Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[davidbfpo]

Way back in 1968 the UK decided to reduce it's role, in all aspects, 'East of Suez' and withdrew over a short period from a number of bases - such as Aden and Singapore. At the time the UK was the only major power with deployed military forces in the region; much of the effort was multi-lateral, principally with Commonwealth nations and some Persian Gulf nations.

A variety of suggestions were made about the doom that would follow IIRC. In reality little happened.

In one key "choke point" the Straits of Hormuz the UK continued to have a direct role, in tandem with Oman; the Gulf of Aden was left alone, although the French were in Djibouti.

South Asia has seen serious involvement by China (in Pakistan), USA recently and historically Russia (ex-USSR) in India. Other nations, like the USA and Japan, are far behind. Containment to assist peace aside and national advantage, principally in selling weapons, what real national interest has been served?

Yes times have changed since 1968, just two examples: local nations have a greater role and there is the presence of many more non-local nations.

[Dayuhan]

I've often thought that fear of what the Russians or Chinese might do is a greater threat to the US than anything the Russians or Chinese might do. Fear is rarely a sound basis for policy.

[carl]

Color me fearful.

In 1968 the Americans still had a gigantic navy. If the British pulled out it didn't make much difference because our huge navy still insured free seas, even with the effort in VN. All the other states in the area were relatively weaker then compared to the USN. Now we have only a relatively big navy that is getting littler and littler. But there is no other navy to take its' place as the USN could take the place of the RN in the old days. (Is there still an RN?)

If we were to completely pull out of the middle east and south Asia, to include Diego Garcia I presume, I think the states with interests in the area could legitimately conclude that the world had fundamentally changed, the USN wasn't going to guarantee free seas as it had since the end of WWII. People would get very nervous about that and when people get nervous, dangerous things happen.

If the most dangerous things happened, we would be drawn in. Fortress America can't stand on its own, or won't, if only because of emotional ties to Israel.

Mike: Parts of the US may not have gone soft, but do those parts have more, or less influence than the parts that have gone soft? If the soft parts have the political power, then the country will be that.

[Dayuhan]

If we were to completely pull out of the middle east and south Asia, to include Diego Garcia I presume, I think the states with interests in the area could legitimately conclude that the world had fundamentally changed, the USN wasn't going to guarantee free seas as it had since the end of WWII. People would get very nervous about that and when people get nervous, dangerous things happen.

People get very nervous about sole superpowers as well... especially when people think they are capricious and prone to unilateral action.

The US Navy may not have the number of assets that it once did, but it's still orders of magnitude beyond any other Navy.

These so called 'fears' are actually geostrategic and geopolitical 'scenarios' that could occur.

And to be ready to face them rather than be surprised and rudderless, 'contingency plans' for all possible scenarios are prepared.

All countries, big and small, prepare such contingency plans.

These scenarios may or may not play out, but then forewarned is forearmed.

You can drive yourself batty envisioning scenarios, and you can drive yourself bankrupt preparing for scenarios, and you can drive yourself into a world of $#!t trying to preempt scenarios.

A total US pullout from the ME and South/Central Asia is unlikely, and envisioning scenarios based on that assumption is a largely academic exercise. Envisioning scenarios based on excessive sinophobia or russophobia is also not terribly productive. We can't assume that we must have military dominance over every strategic area of the world because if we don't, somebody else will... the cost of trying to maintain that dominance will choke us far more surely than the possibility of having to share influence.

Certainly it makes sense to envision and prepare for scenarios built on the assumption that the US will no longer be a sole superpower, as the US no longer has the economic wherewithal to maintain that status.

[carl]

People get very nervous about sole superpowers as well... especially when people think they are capricious and prone to unilateral action.

I don't think they do. They say they do and they make all kinds of noises about the unfairness of it all, but they don't really do much to change the situation. They basically accept that the USN keeps the seas in order. If the USN publicly said they weren't going to do it anymore, great disorder would ensue.

The US Navy may not have the number of assets that it once did, but it's still orders of magnitude beyond any other Navy.

That may be true but it will get to the point where it won't matter. All the other navies may have only 2 ships each and if we have 20 we are an order of magnitude stronger. But we would still only have 20 ships. There's not much you can do when you don't have many ships.

