Where did???

[Abu Suleyman]

The number of starving, dead-broke independent intelligence & counterterrorism analysts is a testament to the bureaucratization of the Intelligence Community.

100,000 people in complete agreement with one another, projecting the illusion of complete national security.

The stage is set for even grander Congressional committee hearings after The Next Big One to determine how on earth this could ever have happened. Provided, of course, Congress is still around after The Next Big One.

100% Agreed. However, I take hope in the fact that there are actually many people outside of the establishment, that when the time comes, do have the appropriate skills. This wouldn't be the first time that the military turned to people who were not up to snuff in the "bureacratic" military, but who were just what was needed in war. (I am thinking specifically of U.S. Grant.)

[Ken White]

100% Agreed. However, I take hope in the fact that there are actually many people outside of the establishment, that when the time comes, do have the appropriate skills. This wouldn't be the first time that the military turned to people who were not up to snuff in the "bureacratic" military, but who were just what was needed in war. (I am thinking specifically of U.S. Grant.)

I think you're right. I sure hope you are. However, I doubt those kinds of people will be available in the comparative numbers they were during WW II. We have had two more generations of added 'government' and 'safety and security.'

People that put bike helmets on kids aged four on tricycles, that have to buckle their seat belts under penalty of a fine if they get caught without one, that have a FEMA passing out checks to idiots who decide to live on a flood plain or a beach, that contend many benefits provided by big government are 'entitlements' simply aren't into risk taking.

[Cavguy]

My former boss @ COIN has been going crazy with the blog since I left - he posted this about a month ago:

WHERE ARE THE AFGHAN INGLORIOUS BASTARDS?

I was struck by a comment from an Army officer fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. He said, “fighting these guys (the Taliban) is like fighting the Marines.” I want to know who is training those guys, and where can we get them because without air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers, they seem to be getting pretty impressive results on the cheap.

There are a few facts and questions that we need to address honestly in an “understanding the environment” way before we can go on. We need to be honest with ourselves before we move forward because platitudes and slogans won’t win the COIN fight.

Here are some hard questions we need to ask:

We learn from Afghan/Pashtun culture that one of the basic tenants of “Pashtun Wali” (way of the Pashtun) is “Badal” (revenge). Logic dictates that if we kill one Afghan, we make 10 enemies. Where are the slighted Afghans that have been grieved by the Taliban who are thirsting for revenge or does this only work against us?

We know that the Taliban are not one monolithic group, but several small groups each with their own goals and area of operations. That is a weakness that begs to be exploited. We know that they have village auxiliaries who support hard corps fighters who travel around in groups from 10 – 50. History also shows that from the 1940’s the Afghans were quite adept at infiltrating insurgents into the Pakistan’s FATA in order to instigate trouble. We know that part of COIN theory speaks of denying sanctuary to the insurgents. Afghan forces are more welcome and can operate more freely than Western troops. So, where are those Afghan Inglorious Bastards? Where are the small bands of Government of Afghanistan fighters operating on foot in Taliban safe havens, mixing with the people, getting intelligence, denying the Taliban that safe haven, ambushing Taliban groups, (with coalition backup) giving them no respite, taking away their feeling of invulnerability and exacerbating mistrust between Taliban groups? Where is the Afghan version of the “Les Commandos Tigres Noir,” (The Black Tigers), a group of former Viet-minh who under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Roger Vanenberghe in 1952 Indo China dressed in black uniforms and brought the fight to the insurgents and captured one of their command-posts?

We also know that the Taliban are very good at setting up roadblocks to collect taxes and control the population. Roadblocks, were used effectively to prevent voting materials getting distributed in the 20 Aug elections and also to prevent Afghans from voting. They are also quite effective at preventing IOs, NGOs and Afghan civil servants from getting out and working with the people. Where are the undercover Afghan Inglorious Bastards, who roll down the road in an old truck either armed to the teeth or armed with radios that talk to a trailing UAV or Attack Helicopter or follow-on truck full of undercover hard men? If a few of these check points were hit, the Taliban or local criminals might be less inclined to use them. This tactic was used quite effectively by Canadian troops in Somalia. Why aren’t we seeing it in Afghanistan?

These are not hi-tech, complicated solutions, but they could be effective. If we can’t find the Afghan Inglorious Bastards and figure out why criminals without money, air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers can be compared to the Marines, we will never win this fight. We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.

LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, COIN Branch Chief US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center.

[Ken White]

but I'll posit an answer anyway...

My former boss @ COIN has been going crazy with the blog since I left - he posted this about a month ago:

I suggest:

The average Afghan is more afraid of the Talibs.They are not afraid of us because they know we're constrained by mores they think are dumb. Thus they'll pick on us as infidels and nice guys (who deserve to be fleeced in their view). As for revenge on the Talibs, they're willing to bide their time to get at them. What's a century or two...

