The Green Beret System For Winning

[slapout9]

Don't need no Strategy........We need a System for Winning.
3 part interview with Army Special Forces Major on The Green Beret System for Winning.......throw in a little Airpower just in case




http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/cat...ibe-at-a-time/

[Steve the Planner]

A System for Winning?

Won't that get in the way of the current program?

What are you suggesting?

[IntelTrooper]

I see this as a variant of the ink blot strategy, but gets into more of the nitty-gritty of how individual units should behave and embed with the population. I think it would work in a lot of places, but certainly not all. A lot of other things would have to change in order to make it workable longer than the length of one deployment.

[slapout9]

A System for Winning?

Won't that get in the way of the current program?

What are you suggesting?

STP, just suggesting that you read the link and then comment.

[Steve the Planner]

One of my favorite parts of the article was:

" When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The Chinese bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider. But, on the fifth year the tree often grows more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to grow so much in year five.

Bottom line: A Tribal Engagement Strategy will have to be given time to do its work. But in the end, the result will be far-reaching and strategic in nature—a strong presence, firmly rooted, great in stature."

The problem is: What have we been doing for nine years? How do we catch up?

No offense but history will indicate that SF had a lot to do with stabilizing big parts of Northern Iraq. Worked with a lot of folks from Campbell. They had the some very good tactics, and knew everything about their AO and what it was about.

Evolution for Green Beret days?

[slapout9]

One of my favorite parts of the article was:

" When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The Chinese bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider. But, on the fifth year the tree often grows more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to grow so much in year five.

That Marine Corps guy that runs the website put that part in by mistake It would not take that long by any means.

[MikeF]

Slap- great article

Intel Trooper- The FID/SF option is night and day to the current GPF-led COIN option. I respect what GEN McChrystal did with JSOC, and I know he was trained at one time as a snake-eater, but SF does not equal McChrystal. They parted ways a long time ago. Currently, they are mutually exclusive. Anyone that's worked with him or them will agree. A lot of unneeded resentment and anger between both parties (mostly over intel and aircraft requirements). In this case, we're looking at ROI/ROE, return on investment and return on equity- basic microeconomics. In this case, 10 men to a village, not 100. STP adds the part of JSOTF in northern Iraq. I hope the story is unclassified soon so that everyone can understand their contribution.

STP- my favorite quote too. Below, I'll break in down in a couple of days as I sort it out in my mind the economics for both the laymen and the think tanks. It's Present Value to Future Value. The same equations we make on any loan or investment.

" When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not grow more than one inch above the ground. During the second year, after more watering and fertilizing, the tree does not grow any more than it did during year one. The Chinese bamboo tree is still no more than one inch high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by any outsider. But, on the fifth year the tree often grows more than eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots that enable the tree to grow so much in year five.

Bottom line: A Tribal Engagement Strategy will have to be given time to do its work. But in the end, the result will be far-reaching and strategic in nature—a strong presence, firmly rooted, great in stature."

It's all about adjusting the appropriate principle and rate while mitigating the inherent risks.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Good link.

SF working with tribes... so re-learning all the stuff that was a core SF function back in the 1960's? Sad really. Why do we keep having to re-invent this stuff??

“From the 1890s to 1947, British control relied heavily on a small number of highly trained British officers. These frontier officers were highly educated, committed, conscientious, and hard working. Many had studied law and the history of the area and spoke some of the local languages. They had a deep sense of duty and a strong national identity. All required a depth of administrative competence and judgment to successfully wield the extensive powers at their disposal. They contributed significantly to the province’s security and stability. These men were particularly valuable in navigating the intricacies of tribal politics.” (To Create a Stable Afghanistan, Roe, p. 20, Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005)

Yes, that's very much our good old way of doing business, as I have said many, many times before. Why does no one want to copy this idea? Seems a lot more sensible than a "Human Terrain Team."

What is more, this was never a hidden fact. It was a central pillar of Colonial Administration, and extremely well reported and well researched, and it some shape or form, they never went away. They just evolved, into something ,some would say was less useful, now we don't have an empire.

