Where did???

[MikeF]

Where did all the "Wild Bill" Donovans go?

Why do we have a lack of creativity in this GWOT or Long War?

My answer is simple- insitutional bureacracy coupled with risk adversion in the FBI, CIA, SOCOM, JSOC, and Special Forces. Today, Donovan would be fired as an infantry/recon LT.

Alas, maybe I'm just an armor officer asking silly questions.

Maybe not.

I'm curious to see others' opinions and thoughts...

v/r

Mike

[Bill Moore]

The Wild Bill's are still there, they come and go (very few in the military anymore, as they are quickly weeded out for being non-conformers). Our bureaucracy and risk adverse culture is crushing, so those who have the brains, creativity and balls to take the fight to the enemy the way Wild Bill's gang did are quickly disillusioned today. Instead they open businesses or engage in other activities where they can apply their talents. Remember a lot of Wild Bill's men were successful lawyers, bankers, etc.

I recall a somewhat humorous news interview (maybe a little over a year ago), where a well known national news host was interviewing a former CIA agent who wrote a book about the war on the terror (typical ex-CIA book, everyone is screwed up but me tale), and she asked him why the CIA didnt do such and such in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, and he looked at her like she was from mars, then answered her with, "it was too dangerous". She kept pressing him with, isn't that what the CIA is supposed to do? To give credit where it's due, I believe some in the CIA did some great work, but this interview definitely reflected the risk adverse culture in the U.S. government.

By now we're all too aware of what one of our four star generals told Clinton about the risk of sending Special Operations Forces into Afghanistan to get OBL when the President inquired back in the 1990's, so instead we have now endured 9/11 and the consequences since then. Exactly how is risk calculated?

I can't imagine "it's too dangerous" being the response from Bill Casey, Bill Donovon, or Bull Simmons. If it was easy, he would have asked the Air Force to do it.

The good news is there would have been no shortage of volunteers from the ranks to take those risks, so don't give up hope.

[Timbers]

The number of starving, dead-broke independent intelligence & counterterrorism analysts is a testament to the bureaucratization of the Intelligence Community.

100,000 people in complete agreement with one another, projecting the illusion of complete national security.

The stage is set for even grander Congressional committee hearings after The Next Big One to determine how on earth this could ever have happened. Provided, of course, Congress is still around after The Next Big One.

[MikeF]

This is a serious topic, one that I've discussed privately with Ken White and others...

I would be the first to volunteer for a venture in a "new" organization to jumping into the FATA to actually conduct strategic patrols to achieve our stated national policy goals. Trust me, I would have no problem for volunteers.

I think sometimes we let politics slide into national security. I.E. risk adversion creeping into institutions.

Mike

[Tom Odom]

Mike

Stan and I lived with this constantly in Zaire/Congo when taskings came in and we sought ways to meet them. On the other hand, the same risk adverse people would think up truly hair-brained schemes for us to do, when the real issue was budgets our ability to achieve hairbrained schemes supposedly affected the organization's budget. They were shocked when I told them to pound sand.

I didn't find things much different in Rwanda except I had Ambassadors who were common sense and allowed us to use our judgement. My organization didn't change but my immediate in-country leadership improved dramatically.
The old saying about "yes, you can go swimming, but don't go near the water" definitely applied when it came to HQs.

To answer your original question: anyone with "Wild" in his nickname is trouble.

Best
Tom

[Abu Suleyman]

The number of starving, dead-broke independent intelligence & counterterrorism analysts is a testament to the bureaucratization of the Intelligence Community.

100,000 people in complete agreement with one another, projecting the illusion of complete national security.

The stage is set for even grander Congressional committee hearings after The Next Big One to determine how on earth this could ever have happened. Provided, of course, Congress is still around after The Next Big One.

100% Agreed. However, I take hope in the fact that there are actually many people outside of the establishment, that when the time comes, do have the appropriate skills. This wouldn't be the first time that the military turned to people who were not up to snuff in the "bureacratic" military, but who were just what was needed in war. (I am thinking specifically of U.S. Grant.)

[Ken White]

100% Agreed. However, I take hope in the fact that there are actually many people outside of the establishment, that when the time comes, do have the appropriate skills. This wouldn't be the first time that the military turned to people who were not up to snuff in the "bureacratic" military, but who were just what was needed in war. (I am thinking specifically of U.S. Grant.)

I think you're right. I sure hope you are. However, I doubt those kinds of people will be available in the comparative numbers they were during WW II. We have had two more generations of added 'government' and 'safety and security.'

People that put bike helmets on kids aged four on tricycles, that have to buckle their seat belts under penalty of a fine if they get caught without one, that have a FEMA passing out checks to idiots who decide to live on a flood plain or a beach, that contend many benefits provided by big government are 'entitlements' simply aren't into risk taking.

[Cavguy]

My former boss @ COIN has been going crazy with the blog since I left - he posted this about a month ago:

WHERE ARE THE AFGHAN INGLORIOUS BASTARDS?

I was struck by a comment from an Army officer fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. He said, “fighting these guys (the Taliban) is like fighting the Marines.” I want to know who is training those guys, and where can we get them because without air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers, they seem to be getting pretty impressive results on the cheap.

There are a few facts and questions that we need to address honestly in an “understanding the environment” way before we can go on. We need to be honest with ourselves before we move forward because platitudes and slogans won’t win the COIN fight.

