Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[davidbfpo]

An interesting article on the likely reaction of the Mehsud tribe, who dominate South Waziristan, which is based on interviews with refugees (no-one is embedded with the Pakistani Army IIRC): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...tribesmen.html

One telling passage reminds us of the previous 'Go,Stop' policy:

Three times in the past, the army has agreed a ceasefire and peace terms with the Taliban in South Waziristan. Each time, the Taliban took bloody revenge on those who had sided with the state. Mehsuds remember bitterly how in 2005, following such a deal, a Pakistani army general literally embraced the then Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud, and called him "a soldier of peace".

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Lots of offsite reporting (see SWJ Blog) and here is an on the ground report, when the Pakistani Army allowed access: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335232.stm

A rare item on the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, a vist to the King by the ISI chief: http://www.ptinews.com/news/357248_I...-King-Abdullah

[MikeF]

Lots of offsite reporting (see SWJ Blog) and here is an on the ground report, when the Pakistani Army allowed access: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335232.stm

David,

Thanks for the link. This operation looks very impressive, and the Pak Army should be praised. When the military operation is concluded, I hope that they take the time to really build the area (schools, roads, wells, etc).

Mike

[carl]

A rare item on the Pakistani-Saudi relationship, a vist to the King by the ISI chief: http://www.ptinews.com/news/357248_I...-King-Abdullah

The ISI head meets with the King instead of the Pakistani President. The King states he supports Pakistan's fight against the militants. Given the history of both Saudi Arabia and the ISI in supporting the Taliban, I wonder what kind of deal making was going on. My suspicious mind can come up with all kinds of things.

[M Payson]

This site is tracking day-by-day actions and maps on South Waziristan campaign http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009.

They’ve also got profiles of Taliban leaders. Here’s the link to Hakimullah Mehsud. I found Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s profile to be detailed and careful with the facts (accurate as far as I could know) http://www.irantracker.org/related-t...akes-power-ttp.

[davidbfpo]

MPayson,

Thanks for the pointer to:http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/...n-october-2009 . Yes, the mapping is useful and the information. I did read some of the analysis and paused reading this:

Pakistan has an effective military strategy

•Methodical – slow advance with a force that outnumbers the enemy. Difficult towns (Kotkai, Makin) are encircled through control of surrounding peaks then cleared later. Jets with precision munitions eliminate 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns after initial TTP harassment of helicopters, allowing close helicopter support.
•The Pakistani military has learned lessons from its 2004 incursion into Waziristan and 2008 Bajaur operation: they are seizing the high ground to control valleys.
•Pakistanis employing effective route clearance packages to limit damage from IEDs

Even I know from this "armchair" that seizing the high ground is basic in mountain warfare, add in years of experience and preparation - if the Pakistanis had failed to do this I'd be worried. They are a professional army, grounded in preparing to fight a conventional war and have adapted.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

Well, it turns out that she didn't really meet with "Pakhtun leaders" as we might reasonably understand it -- or the mix of traditional leaders I'd have hoped for in the current situation http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=206400. Whether that was because they refused or weren't invited isn't clear.

But it's more likely that "promoting civil society" won out over talking to the tribes, and that an NGO-driven approach to development and reconstruction is being pursued in a place where people don't even relate to what that is -- except in the negative. "We don't understand what it is, but we know it's bad," said one senior leader from North Waziristan during a discussion about development earlier this year. "They come to do development but preaching religion is their main aim," said another. They're also the ones who said non-threatening things like, "We invite foreign assistance, we need it" and "People are losing confidence....We need action and results!" and "Until now, we were just asked about our problems, not about how to solve them."

It's ironic that the group credited with organizing the invitees seems to have lost their own plot. "FIDA aims to act as a bridge between traditional and modern systems of governance and society." http://fidapk.org/about/intro.html They forgot the traditional.

The US has virtually no constructive relationship with either of the Waziristans. Working from the outside in and forgetting the complex of existing leaders simply won't cut the mustard, nor will nattering on about peace. I thought the Obama administration was working on that, but somebody on the team got the messaging wrong this time. And these folks are pretty attuned to messages.

[omarali50]

I think that the US embassy would have LIKED to see some actual tribal elders there, but THEY refused to meet her because they are afraid of having their head cut off. Btw, being identified in this specific manner in ""the news" is probably not helping any of them sleep better at night.