[Steve the Planner]

William:

Re: British Officers

Last December, I was reviewing the British Officer/Agent reports from Iraq (WWI Era) of field trips to the east of Khanaqin.

Their amazing meticulousness (names, people, locations, political/economic dynamics) reminded me of the reports I got from Ft. Campbell friends scattered around Northern Iraq in 2008.

Great similarities: Strategic Patience. Astute and Incisive Observation. Background Knowledge to understand what they were seeing, and draw from it what was important.

Steve

PS- Same bad guys, locations and problems then as now. The names changed. Better weapons. SUVs instead of horses.

[William F. Owen]

Great similarities: Strategic Patience. Astute and Incisive Observation. Background Knowledge to understand what they were seeing, and draw from it what was important.

Thanks Steve,

This is yet another classic and on-going case of people not studying history and inventing "new and better ways."

[jmm99]

might be answered by the answer as to how long did those colonial administrators stay in country ? Where did their wives live and where did their kids grow up ? E.g., John Masters.

While the US presence may not be very transient, the tours of its officers and NCOs in a given unit or locale are. On the civilian side of the ledger, we (US) do not have the horses - as Schmedlap has graphically pointed out.

Finally, the British administrators were administering part of the British Empire; and as such, were applying British governance. We (US) do not have that luxury in places like Astan where we have to sell Karzai governance. E.g., Thompson in Malaya vs Thompson in South Vietnam.

[Steve the Planner]

jmm:

Finally, the British administrators were administering part of the British Empire; and as such, were applying British governance. We (US) do not have that luxury in places like Astan where we have to sell Karzai governance. E.g., Thompson in Malaya vs Thompson in South Vietnam.

My problem with that is: we created/enabled/defined Karzai. He sat at the knee of George Bush and Amb. Khalilizad for too long while we failed to institute and support good governance by contracting fraud, foolish bureaucratic waste, lack of cohesive and coordinated planning for ways, means and ends, etc.. Just throwing a lot of international contractors at problems is hardly a path to enlightenment.

Assuming the game plan is to stay, somehow, we have to make him and his government more effective, or, in a Toynbee sort of way, bypass the defective parts.

New mission?

[Ken White]

SF working with tribes... so re-learning all the stuff that was a core SF function back in the 1960's? Sad really. Why do we keep having to re-invent this stuff??

The Teams did what they were trained to do, no more. Then they got pulled onto other missions they probably should not have been given. We don't have to keep re-inventing anything but we, the US dumbed down our training in the 1970s and it still has not recovered. We also invented USSOCOM and created yet more turf battles.

In the 1960s, SF helped train GPF units for "COIN." That worked. Today, they're 'too busy.' Turf is turf, spaces are spaces...

Yes, that's (Colonial District or frontier Officers) very much our good old way of doing business, as I have said many, many times before. Why does no one want to copy this idea? Seems a lot more sensible than a "Human Terrain Team."

Umm, probably because there are no more Colonies and in today's PC world, attempting to do that would bring a firestorm of complaints -- not least from the western intelligentsia...

Steve the planner:

Last December, I was reviewing the British Officer/Agent reports from Iraq (WWI Era) of field trips to the east of Khanaqin.

Their amazing meticulousness (names, people, locations, political/economic dynamics) reminded me of the reports I got from Ft. Campbell friends scattered around Northern Iraq in 2008

That's reassuring, I was beginning to think you hadn't seen anyone from the US ever do anything correctly or to your satisfaction.

My problem with that is: we created/enabled/defined Karzai. He sat at the knee of George Bush and Amb. Khalilizad for too long while we failed to institute and support good governance by contracting fraud, foolish bureaucratic waste, lack of cohesive and coordinated planning for ways, means and ends, etc.. Just throwing a lot of international contractors at problems is hardly a path to enlightenment.

Yep. All true. Penalty of doing business in a democracy -- you get all sorts of people in positions of power. Some are good, some not, so you get a mixed bag of competence and almost dangerous ineptitude. What we need is a benevolent dictator to put a stop to that...

