Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[Bob's World]

Senior leaders tend to take themselves too seriously...and thereby ascribe the same self-importance to the leadership of their opponents.

Querry: How deep into the leadership chain at the Pentagon would you have to cut in order to have a negative effect on US military operations?
1 deep?
10?
100?
1000?

Query two:
As you are chopping away at the top of the pyramid with no measureable affect on performance of the organization; what affect are your actions having on the motivation of the organization and its populace base of support to continue the fight???


The real question isn't if he is dead or not; the real question is what is the relative effect of conducting such operations in the first place.

[davidbfpo]

Query two: As you are chopping away at the top of the pyramid with no measureable affect on performance of the organization; what affect are your actions having on the motivation of the organization and its populace base of support to continue the fight??? The real question isn't if he is dead or not; the real question is what is the relative effect of conducting such operations in the first place.

From a faraway armchair and mindful that less deaths are preferable, primarily because of the local Pashtun culture i.e. revenge and status, my answers are and not in priority:

1) As a symbol and dangerous leader his removal is justified. Primarily with it's local effect and on Pakistan. Symbolism aside little effect to the USA etc (IMHO the White House spokesman should have stayed silent).

2) Yes, new leadership will appear and have to adapt further their lifestyle.

3) From my knowledge of Kashmiri-Pakistanis here they prefer to stand on the sidelines and await a sign who is stronger. That is where the impact could / should be on the flow of support, recruitment and legitimacy.

4) The action extends the window of opportunity for Pakistan to act in the FATA; in some ways following the Imperial strategy - harsh punishment.

davidbfpo

[George L. Singleton]

Ironic that British Commonwealth status allows some of the actual terrorists more travel access from their native areas into UK and elsewhere worldwide in the Commonwealth, especially including Canada.

[davidbfpo]

Ironic that British Commonwealth status allows some of the actual terrorists more travel access from their native areas into UK and elsewhere worldwide in the Commonwealth, especially including Canada.

George,

The UK visa rules are now quite strict in theory; both Indian and Pakistani visitors need visas for example, whereas the 'Old Commonwealth' do not, so Australians have visa-free travel for example. For the current list see: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/po...les/appendix1/

Yes, there are gaps and fraud can allow entry. For example an Indian national wanted for a Mumbai terror attack in 2006 got entry to work here and then disappeared: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ghlight=mumbai Post 5.

The US DHS regularly raises the issue of visa-less travel by UK nationals to the USA, not that they are worried about Mr & Mrs Smith.

davidbfpo

[George L. Singleton]

David, thanks for the travel v. visas clarification(s).

I suspected my post on this topic would get a comment or two from you.

[davidbfpo]

An assessment, pro & con on: http://counterterrorismblog.org/ (Currently first item).

Secondly there is an old thread on assassination of high value targets etc: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4025 and a June 2009 update by Steve Metz, with a PPT on the topic: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...nterest-14.pdf

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Querry: How deep into the leadership chain at the Pentagon would you have to cut in order to have a negative effect on US military operations?
1 deep?
10?
100?
1000?

Perhaps a better comparison is how many of a deployed SF A-TEAM would you have to kill for them to loose their effectiveness.

Killing enemy leaders works. It may not be highly effective, but I cannot think of any good reason to pass up the opportunity. Also from an intelligence perspective identifying and tracking enemy leaderships, usually brings a host full of other goodies.

[jcustis]

Killing enemy leaders works. It may not be highly effective, but I cannot think of any good reason to pass up the opportunity.

By this statement Wilf, are you saying that going after leadership is always worth the squeeze, even if it turns out to not be highly effective?

At what point is a leader's death worth 1, 10, 100 civilian casualties? Not trying to apples and orange this issue, but this does go back to a potential collateral damage issue that I think always needs to be thought of.

[Ken White]

At what point is a leader's death worth 1, 10, 100 civilian casualties? Not trying to apples and orange this issue, but this does go back to a potential collateral damage issue that I think always needs to be thought of.

How can you ever ascertain that, other than those who were killed in the specific attack, casualties are due to that death or action?