David, About the Pakistani army's current offensive, where do you think the taliban have gone? The army has claimed to have killed about 50 of them (the taliban have admitted less, and in this matter, their spokesmen have a history of being more reliable than the army) so where are the other 9950? If they have slipped away to other agencies, then this whack a mole strategy will soon be faced with new problems...

Do you think the army has decided to dump the good taliban? If not, what great difference will this offensive make to Afghanistan (or even to Pakistan, where the bad taliban frequently find refuge with their good cousins)? And if they have decided to dump the good taliban, what should we expect to see next?

I really dont know the answers. I am working on the formula that sometimes its a good idea to just ask...

[davidbfpo]

Following a recommendation on Abu M, as written by the best sourced local reporter:

Hakimullah Mehsud of the TTP, according to Asia Times Online contacts, has apparently adopted a strategy that will not expend too many resources on protecting the Mehsud area. Instead, he aims to spread chaos by attacking security personnel in the cities.

The same contacts say that when thousands of people left South Waziristan last week under the military's directives, a majority of the militants melted away to the Shawal region, situated at the crossroads of South Waziristan, Afghanistan and North Waziristan, besides going to Pakistani cities.

A very limited force is entrenched in the Mehsud tribal area, and by all accounts it is putting up fierce resistance.

By marching into South Waziristan, the military has taken something of a gamble as it is highly unlikely to eliminate the militant threat. Indeed, the past seven or so years have shown that after any operation against militants, the militants have always gained from the situation. By the same token, the militants don't have the capacity to permanently control ground beyond their areas in South Waziristan and North Waziristan.

...there are signals that the Taliban in the Swat area in North-West Frontier Province are regrouping after being pushed back by the army this year. It is likely that by the time the snow chokes major supply routes, the Taliban will have seized all lost ground in the Swat Valley.

From: http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/10/19-10

From a Time article. The Pakistani Army CoS letter dropped in South Waziristan, an excerpt:

To the brave and honorable people of the Mehsud tribe. The operation is not meant to target the valiant and patriotic Mehsud tribes but aimed at ridding them of the elements who have destroyed peace in the region.

The article ends with:

Taking the battle to the militants in South Waziristan, says Lieut. General Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai, the former governor of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, "is a requirement, but not a solution — a first field dressing to a battle wound." The solution, as is usually the case in regions that breed insurgencies — and not just in Pakistan — is better governance. No sign of that yet.

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...#ixzz0Vq6fufQr

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Omarali50 asked:

David, About the Pakistani army's current offensive, where do you think the taliban have gone? The army has claimed to have killed about 50 of them (the taliban have admitted less, and in this matter, their spokesmen have a history of being more reliable than the army) so where are the other 9950? If they have slipped away to other agencies, then this whack a mole strategy will soon be faced with new problems.

I expect that many of the fighters left before the attack, it was so well advertised and the Pakistani Army's options on the ground were limited. I have seen one report that they are in the area where the Afghan border abuts the two Waziristan and of course there is no "anvil" on the other side of the border. Unless of course there is a "flying anvil" waiting to act.

Do you think the army has decided to dump the good taliban? If not, what great difference will this offensive make to Afghanistan (or even to Pakistan, where the bad taliban frequently find refuge with their good cousins)? And if they have decided to dump the good taliban, what should we expect to see next?

No, the Pakistani Army have not dumped all the Taliban; that has not been their approach before, rather military action: negoitate, local deal, Taliban renege on deal, wait awhile and start again. I am beginning to suspect the Taliban have decided to dump the Army. For a variety of reasons the internal Taliban (a very broad coalition) have made the Pakistani state the main target. Next, well some sheer terror attacks e.g. Peshawar market (used by women), raids on state installations and "spectaculars" by LeT in particular.

I wonder what Stephen Tankel's thoughts are now? (LeT expert).

My answers are from an "armchair" faraway and based on some reading.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

I think that the US embassy would have LIKED to see some actual tribal elders there, but THEY refused to meet her because they are afraid of having their head cut off. Btw, being identified in this specific manner in ""the news" is probably not helping any of them sleep better at night.

