had to lead to the exact opposite of what you indicate, corrrectly, is the way to reduce centralization. To be able to fight the deep battle, headquarters at brigade and above started to bloat their planning and operations staffs. They did this because, as victims of the micromanagement the Army practiced in SEA in the 60s and 70s, they also felt the need to stay abreast of the close battle. THey had learned not to be trusted as junior officers. So, as they became the Army's more senior "leaders" (starting at Battalion command level), they in turn, did not trust their subordinate leaders to do their jobs. Thus, the division of effort required to implement the "areas of interest/areas of influence" concepts effectively did not happen. Of course it didn't help matters that most CPXs and TEWTS (not to mention the environment at the NTC) had no real "deep battle" component to keep the higher headquarters ops staffs out of the knickers of the battalions and companies. Nor did it help that the only time the US Army engaged in major combat after the move to the new theory, it was the attacker and did not have to worry about finding and fixing an operational or strategic second echelon before it overwhelmed us in the main battle area.

WM

If the issue you are describing is centralization, no issues with your points regarding the effects of 100-5 on centralization.

But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.

And Wilf: Where's my blind spot?

That would be at the operational level

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

quote of the year.

Operational art devoured strategy? That would be a thin meal indeed.

[wm]

But if the issue is the void in strategic thought and application as was put forth in the the paper that this thread was about in the first place, then 100-5 didn't create that void, it was there before 100-5 and it is still there now.

My point to the authors is that if you want to understand a lack of strategy, don't start at the bottom (or middle) and work up. You are in essence examining the symptoms, not the cause. There is much talk of military dominence of foreign policy; that may be true, but the absence of strategic thought across the interagency gap is the cause.

I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.

Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades. Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)

It still leaves me confused as to see any greater point in the "Operational Level" than the manoeuvring and sustaining of forces of for tactical advantage, and that it is tactics that actually deliver the strategy.

I submit that irrelevant tactical action is only irrelevant in that it does not further strategy, and not because it does not contribute to the operation.

Where's my blind spot?

Wilf,
First thanks for the kudos. On to your "blind spot." I think that the advent of very long range strike capability has added a wrinkle to the strategy/tactics divide. When one talks about engaging a maneuver force at distances that far exceed the normal range of the tactical commander's actions--interdicting a follow-on force as it is forming at its mobilization center for example--then one has reached a level of complexity that argues for a different point of view and may justify a slightly different consideration. While a "deep attack" still envolves maneuvering forces, which I view as largely a matter of strategy, it also contains a direct lethal strike/engagement component, which I submit is the sine qua non of tactics. Maybe not a blind spot--more a Hegelian synthesis that you, as a CvC adherent, ought to be able to appreciate

[William F. Owen]

I think that the advent of very long range strike capability has added a wrinkle to the strategy/tactics divide. When one talks about engaging a maneuver force at distances that far exceed the normal range of the tactical commander's actions--interdicting a follow-on force as it is forming at its mobilization center for example--then one has reached a level of complexity that argues for a different point of view and may justify a slightly different consideration.

Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."

I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.

[Fuchs]

The Operational level is the tactical level of corps and theater headquarters.

[wm]

Well in 1909 the British teaching of "Military Operations" considered only "Strategical Issues" and Tactics - explicitly stated . Operations were essentially how "Armies" did "stuff". _ "Advancing along a coast line." "Movement by Sea." Success in both Tactics and Strategy required competent and well planned "Operations."

I think what all the above is telling me is that the idea of an "Operational Level" - as popularly conceived, needs to be held to rigour.

I concur that some of the stuff about operational art is probably muddy thinking. We could probably make a case that it is really still just tactics--i.e., fire and movement/maneuver--but the distances are greatly expanded--not that big an issue given the improved capability to communicate over the longer distances and thereby view/direct the action.

The first part of your post however equivocates on the meaning of operations. I think the basic 1909 point is to distinguish the strategic and tactical issue in military operations from issues in support of those operations (in the manufacturing world I think the distinction is between operations, as production, and support as logistics, sales, HR and all the other stuff military folks lump under combat service support). The other sense of operations in your post applies to classes of activities used to execute a military event, such as a river crossing operation as a way of maneuvering on or near the battlefield, covering force operations as a way of hiding your tactical dispositions from an enemy and channeling its attack into a desirable (on your part) location for the defensive tactics you intend to use.

[Tom Odom]

I submit that it is rather hard to engage in strategic thought when a senior leader is too busy making sure the platoons and companies are minding their Ps and Qs.

I would submit that your point is irrelevant to the discussion of a void in strategic thinking on the interagency level, the purported theme of the book under discussion. Did you read the paper?

Now it might well be the case that this overwatch of one's LTs/CPTs happens because the more senior folks are not capable of strategic thinking and devolve to doing what they know. It might also just so happen that they are precluded from doing strategic thinking by their own higher level leadership and fill the void by micromanaging the company grades.