We are not going to play a Viet Nam repeat because the rules have changed and 24 hour news cycles mitigate against such operations unless they are very low key; thus small and generally not terribly effective in the strategic sense.

There will be no -- or very, very few -- Afghan government inglorious basterds because the Afghan government does not necessarily want what the west thinks they ought to want. Far from it, I believe.

Consider also that if an Afghan soldier or police officer decides to beat a detained person to get information or just for the heck of it, he'll say something to the effect: "Please forgive me but I must beat you. It's my job, you understand." The beatee is likely to respond: "Please, go ahead. I understand. If God wills, I shall bear it manfully. I will bear no malice for this." Point there is that Pashtunwali is far more nuanced and complex than most westerners think. Also note that it is 'Pashtun...' Blood is thicker and so forth...

He states:

We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.

Those are fair questions. I'm not sure whether the answers are pleasing or not but they really boil down to three rather immutable factors.

We may be nice guys but we are still outsiders and flatlanders in hill country. Hill people are rather comfortable fighting each other but they will unite to fight outsiders. No one not from a bunch of Hill folks is likely to understand that fully.

We are trying to fight a war nicely for western domestic political reasons and our opponents do not have that quite significant constraint.

While I know some US Sergeants Major who could and would lead some Tigres Noir, I know many more who could not and would not (the ratio used to be about 20:80, I suspect it is even more skewed today) and I strongly doubt the US Army for one would allow that to happen -- again more due to US domestic politics than to the fact that there are only a few commanders who countenance such operations -- fewer still would entrust it to an NCO. So the second factor is our bureaucracy and dictated conformity. The US Army is still, unfortunately, mentally geared to fighting a peer competitor on the north German plain.

Short version: Outsiders who try to be nice and are doctrinaire are very unlikely to win against tough, unconstrained, xenophobic hillmen. They can get a marginally acceptable conclusion...

[omarali50]

but I'll posit an answer anyway...I suggest:

The average Afghan is more afraid of the Talibs.They are not afraid of us because they know we're constrained by mores they think are dumb. .....
Short version: Outsiders who try to be nice and are doctrinaire are very unlikely to win against tough, unconstrained, xenophobic hillmen. They can get a marginally acceptable conclusion...

Somehow I doubt that they consider the US army as being too nice or too constrained. They ARE less afraid of you than they are of the taliban because in the last year or two they have begun to think that the talibs are likely to win. Its true that they dont like infidels and outsiders in general. But, they are people and they see which side their bread is buttered. If the infidels had set up a better regime AND appeared determined to win, they would go along with that (especially if said "better regime" interferes little with their life and still provides security...less corruption, less extortion, more justice?). Also, lets not generalize TOO much. There is an urban population and slightly more developed population (in Kabul, Mazar, Herat) that would support a US supported regime over the taliban, but needs fig leaves of legitimacy, Islamic cover, less corruption, more service.
Having said all that, I think if the US actually decides to stick around, the nutcases who are increasingly dominant on the Pakistani side of the border (the arabs and uzbeks and punjabi taliban) will prove to be their own worst enemies. They will kill mercilessly and almost randomly, provide no real service, butt into everyone's private life and generally make Karzai look slightly better by comparison....but only slightly better.

[Ken White]

Somehow I doubt that they consider the US army as being too nice or too constrained. They ARE less afraid of you than they are of the taliban...

'Too nice' is shorthand for not as brutal (or as dedicated) as the opposition, no more.

...because in the last year or two they have begun to think that the talibs are likely to win.

Or that we are more likely to leave sooner rather than later which is the same thing said a different way...

Its true that they dont like infidels and outsiders in general. But, they are people and they see which side their bread is buttered.

They are pragmatic, no question. They are also xenophobic so they are conflicted -- that makes them prone to go with the flow -- and the meanest, most likely to affect them long term.

If the infidels had set up a better regime AND appeared determined to win, they would go along with that.

Agreed. Problem is that said infidels want to to do western things that aren't always in tune with what's needed and are influenced by those who have personal ideas, not necessarily 'good of Afghans' ideas.

Also, lets not generalize TOO much.

The population of primary concern is covered by those generalizations -- the others are more easily assuaged as you point out.

Having said all that, I think if the US actually decides to stick around, the nutcases who are increasingly dominant on the Pakistani side of the border (the arabs and uzbeks and punjabi taliban) will prove to be their own worst enemies. They will kill mercilessly and almost randomly, provide no real service, butt into everyone's private life and generally make Karzai look slightly better by comparison....but only slightly better.

Agreed -- and that's the problem; the sticking around bit. To be determined, as they say...