First, Omar sahib, I've read your stuff on AM and here, and find it thoughtful and illuminating.

In terms of tribal elders, I'm not at all convinced the embassy or aid community actually sought to talk with them, at least those from North Waziristan. And while FATA's environment has proven hazardous to traditional leaders, I've seen some nuanced relationships between leadership groups, even within the same agency. We need to learn to deal with such shades of grey without panicking.

I think it would be an unfortunate error to focus on NGOs and politicians and omit traditional dialogue in a land where many have concerns and few have instruments less blunt than bombs. The aid community, if it is to be used as one of those less-blunt instruments - or even if it just aims to deliver assistance to those in need - will have to re-envision its concept of "civil society" and "NGO" to work in an environment where kinship is the driving force. Given the billions of dollars looking for a way to sluice to "the people" in Pakistan, this is no small matter.

Regarding Shawal, if even from my armchair, it seemed a predictable area for militants to shift, one hopes it was anticipated.

[davidbfpo]

Released in July 2009 in Pakistan, with an un-identified male prsioner, shown in shadow, which was on Geo-TV (IIRC an independent station); a stunning and depressing film clip:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nq88egK755k&feature=fvw

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Again thanks Abu M spotting a UK Daily Mail reporter on the Pakistani campaign, under the hopeful IMHO headline 'Why Pakistan is winning ITS war against the Taliban'.

As always there is a "sting" at the end:

Meanwhile, General Abbas cited a further stupefying sign of Nato’s apparent absence of strategic co-ordination.

In the name of the new ‘protection’ strategy, the US has this autumn been withdrawing from its posts on the Afghan side of the frontier, including those in Paktika, the province next to South Waziristan.

‘It will create a vacuum,’ he said, ‘and if militants escape from Waziristan, what can we do? We cannot fire on them when they cross the border.’

For years, Nato chiefs have accused Pakistan of failing to deal with the Taliban’s safe havens in Pakistani territory. Now, in one of the more bitter ironies of this ever-lengthening war, that role has been reversed.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/ar...#ixzz0XFwBOxbn

[omarali50]

If you go to this link and scroll down the comments, you can see a discussion about the ongoing war in Pakistan (I am a participant and have the longest final comment, so this is also a plug). I thought some of you may be interested.

http://www.chapatimystery.com/archiv...comment-158346

also check out Pakistani blogger Hakim Hazik's latest at

http://justicedeniedpk.com/JDP/post/....aspx#continue

[davidbfpo]

Reports on an attack on a mosque used by the Army, within the Rawlpindi cantonment: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ue-attack.html

Five serving officers, including a major general, a brigadier, two lieutenant colonels and a major, died in the assault by suicide bombers and gunmen on a mosque near the army's headquarters in Rawalpindi....A retired major and three serving ordinary soldiers were also among the dead as well as 17 children, including 11 sons of officers....The main Pakistani extremist group, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is closely tied to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack.

The BBC:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8394694.stm

From Londonstani, on Abu M blog:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...an-update.html Within and referring to a forthcoming Shia festival, for the first time IIRC he asks:

Is anyone else thinking Algeria 1990s?

I wonder how the Pakistani Army officer corps view the "accomodation" made with the "militants" now? In particular the role of ISI creating and maintaining the "militants" and the Taliban as a strategic defence option!

[omarali50]

I spoke with someone in Pakistan recently (someone who eagerly supports what one may call the ISI version of recent events) and his vision was as follows:
1. The US and Israel and maybe India want to destroy Islam and to do this, they understand that they must destroy Pakistan.
2. Using 9-11 as the excuse, an invasion was launched.
3. Our army has managed, in very adverse circumstances, to keep Pakistan intact until now and protected our nuclear assets.
4. Terrorism that you see is basically mercenary jihadis acting on the instructions of America, Israel and Zionist Brahmins (I kid you not).
5. The army is united, and every officer knows that this is the final battle for Pakistan. We will defeat these mercenary terrorists, safeguard our nuclear assets and inshallah win the war after the coming global collapse destroys America's ability to impose its will on us. India will be the first to fall> Already, our Red chinese friends have green lighted the naxalites and when we unleash the jihadis, the brahmins will fall in one day...
and so on. This is NOT a fringe view. He gets this from TV 21, which is owned by interflo, which is the largest ad agency in Pakistan and the largest civilian asset used by the army in its PR moves. I highly recommend visiting paknationalists.com or http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/ to see for yourself.