Here are some hard questions we need to ask:

We learn from Afghan/Pashtun culture that one of the basic tenants of “Pashtun Wali” (way of the Pashtun) is “Badal” (revenge). Logic dictates that if we kill one Afghan, we make 10 enemies. Where are the slighted Afghans that have been grieved by the Taliban who are thirsting for revenge or does this only work against us?

We know that the Taliban are not one monolithic group, but several small groups each with their own goals and area of operations. That is a weakness that begs to be exploited. We know that they have village auxiliaries who support hard corps fighters who travel around in groups from 10 – 50. History also shows that from the 1940’s the Afghans were quite adept at infiltrating insurgents into the Pakistan’s FATA in order to instigate trouble. We know that part of COIN theory speaks of denying sanctuary to the insurgents. Afghan forces are more welcome and can operate more freely than Western troops. So, where are those Afghan Inglorious Bastards? Where are the small bands of Government of Afghanistan fighters operating on foot in Taliban safe havens, mixing with the people, getting intelligence, denying the Taliban that safe haven, ambushing Taliban groups, (with coalition backup) giving them no respite, taking away their feeling of invulnerability and exacerbating mistrust between Taliban groups? Where is the Afghan version of the “Les Commandos Tigres Noir,” (The Black Tigers), a group of former Viet-minh who under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Roger Vanenberghe in 1952 Indo China dressed in black uniforms and brought the fight to the insurgents and captured one of their command-posts?

We also know that the Taliban are very good at setting up roadblocks to collect taxes and control the population. Roadblocks, were used effectively to prevent voting materials getting distributed in the 20 Aug elections and also to prevent Afghans from voting. They are also quite effective at preventing IOs, NGOs and Afghan civil servants from getting out and working with the people. Where are the undercover Afghan Inglorious Bastards, who roll down the road in an old truck either armed to the teeth or armed with radios that talk to a trailing UAV or Attack Helicopter or follow-on truck full of undercover hard men? If a few of these check points were hit, the Taliban or local criminals might be less inclined to use them. This tactic was used quite effectively by Canadian troops in Somalia. Why aren’t we seeing it in Afghanistan?

These are not hi-tech, complicated solutions, but they could be effective. If we can’t find the Afghan Inglorious Bastards and figure out why criminals without money, air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers can be compared to the Marines, we will never win this fight. We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.

LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, COIN Branch Chief US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center.

[jmm99]

I missed Mr Donovan by a decade, but his lawfirm, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, was a "friendly" lawfirm to the firm where I worked. We think of him for his WWI and OSS activities, but Bill Donovan was a product of large firm litigation practice. In that context, he was a conformist.

What do I mean by that ? Here are a few points (not an ideal, because they are realized in practice by successful firms).

1. Correction by subordinates. As a young associate, you are expected to know your case and to correct errors made by those above you in the pecking order. Obviously, that includes substantive legal and factual errors, but also such things as grammar. Of course, if you expect to stay around, you had best be right most of the time. You are also expected to discuss (intelligently) the many judgment calls that have to be made. All good things have to come to an end. So, if you are a regular "counterformist", you will not last long.

2. Lines of Communication. You are expected to use horizontal lines of communication - with those roughly on your level; and to share knowledge. Selfish folks also did not last long. Vertical communications also had to be open - usually initiated from higher levels. Say, you have a four-person case team. The top dog wants input from all lower levels. So, it wouldn't be unusual for the bottom dog to be asked to give the top dog a complete brief (one on one) on the case. In that atmosphere, "yes men" also do not last long.

3. Consideration. The rule was simply "don't kiss ass upstairs; don't kick ass downstairs" - thank yous to the secretarial pool go a long way. And although vertical communications were open, never go behind someone's back. Positive input goes upstairs; negative input goes through the "chain of command". All of that is simply a matter of judgment and discretion.

In short, the normal world that Bill Donovan lived in for 50 years - after graduating Columbia Law in 1908 - was one where independent thinking, shared communications, exhaustive (but not exhausting) argument, judgment and discretion, were the norm. So, in that sense, Bill Donovan was a conformist. In WWII, half of the partners of the lawfirm where I later worked were "in uniform" (some in Donovan's organization).

[Rex Brynen]

100,000 people in complete agreement with one another, projecting the illusion of complete national security.

I must go to different CT and intel meetings, because I've yet to ever attend a working US IC meeting that looked anything like this.

[Red Rat]

Where did all the "Wild Bill" Donovans go?


My answer is simple- insitutional bureacracy coupled with risk adversion in the FBI, CIA, SOCOM, JSOC, and Special Forces. Today, Donovan would be fired as an infantry/recon LT.

My 2 star CG on OIF (the break-in) described SF as over bureaucratised and risk averse - and he had a long SF pedigree!!

As I think we are never going to fight the Afghan as well as they fight each other I harken back to the SAS of the Imperial Indian Army - notably the Frontier Scouts (The South Waziristan Scouts, The Tochi Scouts, The Gilgit Scouts and the Chitral Scouts). It takes a poacher to make a really effective gamekeeper

The Frontier Scouts by Charles Chenevix Trench is out of print but highly recommended. Personally I think there is quite an appetite in the army for officers and SNCOs to do extended tours in AFG or other places with such formations. At the close of empire Loan Service with the various ex-colonial armies was always sought after by the more adventurous and less career minded individual, especially where it involved shooting at people, tigers or both