Don't need no Strategy........We need a System for Winning.
3 part interview with Army Special Forces Major on The Green Beret System for Winning.......throw in a little Airpower just in case
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/cat...ibe-at-a-time/
Don't need no Strategy........We need a System for Winning.
3 part interview with Army Special Forces Major on The Green Beret System for Winning.......throw in a little Airpower just in case
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/cat...ibe-at-a-time/
A System for Winning?
Won't that get in the way of the current program?
What are you suggesting?
I see this as a variant of the ink blot strategy, but gets into more of the nitty-gritty of how individual units should behave and embed with the population. I think it would work in a lot of places, but certainly not all. A lot of other things would have to change in order to make it workable longer than the length of one deployment.
"The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
-- Ken White
"With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap
"We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen
One of my favorite parts of the article was:
" When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The Chinese bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider. But, on the fifth year the tree often grows more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to grow so much in year five.
Bottom line: A Tribal Engagement Strategy will have to be given time to do its work. But in the end, the result will be far-reaching and strategic in nature—a strong presence, firmly rooted, great in stature."
The problem is: What have we been doing for nine years? How do we catch up?
No offense but history will indicate that SF had a lot to do with stabilizing big parts of Northern Iraq. Worked with a lot of folks from Campbell. They had the some very good tactics, and knew everything about their AO and what it was about.
Evolution for Green Beret days?
Slap- great article
Intel Trooper- The FID/SF option is night and day to the current GPF-led COIN option. I respect what GEN McChrystal did with JSOC, and I know he was trained at one time as a snake-eater, but SF does not equal McChrystal. They parted ways a long time ago. Currently, they are mutually exclusive. Anyone that's worked with him or them will agree. A lot of unneeded resentment and anger between both parties (mostly over intel and aircraft requirements). In this case, we're looking at ROI/ROE, return on investment and return on equity- basic microeconomics. In this case, 10 men to a village, not 100. STP adds the part of JSOTF in northern Iraq. I hope the story is unclassified soon so that everyone can understand their contribution.
STP- my favorite quote too. Below, I'll break in down in a couple of days as I sort it out in my mind the economics for both the laymen and the think tanks. It's Present Value to Future Value. The same equations we make on any loan or investment.
It's all about adjusting the appropriate principle and rate while mitigating the inherent risks." When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The Chinese bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider. But, on the fifth year the tree often grows more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to grow so much in year five.
Bottom line: A Tribal Engagement Strategy will have to be given time to do its work. But in the end, the result will be far-reaching and strategic in nature—a strong presence, firmly rooted, great in stature."
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 10-15-2009 at 02:53 AM.
Good link.
SF working with tribes... so re-learning all the stuff that was a core SF function back in the 1960's? Sad really. Why do we keep having to re-invent this stuff??
Yes, that's very much our good old way of doing business, as I have said many, many times before. Why does no one want to copy this idea? Seems a lot more sensible than a "Human Terrain Team."“From the 1890s to 1947, British control relied heavily on a small number of highly trained British officers. These frontier officers were highly educated, committed, conscientious, and hard working. Many had studied law and the history of the area and spoke some of the local languages. They had a deep sense of duty and a strong national identity. All required a depth of administrative competence and judgment to successfully wield the extensive powers at their disposal. They contributed significantly to the province’s security and stability. These men were particularly valuable in navigating the intricacies of tribal politics.” (To Create a Stable Afghanistan, Roe, p. 20, Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005)
What is more, this was never a hidden fact. It was a central pillar of Colonial Administration, and extremely well reported and well researched, and it some shape or form, they never went away. They just evolved, into something ,some would say was less useful, now we don't have an empire.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Before you can talk about a system for winning, you have to know your objective. Winning means accomplishing your objective, and you can't do that if you don't know what the objective is. If anyone here knows what the objective in Afghanistan is, in anything beyond the most nebulous and vacuous terms, please tell me, because I haven't a clue, and I suspect that many others haven't either.
It also helps to have an achievable objective. If our objective is to transform Afghanistan into a liberal democracy, we're toast, because we can't do that.
We also have to assure that we're applying tools that are appropriate to the objective being pursued. You don't start building a house by showing up with a demolition team, and you don't start demolishing a building by showing up with construction workers.
If we don't get those matters in order from the start, the best we can do is to come up with a system for winning the battles and losing the war. We have, I believe, been there and done that.
If you watch all the videos they talk about that a great deal. The Military Objective is all about achieving a certain" Effect on the Populace."
But there is a lot of merit in what you say about what is the final Political Objective. I would agree with you I don't think anybody knows. Which is a big,big,big problem.
So we know the military objective but not the political objective... isn't that a little backwards?
Don't know where we're goin', but we know how to get there...
the Age of Aquarius, the Age of Aquarius .... Aquarius !!! Seems some Brotherhood and Understanding will then come about, etc. etc.
Cheerrs
Mike
Bookmarks