Anyway, I wrote the following on the Pakistani blog chapati mystery today (or Pakistani-German, as the owner is a pakistani historian working in Germany). Its in response to comments that questioned the existence of an international jihadi threat. Some of it is relevant to your question.

http://www.chapatimystery.com/archiv....html#comments

The army armed and trained half a million terrorists. It encouraged an entire cultural shift towards Jihadism and extremism. It then lost control of the situation after 9-11. BUT instead of stepping back and saying we were wrong (not necessarily publicly, I am just speaking of saying it to themselves) and need to do many things now to fix the mess, they have always pursued a schizophrenic policy where they will abandon some of their former proxies and kill them, while keeping others for future use AND retain crucial parts of the previous paradigm of zero-sum competition with India, playing profitable games with America, retaining monopoly over most of Afghanistan and so on.
As a result, there is continued confusion within Pakistan about who is fighting who and for what reason and this confusion is hampering the war effort. A good section of the military is still working on the Zaid Hamid and Ahmed Qureshi paradigm without noticing that Zaid Hamid and company themselves believe that the future consists of massive and extremely violent wars against India and other powers...wars they hope to win, but wars which to any sane person must seem MUCH worse than the current mess. The army high command may or may not all be in the Zaid Hamid mould, but their continued short sighted encouragement of this line of psyops is creating massive confusion and will make their job harder, not easier.
The army itself will be better off if it faces the facts and changes some of its fundamental assumptions. Let us, for the sake of argument, accept that all these attacks are carried out by jihadis acting on the orders of India, Israel and America. What is the army doing to clarify the situation and fight back? What is the plan by which these three great powers and their jihadi agents are to be defeated? I submit that no coherent plan can be made because the accusation itself is incoherent.
I am not saying the US or India could not be involved in any terrorist acts. Pakistan is not a total outlier in its use of terrorism as a tool of policy. Others can and do play this game. But the question remains, what is the policy? why do these powers oppose the army? What can be done to stop them? What is in the best interests of the people of Pakistan? on all these questions, the army's response has been and remains unclear. And it remains so because they insist on having their cake and eating it too. Either they throw in their lot with the jihadists and the taliban and deal with USA and India as best as they can, or they fully switch sides and try to find a way to cooperate WITH the US and India AND with civilian politicians, against the jihadi worldview. There is no middle way that is going to work....

[Jedburgh]

JSOU, Dec 09: Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies

Most American and Pakistani political and military leaders agree that without a credible U.S.-Pakistan partnership, victory against Taliban and Al Qaeda is impossible. For such a partnership, shared goals must be matched by shared threats, and perceptions must follow demonstrable action. Washington and Islamabad agree that Al Qaeda must be defeated. Pakistan’s national security calculus—based on India’s influence in Afghanistan—however, treats Afghan Taliban as leverage and Pakistani Taliban as enemies of the state. Consequently, Afghan Taliban are provided asylum in Pakistan while they wreak havoc in Afghanistan, and Pakistani Taliban are attacked. While Pakistan has countered and fomented numerous insurgencies, this is the first time that it has done both to achieve its national security goals. This dual policy and disconnect between American and Pakistani threat perceptions is at the heart of Pakistan’s security paradox. Pakistan continues to indirectly counter (COIN) and foment (FOIN) insurgency in Afghanistan. Without acknowledging, explicating, and eventually changing this paradox, Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to descent into chaos.....

[omarali50]

http://wichaar.com/news/294/ARTICLE/...010-01-06.html

Dr. Manzur Ejaz's opinion piece above, in which he has unequivocally stated that the army-jihadi nexus is history and all jihadi parties will gradually be eliminated by the armed forces. An unstated corrollary of this hypothesis is that the state will actually survive and stabilize and all the "worst case scenarios" will fail to materialize.