Same with the contractors and consultants. Some are worth their money, some are not. Unfortunately, Congress's rules on how to hire are oriented toward 'fairness,' 'cost-effectiveness' and their Districts, not performance. That democracy thing again. That's also what dictates the Army's makeup and personnel criteria -- again, competence is not an issue. Same thing is responsible for the SOCOM and rest of the services turf battles I mentioned to Wilf above.. Thus I fear you'll have to keep complaining...

Assuming the game plan is to stay, somehow, we have to make him and his government more effective, or, in a Toynbee sort of way, bypass the defective parts.

Most everyone would agree. Pity no one has an idea that is politically acceptable of just how that might be accomplished...

[BayonetBrant]

Good link.
Why does no one want to copy this idea? Seems a lot more sensible than a "Human Terrain Team."

What is more, this was never a hidden fact. It was a central pillar of Colonial Administration, and extremely well reported and well researched, and it some shape or form, they never went away.

Because you can't put those guys in place an 12-month rotations...


It seems like we've thrown out the administrative babies with the 'colonial' bathwater. Because all things 'colonial' are bad we can't use any of it, even if it makes sense, otherwise we risk looking like the white man bringing civilization to the savages, and we can't have that. ugh.

[jmm99]

from STP
My problem with that is: we created/enabled/defined Karzai. He sat at the knee of George Bush and Amb. Khalilizad for too long while we failed to institute and support good governance by contracting fraud, foolish bureaucratic waste, lack of cohesive and coordinated planning for ways, means and ends, etc.. Just throwing a lot of international contractors at problems is hardly a path to enlightenment.

Assuming the game plan is to stay, somehow, we have to make him and his government more effective, or, in a Toynbee sort of way, bypass the defective parts.

New mission?

The solution would be 40,000 civilians, competent in Afghani governance, fluent in the various Astan languages (and the many Pashtun dialects), honest and filled with integrity, etc., etc. And, if 40,000 more troops are needed to provide them security, so be it. Those 40,000 civilian horses are not available that I know of.

It matters not who caused the mess - the question is whether there is an answer that is feasible given present capabilities and that would lead to an acceptable endstate.

All I know is that we have a 2005 Executive to Executive Joint Strategic Partnership with the Karzai government (which has been re-affirmed). That looks like a valid executive agreement to me; although it contains enough lawyerly weasel words to allow either party to bail out.

[Steve the Planner]

jmm:

"The solution would be 40,000 civilians, competent in Afghani governance, fluent in the various Astan languages (and the many Pashtun dialects), honest and filled with integrity, etc., etc. And, if 40,000 more troops are needed to provide them security, so be it. Those 40,000 civilian horses are not available that I know of."

We have all witnessed a tremendous amount of military/diplomatic effort to analyze an enemy as part of the foundation for military strategy revisions.

On the civilian side, we have a country of, arguably, between 26 million and 33.5 million population. Poorly educated, primarily young (and possibly malnourished with all the ramifications for educational attainment), poorly resourced, often living in informal urban settlements, and very difficult to serve on a uniform basis due to geography and diversity of culture, langauge, etc... Behind that, we have a "ticking time bomb" of some $1 million students per year graduating from school into ????

If as much effort were focused on the civilian side as on the military effort, a couple of things would be evident.

First, it would be good to know (plus or minus 7 million people) how many people would be the subject of service, and to disaggregate them by location, urban/rural, language, ethnic background, etc...

Next, it would be good to assess, for each major category, what resources exist today, what needs exist today, and what services are culturally and practically appropriate as a reasonable short, medium and long-tefrm objective (to accomplish whatever minimum goal is identified).

Finally, regardless of the estimated 5,000 civilian expat experts wandering around Kabul, a plan needs to be devised to connect Afghans to their own solutions. Can kids graduating from school become teachers for the others, and the technicians needed to maintain irrigation systems? Can unemployed workers in the cities (and informal settlements) become laborers (and later, skilled workers) to maintain and improve city services? Can the agricultural core be protected against the ravages of a distorted aid-based economy & foreign imports to improve their market connections to local cities, and, thus, greater prosperity?