While that might be true, it has nothing to do with the absence of strategy on the Department of State or any other national agency. You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.

Or, it might be the case that in the absence of strategic thinking from their civilian seniors, military seniors try to fill the void without overstepping their legal bounds by creating something in between strategy and tactics. Enter one understanding of operational art, a poor compromise not unlike the M551 Sheridan. (But see more below in my response to Wilf.)

Certainly military leaders fill the void; that in itself while not ideal does not mean that FM 100-5 1986 and the operational level of war instigated or justified that encroachment. Voids get filled as you say. But in the case of operational art as it was laid out in the FM 100-5 in 1986 and as it provides the theme for this monograph, it had no role in "devouring strategy." The issue predated the supposed cause.

Beyond that, roger on inherent tendencies to micro-manage. We focus on leader development and as those leaders advance in grade, many continue to believe they were the best (fill in the blank) that ever walked the earth, a belief that mandates that they micro-manage for to not do so would be a personal failure. We add to that tendency by creating C2 systems that encourage leaders to abuse the capabilities systems, and we continue to build ever larger staffs to somehow take advantage of the same "manpower" saving C2 systems.

Tom

[wm]

I would submit that your point is irrelevant to the discussion of a void in strategic thinking on the interagency level, the purported theme of the book under discussion.

I believe that Chris Nunn had it right with this post:

I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why.

I was trying to cash out how it happens that the authors' claim, quoted by Chris above, may have come to pass.
100-5 had little to do with strategy at the national/interagency level. Nor should it have done so in my opinion. It was an Army doctrinal publication that ought to have explicated how the Army "operates" to complete, successfully, the missions it is directed to perform as a part of the execution of national strategy in a given conflict.

Strategy comes in many different flavors, which is why it may be preceded with different adjectival constructions like "national," "economic," "diplomatic," and "military." One might expect to find some discussions on military strategy in an Army doctrinal publication devoted to a high level discussion of the various ways of conducting military operations but to include in such an Army document a discussion of how to work an inter-agency approach to accomplish a national objective seems inappropriate. Perhaps a publication called Military Strategy would be more apropos, but it too would not resolve the lack of a national strategy lamented by the authors.

You seem to be confused between tactical and strategic because all you refer to is inside the military at the operator level, none of which is discussed in the book to which this thread's title (and indeed the title of the book) refers.

To iterate from above, I was trying to point out possible causes for a lack of national strategic thinking within the Army. One may be due to the fact that Army leaders are spending too much time being tacticians. As a result they do not have enough time left over to practice and perfect their strategic level thinking. I will not rehearse the other two alternatives previously posted.

[GI Zhou]

The paper neds a rewrite and to substantiate the argument. It fails to substantaite its claims in the introduction or even explain them.

East Timor was not a failure of military strategy, and it was too small to claim any theory of an operational art. It failed because the poltical groups in East Timor, who were split along differing lines of personalities long before independence, were usurped by Mari Alkatiri's FRETLIN group. Threw the East Timorese political parties plans into disarray. There are other reasons I am happy to explain off line.

The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.

[William F. Owen]

One view I wa stold by an Australian practicioner/theorist is that the Operational Art is the art of winning wars as opposed to battles.

I submit that "Operational Art" is - as the Soviets described it - the art of conducting operations. The "art" of wining wars is most definitely strategy.

The theories held up in the period 1941 - 1945. The operational arts looks at a series of fronts inside the whole conflict.

...and that's my major beef. I am not sure the Theories did hold up. There is a chasm between Soviet Theory and Practice. Yes they won - as vast cost, with huge numerical superiority.

The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.

Depends where you start the clock. A.A. Sveckhin's 1927 paper is for some reason commonly cited, but as concerns someone talking about solving the "problem", but it's Triandafillov's 1929 "The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies," is, IMO the actual starting point.
- but If you believe the PU-36, is the "how to" cook book of "Deep battle" then poster child of the "Operational Level," is Tukhachesvsky. Svechkin and Triandifillov never really say anything about "Deep Battle" and it is that which has come to define the idea of Operational Art.

[Tukhachevskii]

...of my days at Uni came flooding back after reading some of the above posts (I had a particular fondness for Soviet Military Thought; hence my moniker). I understand, wholly, the confusion around the Operational level of war; even my lecturers had trouble defining this one. Personally, I prefer Svechin's definition because of its pragmatic rather than dogmatic/doctrinal bent;

"tactics makes the steps of which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path"

In Soviet military science and strategic thought any physical combat between units of any size was defined as a "tactical action" regarding boi (combat /fighting in the literal sense). Operations loosely refered to all the competencies, manoevres, resource allocations, planning and logistics required to get a particular unit to a particular location to secure a particular objective or acheive a particular mission. Soviet Divisional, Army, Army Group and Front level forward detachments (anything from coy to Reg/Div in size) regardless of the manourvere they were conducting (tactical forward reconnaissance, seizure of a bridge, an OMG, etc) were considered to be engaged in tactics once in actual contact with the enemy.

