Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[davidbfpo]

A quick Google found some details of the Warren book:

Alan Warren. Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936–37. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. Pp. xxxii, 324. $29.95.

This is an account taken from official records of the 1930s' tribal insurgencies in the Waziristan region of India's northwest frontier. The Waziristan agencies were on the periphery of British India and had a population, by its close, of little more than two hundred thousand. The region was the scene, however, of the greatest military conflicts of the closing years of the Raj. Following the tribal insurgencies of 1919–1920 and 1936–1937, there was the heaviest concentration of troops and police per head of population anywhere on the subcontinent. It is therefore a little surprising that these events had received scant historical attention until the publication of this study.

Alan Warren unashamedly adopts the narrative style of military history and reveals a fine eye for detail as he meticulously pieces together British engagements in Waziristan. The greatest attention is devoted to the insurgency led by the Muslim holy man known as the Faqir of Ipi in 1936–1937. Although the tribal revolt was decisively crushed, a cat and mouse game continued between the Faqir and the British authorities throughout the remainder of their stay in India.

From: http://www.historycooperative.org/cg...6.4/br_26.html

[davidbfpo]

Lots of offsite reporting (see SWJ Blog) and here is an on the ground report, when the Pakistani Army allowed access: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335232.stm

A rare item on the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, a vist to the King by the ISI chief: http://www.ptinews.com/news/357248_I...-King-Abdullah

[MikeF]

Lots of offsite reporting (see SWJ Blog) and here is an on the ground report, when the Pakistani Army allowed access: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335232.stm

David,

Thanks for the link. This operation looks very impressive, and the Pak Army should be praised. When the military operation is concluded, I hope that they take the time to really build the area (schools, roads, wells, etc).

Mike

[carl]

A rare item on the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, a vist to the King by the ISI chief: http://www.ptinews.com/news/357248_I...-King-Abdullah

The ISI head meets with the King instead of the Pakistani President. The King states he supports Pakistan's fight against the militants. Given the history of both Saudi Arabia and the ISI in supporting the Taliban, I wonder what kind of deal making was going on. My suspicious mind can come up with all kinds of things.

[M Payson]

This site is tracking day-by-day actions and maps on South Waziristan campaign http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009.

They’ve also got profiles of Taliban leaders. Here’s the link to Hakimullah Mehsud. I found Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s profile to be detailed and careful with the facts (accurate as far as I could know) http://www.irantracker.org/related-t...akes-power-ttp.

[davidbfpo]

MPayson,

Thanks for the pointer to:http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009 . Yes, the mapping is useful and the information. I did read some of the analysis and paused reading this:

Pakistan has an effective military strategy

•Methodical – slow advance with a force that outnumbers the enemy. Difficult towns (Kotkai, Makin) are encircled through control of surrounding peaks then cleared later. Jets with precision munitions eliminate 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns after initial TTP harassment of helicopters, allowing close helicopter support.
•The Pakistani military has learned lessons from its 2004 incursion into Waziristan and 2008 Bajaur operation: they are seizing the high ground to control valleys.
•Pakistanis employing effective route clearance packages to limit damage from IEDs

Even I know from this "armchair" that seizing the high ground is basic in mountain warfare, add in years of experience and preparation - if the Pakistanis had failed to do this I'd be worried. They are a professional army, grounded in preparing to fight a conventional war and have adapted.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

Well, it turns out that she didn't really meet with "Pakhtun leaders" as we might reasonably understand it -- or the mix of traditional leaders I'd have hoped for in the current situation http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=206400. Whether that was because they refused or weren't invited isn't clear.

But it's more likely that "promoting civil society" won out over talking to the tribes, and that an NGO-driven approach to development and reconstruction is being pursued in a place where people don't even relate to what that is -- except in the negative. "We don't understand what it is, but we know it's bad," said one senior leader from North Waziristan during a discussion about development earlier this year. "They come to do development but preaching religion is their main aim," said another. They're also the ones who said non-threatening things like, "We invite foreign assistance, we need it" and "People are losing confidence....We need action and results!" and "Until now, we were just asked about our problems, not about how to solve them."

It's ironic that the group credited with organizing the invitees seems to have lost their own plot. "FIDA aims to act as a bridge between traditional and modern systems of governance and society." http://fidapk.org/about/intro.html They forgot the traditional.

The US has virtually no constructive relationship with either of the Waziristans. Working from the outside in and forgetting the complex of existing leaders simply won't cut the mustard, nor will nattering on about peace. I thought the Obama administration was working on that, but somebody on the team got the messaging wrong this time. And these folks are pretty attuned to messages.

[omarali50]

I think that the US embassy would have LIKED to see some actual tribal elders there, but THEY refused to meet her because they are afraid of having their head cut off. Btw, being identified in this specific manner in ""the news" is probably not helping any of them sleep better at night.

David, About the Pakistani army's current offensive, where do you think the taliban have gone? The army has claimed to have killed about 50 of them (the taliban have admitted less, and in this matter, their spokesmen have a history of being more reliable than the army) so where are the other 9950? If they have slipped away to other agencies, then this whack a mole strategy will soon be faced with new problems...

Do you think the army has decided to dump the good taliban? If not, what great difference will this offensive make to Afghanistan (or even to Pakistan, where the bad taliban frequently find refuge with their good cousins)? And if they have decided to dump the good taliban, what should we expect to see next?

I really dont know the answers. I am working on the formula that sometimes its a good idea to just ask...