Where in that mission do we find the need for 40,000 foreign civilian experts? What, if anything, could they produce other than what they do now?

In my civilian planning work, the Africom/Centcom countries are crying out for planning and technical resources. Last week, the American Planning Association/ through the Global Planners Network/ were discussing ways to provide "Planners without Borders" assistance to these countries (including Afghanistan and Iraq), despite a lack of any governmental or non-profit funding resources, and with the likelihood that, for many of these countries, we could not even get visas, let alone secure PSDs to support coivilian asistance. What's wrong with that picture?

Where the military problem has been Clear, Clear and Re-Clear, with no successful holding or building capability, it would be a good thing, if exit depends on it, to spend at least a little time contemplating how to accomplish whatever the civilian mission may be. No?

I know some folks like to believe that because their civilian efforts to date were well-intended, or took a lot of commitment, that they were productive. But, like a guy on a mountaintop with a jammed rifle and the enemy at the door, reality is a very cold, hard thing. Our civilian post-conflict and reconstruction process is seriously defective. But that does not mean that solutions are not possible using a different approach.

Just my opinion.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

The Green Beret method is a pretty good guidepost for effective civilian re-strategy.

Strategic Patience. Astute and Incisive Observation. Background Knowledge to understand what they were seeing, and draw from it what was important.

And, heavy engagement and participation of locally available resources, affiliations, organizations, and people.

Steve

[OfTheTroops]

IMO The law gives and the law takes away. The law is the basis for Modern society. Tribal law, religious law, constitutional law, it does not matter. In order to be legitimate everyone needs to know the rules of the game. Our Tribal Engagement Teams, Embedded Transition Teams, MTT, PTT efforts are to immerse ourselves in the understanding of the rules of the game. We are not into empire building but security building. You can always lead a horse to water but how do you get him to drink.

Just taking a stab so i can receive my lessons on all of the etiquette I have broken and how my discussion does not apply.

[jmm99]

from STP
... 40,000 foreign civilian experts....

I said:

... 40,000 civilians, competent in Afghani governance, fluent in the various Astan languages (and the many Pashtun dialects), honest and filled with integrity, etc., etc.

and nothing about national origin. Nice if they were Afghanis

BTW: 40,000 in 30,000,000 breaks down to 40 per 30,000 population - not a large municipal staff.

Anyway, if the Telegraph has a good crystal ball, the 40,000 for security is in the cards.

United States to send 'up to 45,000 more troops to Afghanistan'
The US is expected to announce a significant surge of up to 45,000 extra troops for Afghanistan after Gordon Brown said that 500 more British troops would be sent to the country.

By James Kirkup and Andrew Hough
Published: 11:29PM BST 14 Oct 2009

President Barack Obama's administration is understood to have told the British government that it could announce, as early as next week, the substantial increase to its 65,000 troops already serving there.

The decision from Mr Obama comes after he considered a request from General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, to send tens of thousands of extra American troops to the country.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff, said: "I don't want to put words in the mouths of the Americans but I am fairly confident of the way it is going to come out."

An announcement next week could coincide with a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Bratislava, Slovakia, due next Thursday and Friday.

White House press secretary Robert Gibbs dismissed the claims, after President Obama met with his war council for the fifth time to map out a new strategy in Afghanistan.

"I would not put any weight behind the fact that a decision has been made, when the President has yet to make a decision," he told reporters in Washington.

"I've seen the report. It's not true, either generally or specifically. The president has not made a decision."

But Ministry of Defence sources indicated that the British Government had been told to expect a substantial increase in the number of of American troops. .......

[Steve the Planner]

jmm:

I have seen reports that there was a pretty well functioning civil service for a period: 2001 to 2005????

So where did it go? What's to prevent rebuilding it?

Definitely Afghan based.

What the US DoD has, but often underestimates, is a remarkable resource of logictics, systematic planning/analysis/means-end monitoring, transportation, visibility, and resource convening. Optimizing that against a viable Afghan plan in any sector of public service would truly light a fire under reconstruction.

Steve