Applied Smart Power by a SEAL

[Steve the Planner]

I was particularly struck by recent comments of new Army Chief Odierno that the US military presence not be too big----which would be an impediment to Iraqi progress for its own self-determination.

A small, belated but very insightful mea culpa to the entire sphere of post-defeat "foreign" activism, under any acronym we care to attach.

In grad school in the 1980s, the buzz word was Industrial Policy. The Japanese centralized control and we did not. The argument went that we must follow their lead or (1) we would be toast, and (2) they would take over the world.

A decade ago, the planning profession became enthralled with the term "Smart Growth," to which, ultimately, every smart, dumb, good or bad idea later became attached, and could be thoroughly argued from each side---to the point of meaninglessness.

I am all for "Smart Power," and generally, smart anything, but I can't seem to extend that to haphazard "Whole-of-Government" approaches, or ill-conceived COIN strategies aimed to locally prop up an ineffective central government, etc...

Smart is as Smart does, but it seems, from recent use, that those who argued it, and plaster "Smart" all over their idea, program, project or policy, do so to mask underlying problems.

In Northern Iraq in early 2008, the bridges were all down across the Tigris, and checkpoints restricted almost every movement. It was obvious that trade could not be restored until bridges were reopened and paths cleared.

That done, the recently released Wiki sitreps from Salah ad Din, for example, showed prices dropping, trade increasing, and business returning---across the board.

There is not a lot of rocket science to this, and no need to attach Smart monikers to most obvious post-conflict problems or solutions.

No matter how you label them, if they are stupid, they will fail.

[Bill Moore]

I am all for "Smart Power," and generally, smart anything, but I can't seem to extend that to haphazard "Whole-of-Government" approaches, or ill-conceived COIN strategies aimed to locally prop up an ineffective central government, etc...

Smart is as Smart does, but it seems, from recent use, that those who argued it, and plaster "Smart" all over their idea, program, project or policy, do so to mask underlying problems.

These are great comments. I'm personally under the belief that good ole American egos drive this type of discussion. Of course applying power smartly is better than applying stupidly, but simply calling it smart power doesn't make it smart. I have seen little evidence that our government leaders are even half as smart as our founding fathers who actually thought deeply about important topics and had a better understanding of how the world worked then than we do now buried in information overload.

I think you're right, we are masking the underlying problems with our rhetoric and doctrine. The State Department is largely a relic of history and DOD is trying to fix problems that would most likely fix themselves if they just got out the way.

[Dayuhan]

I didn't see much of substance in the speech or the briefing, mostly broad generalities and motherhood statements... but that's what you expect in a speech. It's hard to argue with using the full range of tools at our disposal, but that's nothing very new, and it seems less a new direction or a new strategy than an effort to highlight a difference from the previous administration's perceived over-reliance on "hard power". "Smart power" seems to me largely a way to imply that the last bunch to sit in the chair were stupid. I wouldn't argue with that proposition, but I've yet to see anything resembling evidence of a smarter proposal, on any level beyond broad generalities and motherhood statements.

It would seem smarter, to me at least, if somebody would explain what they propose to do, on a practical, tangible level, and what exactly makes it smart.

I'd still point out that even the smartest, most balanced, most nuanced mix of powers will be ineffective if applied in pursuit of goals that are poorly chosen and impractical. Smart power starts with smart policy, and that starts with choosing goals wisely. I'm not convinced that we've done that in Afghanistan, to cite one example.

[Steve the Planner]

Rory Stewart's recent piece in NYT, The Uncontrollable Momentum of War, provides a sobering reminder that an analysis with only one line of investigation, one premise, one perspective, and one outcome is not always the smartest way to proceed.

For all those focused on "measurables" and "metrics" even if via simplistic red, yellow, green colors, I wonder which metrics are following those of Stewart, Semple, etc...

I became a planner because I was interested in the connections between things--linkages to problem causation, and viable solution paths (linked to actual resources, schedules, plans and programs that (realistic means to credible ends)).

My problem with much of this "Smart" stuff is that I only find broken links, paths to no apparent outcomes, and resources applied for no obvious purpose.

Maybe it's just me???

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/op...stewart10.html

[Bill Moore]

My problem with much of this "Smart" stuff is that I only find broken links, paths to no apparent outcomes, and resources applied for no obvious purpose.