[Bob's World]

'Too nice' is shorthand for not as brutal (or as dedicated) as the opposition, no more.Or that we are more likely to leave sooner rather than later which is the same thing said a different way...They are pragmatic, no question. They are also xenophobic so they are conflicted -- that makes them prone to go with the flow -- and the meanest, most likely to affect them long term. Agreed. Problem is that said infidels want to to do western things that aren't always in tune with what's needed and are influenced by those who have personal ideas, not necessarily 'good of Afghans' ideas.The population of primary concern is covered by those generalizations -- the others are more easily assuaged as you point out.Agreed -- and that's the problem; the sticking around bit. To be determined, as they say...

Just picturing trying to keep a straight face introducing myself as "Wild Bob." I recommend that everyone add the prefix "Wild" to their SWJ names for next couple of weeks, should have the Taliban begging for mercy in no time!

Though, I did send my boss a two pager Friday on why AFG is neither a war, nor CT, nor COIN; but that it is simply campaign in a larger effort to counter the regional Unconventional Warfare campaign being waged by AQ.

Actually, what I find to be wild are the following widely held beliefs:

1. That AQ is conducting a Global Insurgency

2. That the US declared a war first on a tactic, and then "fixed" it by changing it to a war on a club.

3. That most think we are conducting COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan

4. That most think we are in separate "wars" in those two countries

5. That we run around slapping "AQ" labels on people faster than WWII GIs putting up "Kilroy was here."

6. That 20 years after the end of the Cold War we still have not updated U.S Foreign Policy to reflect that fact.

7. The widely held belief that greater enforcement of the "Rule of Law" will cure an insurgency (As I recall, King George believed the same thing...)

8. The widely held belief that ineffective government causes insurgency, and that efforts by an outsider to fix that ineffectiveness will cure insurgency.

9. The belief that adding an organization to some master "terrorist list" will somehow help us to better address that organization or the reasons why they are employing terrorist tactics in the first place.

10. (and no list should go past 10, so I'll stop here)The widely held belief by Americans that because we are the "Good Guys" everyone will love us no matter how outrageous our behavior might be (this goes for tourists, GIs on leave, as well as foreign policy).


Seriously though, that "Rule of Law" thing really hit me this weekend. I suspect that the excessive enforcement of rule of law has caused more insurgencies than virtually any other governmental outrage in the history of governance.

regards,

"Wild Bob"

[slapout9]

My former boss @ COIN has been going crazy with the blog since I left - he posted this about a month ago:

Kinda of like the statistic that 8 out 10 Police Officers that are killed by firearms are used by people that have never had any formal training in firearms and they usually DON'T use the sights!!!

If you had a mobilized A'stan population it should not take anymore than a week to train a guerrilla force that could win. Why is that Karzid guy living in a palace? why does he live in luxury while HIS people and ours die? Why isn't he wearing a Fidel Castro Uniform like his Army dudes do? Why isn't he LEADING the IED and VILLAGE clearing operations? Crimes and Wars are caused by CERTAIN PEOPLE! When you start bringing smoke on the right peoples butts things will start changing until then it want. My old Platoon Sergeant could straighten out them thugs with a .45 and a pair of spit shined jump boots. As Governor Wallace used to say about politicians too much "Pussyfootin going on".

[jmm99]

I missed Mr Donovan by a decade, but his lawfirm, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, was a "friendly" lawfirm to the firm where I worked. We think of him for his WWI and OSS activities, but Bill Donovan was a product of large firm litigation practice. In that context, he was a conformist.

What do I mean by that ? Here are a few points (not an ideal, because they are realized in practice by successful firms).

1. Correction by subordinates. As a young associate, you are expected to know your case and to correct errors made by those above you in the pecking order. Obviously, that includes substantive legal and factual errors, but also such things as grammar. Of course, if you expect to stay around, you had best be right most of the time. You are also expected to discuss (intelligently) the many judgment calls that have to be made. All good things have to come to an end. So, if you are a regular "counterformist", you will not last long.

2. Lines of Communication. You are expected to use horizontal lines of communication - with those roughly on your level; and to share knowledge. Selfish folks also did not last long. Vertical communications also had to be open - usually initiated from higher levels. Say, you have a four-person case team. The top dog wants input from all lower levels. So, it wouldn't be unusual for the bottom dog to be asked to give the top dog a complete brief (one on one) on the case. In that atmosphere, "yes men" also do not last long.

3. Consideration. The rule was simply "don't kiss ass upstairs; don't kick ass downstairs" - thank yous to the secretarial pool go a long way. And although vertical communications were open, never go behind someone's back. Positive input goes upstairs; negative input goes through the "chain of command". All of that is simply a matter of judgment and discretion.

In short, the normal world that Bill Donovan lived in for 50 years - after graduating Columbia Law in 1908 - was one where independent thinking, shared communications, exhaustive (but not exhausting) argument, judgment and discretion, were the norm. So, in that sense, Bill Donovan was a conformist. In WWII, half of the partners of the lawfirm where I later worked were "in uniform" (some in Donovan's organization).