[Ray]

People get very nervous about sole superpowers as well... especially when people think they are capricious and prone to unilateral action.

The US Navy may not have the number of assets that it once did, but it's still orders of magnitude beyond any other Navy.



You can drive yourself batty envisioning scenarios, and you can drive yourself bankrupt preparing for scenarios, and you can drive yourself into a world of $#!t trying to preempt scenarios.

A total US pullout from the ME and South/Central Asia is unlikely, and envisioning scenarios based on that assumption is a largely academic exercise. Envisioning scenarios based on excessive sinophobia or russophobia is also not terribly productive. We can't assume that we must have military dominance over every strategic area of the world because if we don't, somebody else will... the cost of trying to maintain that dominance will choke us far more surely than the possibility of having to share influence.

Certainly it makes sense to envision and prepare for scenarios built on the assumption that the US will no longer be a sole superpower, as the US no longer has the economic wherewithal to maintain that status.

Sun Tsu had said -It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.

It is true that one should not have any phobias over possibly adversaries, but one help but note that if one cannot visualise the major scenarios (taking into account the CNP), and contingencies, then one is saddle with an Iraq. I believe, from open sources, that the campaign was not 'thought through', or in other words, the contingencies that could arise.

There is no doubt that one cannot have military dominance everywhere; that is axiomatic, given the state of economy. Yet, one cannot help but maintain a force level that can safeguard the nation's interests. Given the US position in the world and interests, it has to be vast, compared to others. Likewise, China and Russia are aggressively enhancing their strategic reach by adding to its arsenal. They too have concerns about the state of their Nation's economy and what their economy can sustain in this quest to increase their strategic reach.

In so far as the US is concerned, given that the Cold War was over, Di.ck Cheney's Defence Policy Guidelines and the National Policy for Energy, when he was the Secretary for Defence, is worth a look as to how the US would detach itself from a unidirectional approach to National Defence to a multi-directional approach in areas that were not within the conventional threat ambit and would be basically on small wars format.

It is also of interest to note that the US is 'outsourcing' the protection of it the defence of its national interest.

This is quite evident in Asia, more so, after the tour of Asia by President Obama and selective tour of Hilary Clinton.

[Ray]

Ultimately, the US Navy is trying to replace 30 FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, 14 MCM Avenger Class mine countermeasures vessels, and 12 MHC-51 Osprey Class coastal mine hunters (TL = 56), with about 55 Littoral Combat Ships.

The LCS requirement has been identified as part of a broader surface combatant force transformation strategy, which recognizes that many future threats are spawning in regions with shallow seas, where the ability to operate near-shore and even in rivers will be vital for mission success.

I don't have the link since it is from my 'archives'.

It indicates to some extent the type of threat the US envisages and how the US will apply itself to exert its will.

Mike,

I like Davy Crockette. It reminds me of my childhood and host of Dell comics and Classics. In fact, I still remember the words of the song and sing it too!

[jmm99]

another Davy Crockett fan - M.A. Lagrange is the other. You all still wear them coonskin caps ?

Cheers

Mike

[Ray]

These so called 'fears' are actually geostrategic and geopolitical 'scenarios' that could occur.

And to be ready to face them rather than be surprised and rudderless, 'contingency plans' for all possible scenarios are prepared.

All countries, big and small, prepare such contingency plans.

These scenarios may or may not play out, but then forewarned is forearmed.

[omarali50]

But its also worth keeping in mind where the "level of analysis" is in any given debate. There are many mistakes being made at much narrower focus...the wide-angle debate may not be as relevant to some of these affairs, but may be used to score points and support a lower level policy that really doesnt make sense AT ITS OWN LEVEL..

[Ken White]

I've often thought that fear of what the Russians or Chinese might do is a greater threat to the US than anything the Russians or Chinese might do. Fear is rarely a sound basis for policy.

Fortunately or not, viewpoint dependent, we tend to err on the side of hubris...

I see nothing to be unduly concerned about save excessive entitlements in the budget.

Been worse in my lifetime internationally in almost all aspects, several times and in one way or another. Though I admit many today seem to want some kind of reassurance. Never be enough of that and it isn't an entitlement anyway...