Maybe it's just me???

Steve, hardly, I think many of us who don't drink the CNAS Kool-Aide feel this way, and I think that is part of the reason our senior leadership wants to see metrics, because their intutition is informing them that what we're doing at great expense to the American people isn't working. Metrics isn't the answer for most of the things we do in the military due to the dynamic situation. There is also the tendency to bias metrics to create the perception that we're on the right path.

Instead of metrics, we should be able to explain why are actions are progressing towards the desired objective, and how that objective ties into our strategic end.

As for planning, I agree with your reasons, and would add that one of our biggest flaws is identifying the real problems, and then identifying which problems "we" need to address and which ones we should ignore. Design is supposed to help us in that regard, but if the planners/designers can't approach design in an unbias manner they'll shape the design to justify their preconceived views (seen it). It is very difficult to overcome our human weaknesses, and even tougher to overcome organizational bias that is reinforced by peer pressure.

[Bill Moore]

Steve,

Good article, and while it is opinion peace the author obviously has a good understanding of the situation based on his experience in Afghanistan. I'll also post this link on the AFPAK thread.

A couple of interesting excerpts:

When I walked alone across central Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 and 2002, I found Afghan villagers to be hospitable and generous, but also far more conservative, insular and Islamist than foreigners acknowledged. When I returned to the country in 2006, to establish a nonprofit organization, it was clear that their resistance was inflamed by the increasingly heavy presence of Western troops, which allowed the Taliban to gain support by presenting themselves as fighters for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign occupation.

That is obvious to most of us I hope.

In reference to the Carr Center at Harvard:

The center’s research fellows collectively had more than a century of experience on the ground in Afghanistan. Research by fellows such as Andrew Wilder, David Mansfield and Michael Semple proved that our aid projects were increasing instability; that we were undermining any chance of political settlement with the Taliban; and that the Taliban-controlled areas were often more secure than the government areas. Their findings explained why our counterinsurgency strategy was empty and the “surge” was counterproductive, but they were often ignored by the military and political establishment, which has remained defiantly optimistic.

At the heart of our irrational persistence are the demons of guilt and fear. Leaders are hypnotized by fears about global security; feel guilty about the loss of lives; ashamed at their inability to honor our promises to Afghans; and terrified of admitting defeat.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

As to any negative implications as to military, my experience was with Gen. Hertling and his 1AD staff at MND-North in 2007/8.

Most outsiders could never have imagined such a crack, and deeply experienced batch of folks seriously pursuing and accomplishing the objectives assigned to them, and pushing hard past any inconsistencies presented.

I recall a conference at Spiecher in early 2008 where then-MG Hertling flew the Baghdad Embassy staff up to explain the plan to stabilize/reconstruct Iraq, so that his staff could support it. When they realized there was none, all of us set about creating on for Northern Iraq---and implementing it with high-level support to bypass the obvious obstacles.

Read the Wiki cables from Salah ad Din, for example, and you will see measurable reports of goods returning to markets, and pricing dropping. People were getting back to life from the safer routes and repaired bridges courtesy of MND-North with Iraqi cooperation and security. Still dangerous, but functioning. This is not rocket science.

Our mission (forget about the window-dressing) was what Gen Odierno is espousing today---to create enough stability to rapidly turn Iraq over to the Iraqis an rapidly get us out of the middle of the road, both for ours and Iraq's sake. Iraq's infrastructure is, today, as bad as its politics, but fixing them is now, properly, up to Iraqis.

Afghanistan, however, is a different kettle of fish from start to finish. My concern has always been that, first, there is no viable plan, and, second, the options for a commander to create his own and successfully implement it were non-existent.

The flaw was in the strategy (or lack thereof), and no amount of tactics, however well considered, could, on a material and sustainable basis, overcome it.

If, as was the case in Iraq, Ambassador Crocker put out a call for civilian troubleshooters to come and cut the Gordian Knot, I would be there, ponce again, as soon as all the silly pre-deployment details were overcome, but even he has not done that in Afghanistan, with ominous suggestions that, in effect, there really is no Gordian Knot that the US can cut.

It is a very different problem set, in large part because of the lack of indigenous resources and capabilities, not actually enhanced during our tenure (as Stewart notes) despite Herculean efforts by those on the ground.