Confusingly, Edward Luttwak defined operational art and the operational level of war as that doman within which units tasked with strategic objectives conducted "relational manouvre" prior to their units shaking out and engaging in tactical level actions to attain their missions. (I have a pdf if anyone is interested enough to bother requesting it)

The way I figure it, Operational art, concerns the unification of tactical actions and their harmonisation with strategic requirements through the campaign. Operational art, therefore, (or, at least from what I was taught) concerns campaigns (multiple battles and objectives) whereas tactics concerns singular engagements. The old school definition for what we now call the operational level was "grand tactics". I think there's a clue in there somewhere.

Anyway, here are some other texts which may help/hinder/cloud further understanding;

David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Art of War: Part I" and "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part 2" in Parameters, 1987.

J. J. Schnieder, "Origins of Operational Art" in Parameters, 1987.

John Kiszely, "Thinking about the Operational Level", RUSI.

Col. M. R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art".

See also, Martin Dunn, "Levels of War: Just a Set of Labels?", who defines operational art as ...

...The Operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. it is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

This has probably confused things terribly but then again, in the spirit of my namesake, why not?

[GI Zhou]

In Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s,London, 1985, pp 23 & 24, Simpkin wrote that

operational art is manoeuvre warfare inside a theatre, as opposed to attrition warfare.

My refences are:

Svechin, A.A. Strategy, East View Publications, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 68. This is a translation of his 1927 work, Strategiia, printed in Moscow by Voennyi vestnick.

Kamanev, S.S. ‘Ocherednye voennye zadachi’, (Successive military objectives), in Voprosy strategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940) , Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 149 – 152cited in Glantz, D.M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 21; and

Tukhachevsky, M.N. ‘Voina’ (War,), 1926, in Voprosystrategii I operativnogo iskusstva v sovietskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940),Voenizdat, Moskva, 1965, pp. 104-105, cited in Glantz, op. cit., p. 22.

Wilf, message me your email address and I will send you my PhD and book.

Secondly could someone show me how to do use the quotation boxes please.(Mod's note PM sent earlier).

Cheers,

GI Zhou 0337 hrs

[Ken White]

I would have to assume that you feel my debating the clarity of these two authors' writing is defensive.

True -- but only in that you caught their flaw in assigning blame to 100-5 and went to work on that, thus ,IMO, missing the broader points that you acknowledge are a problem -- and the point that we have become very (dangerously???) doctrinaire.

Hardly the case as if one is going to write something and publish it hinged on a weak point, my criticism is neither defensive nor is ad hominem. It goes to the heart of their argument--the negative influence of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the term operational level of war. They state it is causal. I would argue that at best it may be symptomatic and at worst it is a red herring.

Herring perhaps. Sympotomatic? I'd say absolutely. We adopted 'the operational level' for a variety of reasons -- none particularly compelling, IMO (YMMV) and we tend to try to apply it where it is inappropriate because we're slaves to the book...

Our national leaders have found it more convenient to contract strategy to think tanks than to actually think strategically.

I sadly suggest that truth is partly due to the fact that the Armed Forces (as a result of mutual distaste) have not attempted (deigned?) to give strategic advice to a DoS and several Administrations who were, umm, not particularly friendly, toward the Services. I'm not sure how to fix that but I think we need to try...

In agreement on the issue, if not the cause:

Finally as for the need to fix over-centralization, no argument from me as I am firmly in that camp...we are as you know doing just the opposite.

We've beat this stud to death but I don't disagree with a thing you said -- other than your first line on the thread:

I judge such works by how the authors form their argument. They lost me with this:...

I understand that but at my age, I've found out that I neglected a lot of good ideas due to having the same attitude and I've lately become inured to putting up- with some often specious arguments to still extract some idea with a bit of merit. I even look up dumb stuff to see what people are up to. The old bit about even a stopped clock being right twice a day sort of applies.

I'd say they arrived at the right destination by the wrong route and that happens often.

Keep on pushin'

[Chris Nunn]

I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why. If you like the DIME model, FM 100-5 and FM 3-0 are really only a subset of the M--the failue of the USG to have a true strategic (i.e. longer term that the 1 year mandate of the NSS) plan is probably a huge contributing cause. The rest of the USG is not fully integrated into the strategic plan and therefore strategy devolves into the land of operations. The authors conclusions--specifically the CvC arguments about war and politics--I think are valid, but by laying the blame at the feet of the operational level they miss the true issues in contemporary warfare linking politics, strategy, and tactics.