I tend to agree with Dr. Ejaz. I think the army has no choice. It was a terrible mistake to create free standing armies of jihadis in the first place (what sane state has ever done that? what were they thinking when dozens of training camps were being set up all across the country and Masood Azhar and company were going around with escorts of armed men on pickup trucks? what was the plan? I already know the answer: there was no plan in the mind of the "secular" morons like Musharraf. They were just being their usual idiotic selves and were being made total fools by the jihadis like General Mahmud and General Gul and so on. But I ask the question to encourage all of you to spend a few minutes thinking about this. WTF was the army thinking and doesnt this deserve a real inquiry and several court martials?). But by now, even our generals must have realized what a mess they have made and know that this is not sustainable.
I also think the arguments presented by many educated people in Pakistan (all this is an American plot, Islam is in danger, Jewish-Hindu plot) reflects the (carefully manufactured) confusion of the chattering classes and not a systematic analysis of the facts on the ground.
But I also think that these confused statements (blaming the jihadis, General Zia, the CIA and everyone else in almost mutually exclusive theories) are an indication of what a tremendous job lies ahead of the army high command and how poorly they have managed the "information war" until now. Once again, I think the explanation has less to do with any clever scheme of having their jihad and eating it too, and more to do with the limited abilities of the high command and their desire to avoid (at all costs, even the cost of efficient handling of the war on terror) any discussion of how they created this mess and who the enemy is. Instead, they prefer to keep people confused with CIA-Jew-Freemason-Hindu conspiracies and any other story that comes to mind...anything but the truth that their own creations have brought Pakistan to this pass. The other driver behind this nonsense is their desire to hold on to "the commanding heights" of the state, even if they have to imperil the functioning of national institutions in a time of war to do so. On this, I differ with Dr. Ejaz, who beleives the army is actually trying to strengthen civilian institutions to save the state. I think he underestimates how totally the PMA mindset hates civilian politics and politicians and how exalted an opinion they have of their own ability to run everything from credit rating agencies to the railways.
I would make an analogy with the US civil war. A Dr. Ejaz in 1861 would have confidently predicted (on the basis of rational analysis of economic realities and the direction of historical trends) that the North was going to win the civil war and the Union would be preserved. Not only that, slavery would be abolished and the entire slave-owning economy overhauled and converted to more modern lines. That is exactly what eventually happened. But this 1861 Dr. Ejaz may not have known how close fought the thing would be, how long and hard the war would turn out to be, how terrible a slaughter it would cause...and even this imaginary Dr. Ejaz might have had second thoughts about his predictions when Lee was marching around Pennsylvania.....I think we are in for some very bad times in Pakistan as well.

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 30 Dec 09: Waziristan: The Last Frontier

....this year the strategy was changed, with considerable success. In May the army swept the Taliban from Malakand, to national acclaim. And in October and November, after a three-month blockade of the Mehsud fief, displacing over 200,000 people, it routed the militants there. On the road from Tank to Wana, perfect round shell-holes, punched through the mud-walls of now-empty houses, show where the army advanced. In Sarwakai, a former Taliban logistics hub, army bulldozers were levelling a bazaar as open-backed trucks loaded with prisoners, blindfolded and bare-headed, drove by. Most of their comrades, including the Pakistani Taliban’s current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, escaped—some to Orakzai, where they are again under attack. Several thousand more are believed to be in Miran Shah and Mir Ali, in North Waziristan, and the army is currently deciding whether to pursue them there.

Pakistan will struggle to pacify Waziristan so long as Afghanistan is ablaze. Yet it is at last giving itself a fair chance, on the heels of its advancing troops, by launching a serious-looking bid to rebuild its shattered administration. South Waziristan’s development budget has been increased 15-fold and, with improved security, the PA should actually be able to spend it. To sideline the weakened maliks, he will be given command of a new, 4,000-strong, tribal police force. The agency may also be divided, to ensure greater attention is given to the marginalised and seething Mehsuds. And political reform is coming, too, with a law passed last August granting political parties access to the tribal areas. For more meaningful democracy, some far-sighted officials advocate setting up agency-level councils, with powers over development projects......

[davidbfpo]

In a recent book launch in London, Owen Bennett Jones, a former BBC World Service correspondent in Pakistan, commented that:

1.3% of US (foreign) aid went to education; the madrassah schools teach 4.6% of school age pupils and in all his travels he'd never found any teachers at a public (state) school

The book which awaits opening is 'Pakistan; eye of the storm' (3rd edition).