If you mean solely those who are nearby and thus who may be or are killed due to the attack on a specific individual, is not that attack made considering the likelihood of those casualties and thus a determination of the cost / benefit ratio is made by he or she who orders the attack? If that is the case, is that not a judgment call on the part of the order issuer based on the particulars of each case and thus subject to situational variance? Can such judgments be wrong? Surely -- but does that eliminate the need to make the call, sometimes incurring that cost, sometimes passing the opportunity by?

Please note I used 'situational variance' and probably too many words, not METT-TC. I expect an Atta-Boy.

[jcustis]

Ken, I was thinking more on the line of civilians killed as a result of the specific attack. Seems we go for a lot of precision in these things, but if killing a leader may not be effective, as Wilf comments, why do it? I'm asking that in a rhetorical way I suppose, because I do agree that the decisions do need to be made, and I know the calculations do happen.

And I do firmly believe that we need to target leaders...no wafting about that.

[William F. Owen]

By this statement Wilf, are you saying that going after leadership is always worth the squeeze, even if it turns out to not be highly effective?

How will you know? What evidence is there to date, that it is counter-productive? I said not "highly effective."
That they get replaced is not a reason not to do it.
My sole point is that killing enemy leaders, usually makes life more difficult for the enemy.

At what point is a leader's death worth 1, 10, 100 civilian casualties? Not trying to apples and orange this issue, but this does go back to a potential collateral damage issue that I think always needs to be thought of.

Of course. You have to weigh the political objective/benefit, against the down side. Your never killing these folks for fun. Your killing them to advance your policy and make their life more difficult. How many civilians is Osama Bin Laden worth? I really don't know, but hopefully someone does.

[George L. Singleton]

HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD, brother of the late Batullah Mashud who was killed by missle strike this week, who was today named to replace his brother as top Taliban commander in Paksitan, may himself have been shot dead today. See below which is from Global Hujra Online today.

Originally Posted by wazir_gul (GLOBAL HUJRA source)
Hakimullah Mehsud killed in armed clash: sources
Updated at: 2120 PST, Saturday, August 08, 2009
SOUTH WAZIRISTAN: Spokesman of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud and another Taliban leader Wali-ur-Rehman have been killed in an armed clash erupted during the Tehreek’s Shura meeting, Geo TV reported Saturday.

At the meeting Hakimullah Mehsud was appointed as TTP Chief after the reported killing of Baitullah Mehsud, the state media reported.

The agenda of the meeting was to appoint successor of Baitullah Mehsud, sources said.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=84579

[Bob's World]

Perhaps a better comparison is how many of a deployed SF A-TEAM would you have to kill for them to loose their effectiveness.

Killing enemy leaders works. It may not be highly effective, but I cannot think of any good reason to pass up the opportunity. Also from an intelligence perspective identifying and tracking enemy leaderships, usually brings a host full of other goodies.

The junior man of any ODA is quite capable of leading himself, and determining if he has the wherewithal to accomplish the mission or not.

But this is not the point I hoped to make. This focus on HVIs is more to the point that I am working through in my "Full-Spectrum Deterrence" and "Deterrence of Irregular Threats" work. Certainly there is a degree of "Prevent" when a key leader is taken out. There will be a short period of sorting out who steps up next for that one particular actor. But what provocative effect does this have elsewhere across a broad range of actors?

Now, I recognize this following fact cuts both ways: 50 years ago to take out such a guy in a COIN effort may well lead to temporary peace in his zone of influence. Today, word of this attack raced around the world in minutes. Some may well have been deterred by the news, for fear of suffering a similar fate. Many more were probably outraged and provoked by the news. What is the net gain or loss?? Hard to say. Generals like assessments, but there is no way to assess that. One man dead.

My strong suspicion is that such temporal, tactical gains produce far more strategic downside than upside on today's global "battlefield." Bragging about these hits to show how we are being effective is what is causing the strategic downside.

We need to just shut up, and be quiet professionals. Do the job and let those who choose to speculate speculate, but the ones we're really trying to influence know exactly what happened.

We are slipping into the same trap with unmanned aircraft and their missiles that we fell into with our bombers and guided munitions. Some news is best delivered in person. Short, violent raids with no post-op clamoring for glory will be less likely to produce the strategic downside, and probably be far more respected by those we target and thereby produce better results.

