Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[davidbfpo]

Lots of offsite reporting (see SWJ Blog) and here is an on the ground report, when the Pakistani Army allowed access: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335232.stm

A rare item on the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, a vist to the King by the ISI chief: http://www.ptinews.com/news/357248_I...-King-Abdullah

[MikeF]

Lots of offsite reporting (see SWJ Blog) and here is an on the ground report, when the Pakistani Army allowed access: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335232.stm

David,

Thanks for the link. This operation looks very impressive, and the Pak Army should be praised. When the military operation is concluded, I hope that they take the time to really build the area (schools, roads, wells, etc).

Mike

[carl]

A rare item on the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, a vist to the King by the ISI chief: http://www.ptinews.com/news/357248_I...-King-Abdullah

The ISI head meets with the King instead of the Pakistani President. The King states he supports Pakistan's fight against the militants. Given the history of both Saudi Arabia and the ISI in supporting the Taliban, I wonder what kind of deal making was going on. My suspicious mind can come up with all kinds of things.

[M Payson]

This site is tracking day-by-day actions and maps on South Waziristan campaign http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009.

They’ve also got profiles of Taliban leaders. Here’s the link to Hakimullah Mehsud. I found Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s profile to be detailed and careful with the facts (accurate as far as I could know) http://www.irantracker.org/related-t...akes-power-ttp.

[davidbfpo]

MPayson,

Thanks for the pointer to:http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009 . Yes, the mapping is useful and the information. I did read some of the analysis and paused reading this:

Pakistan has an effective military strategy

•Methodical – slow advance with a force that outnumbers the enemy. Difficult towns (Kotkai, Makin) are encircled through control of surrounding peaks then cleared later. Jets with precision munitions eliminate 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns after initial TTP harassment of helicopters, allowing close helicopter support.
•The Pakistani military has learned lessons from its 2004 incursion into Waziristan and 2008 Bajaur operation: they are seizing the high ground to control valleys.
•Pakistanis employing effective route clearance packages to limit damage from IEDs

Even I know from this "armchair" that seizing the high ground is basic in mountain warfare, add in years of experience and preparation - if the Pakistanis had failed to do this I'd be worried. They are a professional army, grounded in preparing to fight a conventional war and have adapted.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

Well, it turns out that she didn't really meet with "Pakhtun leaders" as we might reasonably understand it -- or the mix of traditional leaders I'd have hoped for in the current situation http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=206400. Whether that was because they refused or weren't invited isn't clear.

But it's more likely that "promoting civil society" won out over talking to the tribes, and that an NGO-driven approach to development and reconstruction is being pursued in a place where people don't even relate to what that is -- except in the negative. "We don't understand what it is, but we know it's bad," said one senior leader from North Waziristan during a discussion about development earlier this year. "They come to do development but preaching religion is their main aim," said another. They're also the ones who said non-threatening things like, "We invite foreign assistance, we need it" and "People are losing confidence....We need action and results!" and "Until now, we were just asked about our problems, not about how to solve them."

It's ironic that the group credited with organizing the invitees seems to have lost their own plot. "FIDA aims to act as a bridge between traditional and modern systems of governance and society." http://fidapk.org/about/intro.html They forgot the traditional.

The US has virtually no constructive relationship with either of the Waziristans. Working from the outside in and forgetting the complex of existing leaders simply won't cut the mustard, nor will nattering on about peace. I thought the Obama administration was working on that, but somebody on the team got the messaging wrong this time. And these folks are pretty attuned to messages.

[omarali50]

I think that the US embassy would have LIKED to see some actual tribal elders there, but THEY refused to meet her because they are afraid of having their head cut off. Btw, being identified in this specific manner in ""the news" is probably not helping any of them sleep better at night.

David, About the Pakistani army's current offensive, where do you think the taliban have gone? The army has claimed to have killed about 50 of them (the taliban have admitted less, and in this matter, their spokesmen have a history of being more reliable than the army) so where are the other 9950? If they have slipped away to other agencies, then this whack a mole strategy will soon be faced with new problems...

Do you think the army has decided to dump the good taliban? If not, what great difference will this offensive make to Afghanistan (or even to Pakistan, where the bad taliban frequently find refuge with their good cousins)? And if they have decided to dump the good taliban, what should we expect to see next?

I really dont know the answers. I am working on the formula that sometimes its a good idea to just ask...

[davidbfpo]

Following a recommendation on Abu M, as written by the best sourced local reporter:

Hakimullah Mehsud of the TTP, according to Asia Times Online contacts, has apparently adopted a strategy that will not expend too many resources on protecting the Mehsud area. Instead, he aims to spread chaos by attacking security personnel in the cities.

The same contacts say that when thousands of people left South Waziristan last week under the military's directives, a majority of the militants melted away to the Shawal region, situated at the crossroads of South Waziristan, Afghanistan and North Waziristan, besides going to Pakistani cities.

A very limited force is entrenched in the Mehsud tribal area, and by all accounts it is putting up fierce resistance.

By marching into South Waziristan, the military has taken something of a gamble as it is highly unlikely to eliminate the militant threat. Indeed, the past seven or so years have shown that after any operation against militants, the militants have always gained from the situation. By the same token, the militants don't have the capacity to permanently control ground beyond their areas in South Waziristan and North Waziristan.

...there are signals that the Taliban in the Swat area in North-West Frontier Province are regrouping after being pushed back by the army this year. It is likely that by the time the snow chokes major supply routes, the Taliban will have seized all lost ground in the Swat Valley.

From: http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/10/19-10

From a Time article. The Pakistani Army CoS letter dropped in South Waziristan, an excerpt:

To the brave and honorable people of the Mehsud tribe. The operation is not meant to target the valiant and patriotic Mehsud tribes but aimed at ridding them of the elements who have destroyed peace in the region.

The article ends with:

Taking the battle to the militants in South Waziristan, says Lieut. General Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai, the former governor of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, "is a requirement, but not a solution — a first field dressing to a battle wound." The solution, as is usually the case in regions that breed insurgencies — and not just in Pakistan — is better governance. No sign of that yet.

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...#ixzz0Vq6fufQr

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

I think that the US embassy would have LIKED to see some actual tribal elders there, but THEY refused to meet her because they are afraid of having their head cut off. Btw, being identified in this specific manner in ""the news" is probably not helping any of them sleep better at night.

First, Omar sahib, I've read your stuff on AM and here, and find it thoughtful and illuminating.

In terms of tribal elders, I'm not at all convinced the embassy or aid community actually sought to talk with them, at least those from North Waziristan. And while FATA's environment has proven hazardous to traditional leaders, I've seen some nuanced relationships between leadership groups, even within the same agency. We need to learn to deal with such shades of grey without panicking.

I think it would be an unfortunate error to focus on NGOs and politicians and omit traditional dialogue in a land where many have concerns and few have instruments less blunt than bombs. The aid community, if it is to be used as one of those less-blunt instruments - or even if it just aims to deliver assistance to those in need - will have to re-envision its concept of "civil society" and "NGO" to work in an environment where kinship is the driving force. Given the billions of dollars looking for a way to sluice to "the people" in Pakistan, this is no small matter.

Regarding Shawal, if even from my armchair, it seemed a predictable area for militants to shift, one hopes it was anticipated.