A short commentary on the intense US aerial campaign against militant Islamist groups between 2009 and 2014, in Pakistan's tribal areas (FATA) and in particular North Waziristan.
It is part of an academic project into drones (UAV) at Birmingham University (UK):It ends with a passage, which echoes much of what SWJ is about:we carried out more than 30 interviews and two general surveys, with more than 400 respondents, in Pakistan to assess the impact of the drones in the tribal areas. From what they told us, we learned that conflicting perceptions of the use of drones can shape not only conflict but also coexistence – and even cooperation.Link:https://theconversation.com/interviews-with-pakistani-civilians-and-pervez-musharraf-tell-a-complicated-story-of-drone-warfare-102288?In a nutshell, the reason the drone campaign helped dash hopes of a settlement was the social, political, and cultural dynamics of Pakistan’s tribal region and the way the tribal system’s core elements were undermined. If you want to explain what happened to the short-lived peace process in Pakistan in 2013-14, you have to start there. And so does anyone charged with coming up with any new counter-insurgency strategy, whether it includes drone strikes or not.
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