[Ken White]

We are slipping into the same trap with unmanned aircraft and their missiles that we fell into with our bombers and guided munitions. Some news is best delivered in person. Short, violent raids with no post-op clamoring for glory will be less likely to produce the strategic downside, and probably be far more respected by those we target and thereby produce better results.

Very much so.

However, I suspect that three things get in the way and in order of effect they are: Political will to launch and cope with the fallout; The issue of US casualties and potential prisoners to be exploited; The turf battle over who goes, who transports them, who extracts them, who's in charge and who's the backup and thus who gets the glory pre, during AND post op.

There are answers to all those, some easy, some less so. However, I have no doubt that's where we need to go. That's where we should have gone after Korea had we not gotten entranced with the flawed Massive Retaliation and then overeacted in response in typically American fashion and created Flexible Response predicated on an even more badly flawed philosophy of "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." Catchy but extremely short sighted and no strategy at all. Wasn't even really a policy, in fact, just political blather which is still causing problems today -- it did give you guys a catchy motto, though.

Strategic Raids will do far more good than interfering in other nations -- cost less, also...

In the new thinking department, I was pushing that 20 years before Eagle Claw and the Marines were doing it long before even I was born. They started on 3 March 1776 or 27 April 1805 or 18 November 1824, criteria dependent.

One of the young LTCs I pushed it to long ago and who agreed later became the DCSOPS of the Army and later named the first issue I cited as the killer. You and I have both watched the third issue and the second is part but not all of the reason for the first. Simply, the Pols will ask for a guarantee that cannot be given. Unless, of course, someone gets really innovative...

[jcustis]

My strong suspicion is that such temporal, tactical gains produce far more strategic downside than upside on today's global "battlefield." Bragging about these hits to show how we are being effective is what is causing the strategic downside.

We need to just shut up, and be quiet professionals. Do the job and let those who choose to speculate speculate, but the ones we're really trying to influence know exactly what happened.

We are slipping into the same trap with unmanned aircraft and their missiles that we fell into with our bombers and guided munitions. Some news is best delivered in person. Short, violent raids with no post-op clamoring for glory will be less likely to produce the strategic downside, and probably be far more respected by those we target and thereby produce better results.

This is why this news is odd, and makes me wonder what they are playing at. Why admit that he was killed? Why not revert to the practice of claiming civilian deaths, with the typical lack of proof? Letting on that a leader was killed in such an attack doesn't make much sense, based on what little has been provided so far.

[Surferbeetle]

Baitullah Mehsud's death is a public example of our hunting prowess, it will increase our chances of disrupting Taliban operations for a time, and good riddance to someone who has helped to kill our boys, but then again is it possible that the Afghani viewpoint on this is...so what?

If I am 'Albert-Afghani', who is allegedly the COG of this conflict, what does this death mean to me?

1) How does it make my village safer today?
2) Is it going to fix my irrigation canals?
3) Did it help me with this years harvests, or will it with next years?
4) What does this do for today's drinking water or electrical needs?
5) Will it help me make it through the coming winter?
6) How does it give me hope for a better future?

What is the return on this particular investment of effort and how will it turn the population of Afghanistan towards forwarding the coalitions objectives (and how are they aligned with the people of Afghanistan's?) within the next 12 months?


From VOA News: Pakistan Official: Taliban Rivals Involved in Shooting

Pakistan's interior minister says the government has received reports of a shooting between two rivals for leadership of Pakistan's Taliban, and that one of them may have been killed.

Rehman Malik told reporters Saturday that fighting reportedly broke out between Taliban commanders Wali-ur-Rehman and Hakimullah Mehsud, during a meeting to decide a successor to Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud.

[Schmedlap]

My strong suspicion is that such temporal, tactical gains produce far more strategic downside than upside on today's global "battlefield."

I look at it this way: who do we want commanding our enemy's forces? To use an OIF example, I think that killing Zarqawi was wise. Likewise, I think that not killing al-Masri was wise. It was better to have al-Masri running the show than Zarqawi.

[davidbfpo]

An interesting BBC News report on the appearance of bound and blindfolded bodies in Swat Valley, not clear who is responsible - locals seeking revenge or the security forces: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8230267.stm

We know from history the Pakistani Army can be ruthless.

Are these the right suspects?

davidbfpo