Pakistani internal security (catch all)

[davidbfpo]

I was bemused to learn from a Pakistani military contact, who has visited the FATA recently, that he was reading 'The Frontier Scouts' by Charles Chevenix-Trench and learning that the old methods did indeed offer an answer to today's problems.

I too from an armchair recommend the book.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to:http:/watandost.blogspot.com/ for this story on the ground in South Waziristan: http://thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=221823

From the start:

the militants, following classic battle tactics, would stand their ground and fight head-on in the open, and be overwhelmed by a superior force. They did not take into account the likelihood of the militants’ following hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, melting into the familiar terrain after a strike, and then trying to win over the relatives of the civilian casualties of this war. We forgot that the operation was not launched against the entire population of Waziristan, after all, but a limited number of militants.

Concludes

Waziristan has suffered long enough. We cannot afford to ignore it any more if we are concerned about the future of our younger generation. We have to replace the “dismantled training camps” with good schools and hospitals. We have to provide basic facilities and means of livelihood to the people. Only then can we hope to achieve a permanent end to militancy. Banking on the military operation alone as a cure for militancy is tantamount to following a tunnel-vision approach on a road leading nowhere.

Yes the military operation started in October 2009 and follow-on civil action takes time - as we all too well know over the Durand Line.

[davidbfpo]

A lengthy PPT on 'The 1897 Revolt and Tirah Valley Operations from the Pashtun Perspective' by Dr Rob Johnson, Oxford University; maybe historical to some, but may help others understand the context today.

Link:http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/...Operations.pdf

Not seen this website before and exploring it.

[davidbfpo]

A short update:http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36037&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=888154a278

[Pete]

The following obituary is of one of the last British soldiers to have seen action against the Fakir of Ipi in Waziristan. The obituary caught my eye because the brigadier shares the same surname as a grandmother of mine before she married, although admittedly my branch of the family arrived in the U.S. from Cork in 1855. Note that Brigadier Prendergast was made Britain's military attache in Afghanistan at the time of India's Partition in 1947, so Britain was clearly still keeping an eye on the region. I don't believe that Britain's former status as an imperial power necessarily invalidates all of the political and military techniques they used in the region during the last century.

Brigadier John Prendergast

Daily Telegraph
London
Published: 12:01AM GMT 03 Mar 2008

Brigadier John Prendergast, who has died aged 97, won a DSO and two MCs in an adventurous military career which spanned more than 30 years.

In May 1937 Prendergast was serving with the Tochi Scouts in North Waziristan. They were leading an advance on the village of Gariom with the objective of blowing up two of the towers as a punishment for harbouring the wily Fakir of Ipi when they came under heavy fire from rebel tribesmen.

Prendergast, with four platoons under his command, was ordered to take charge. As his small force moved up, they were halted along a lip in the ground.

The tribesmen, 300 yards away, concealed in ilex scrub, could cover every inch of open terrain that separated them and, as he tried to flatten his body into the dirt, the vicious crack of bullets flying past his head was so nerve-janglingly sharp that he had horrid visions of his brains being scattered by the next shot.

"This was terrible," he said later. "I was supposed to be a leader." At school, he had boxed against opponents much bigger than himself and had always believed that he was brave. Then the thought came back, "Well, lead then."

Terrified and with the awful feeling that his legs were made of rubber, he got to his feet, waved his puny revolver and tried to get a charge going.

In a split second, he was covered with dust from the bullets striking the ground at his feet. At the same instant, he saw stark fear in the nearest rifleman's eyes and knew that his men were not going to follow him.

He went to ground again, slid down from the lip and moved one of his platoons round to the left where it could give rapid covering fire from a more enfiladed position. Then, swearing at the other three platoons and getting bayonets fixed, he led them over the edge with a loud Pathan shout of "Halla, Halla." (Attack! Attack!)

Prendergast knew that his stout stature made him a marked man but zig-zagging, he and his Pathans tore across the intervening ground. Some of his men fell, but the tribesmen did not stop to face the bright line of bayonets bearing down on them so swiftly and took to their heels. Prendergast was awarded a Military Cross.

To read the remainder of the obituary click here.

[Pete]

During the past two weeks in six installments Tom Ricks has given a warm review to the book Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849-1947 by Andrew M. Roe, a British officer. The lessons Ricks cites from the book are as follows:

Be prepared to conduct a "constant mapping of political, economic and social information to gain a temporal insight into the views, motivation, and differences among the tribes and subclans."

Don't underestimate your enemy. "To take on the tribesman and defeat him in his own his is a game demanding a lifetime of specialized study."

Tribesman will study your tactics and punish lapses or even simple repetitions. "This is one read on why an advance is seldom disputed with vigour, whereas the withdrawal is ferociously harrassed."

Political officers must counter the tendency of military commanders to rely on their "instinct and their own values and standards, which often will be mistaken, unsuitable or inappropriate." (Tom: I saw this tendency a lot in Iraq in 2003-06.)

"Tolerating ambiguities, shortfalls and inconsistencies must be central to any sustainable policy." (Tom: Hmm, sounds like FM 3-24.)

Don't fight the tribal structure. "Employing and, where necessary, reinforcing the existing tribal framework and structures offers the best opportunity for success."

Be prepared to pay off the enemy.

Local forces should be the heart of your effort, not regular Army troops.

The first in the the series of Ricks' blog entries on the book can be read by clicking here. The more recent installments of the review can be found by scrolling within the blog.

[davidbfpo]

This allegation comes as no surprise given the history of Pakistan and its military. Starts with:

The Pakistani army has allegedly committed hundreds of retaliatory killings and other ongoing human rights abuses in the Swat Valley since the end of its successful anti-Taliban offensive there in September, threatening billions of dollars in U.S. military and economic aid to a crucial ally in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban....The extrajudicial execution of up to 300 alleged Taliban supporters and sympathizers in the area around Mingora, the Swat capital, has been documented by New York-based Human Rights Watch...(Closes with)...the fact is that the engine of abuse is the military.

The HRW report is due to be published next month. Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2010040501618

If true it is easy to fear that winning 'hearts & minds' is not on the Pakistani Army's agenda. How will this affect the local population?

[davidbfpo]

hat tip to Abu M. Patrick Cockburn, a UK journalist, reports from Bajaur: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...n-1946387.html

The article ends with:

Peace has not returned to FATA. Local papers carry stories down-column of suspected Islamic militants' houses being burned, refugees in flight or returning, a girls' school destroyed by insurgents and many killed by American drone attacks. The army is in control, but it is not clear what would happen if it left. It may find it more difficult to get out of FATA than it was to get in.

More reports may follow as he's in a party of journalists hosted for a week by the Pakistani state.

[Jedburgh]

NAF, 19 April 2010: The Battle for Pakistan

Few places in the world have assumed as much importance for the United States and its allies since 2001 as Pakistan’s northwestern tribal regions, which have served as a base for the mix of militants seeking to attack the governments, militaries, and civilians of the United States, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others. In just over half of the serious plots against the West since 2004, alleged militants received training at camps in Pakistan.

On April 19, 2010, the New America Foundation’s Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative launched a unique series of policy papers, ‘The Battle for Pakistan,’ written by local Pakistani researchers and other experts on politics and militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict Across the FATA and NWFP

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Kurram

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Khyber

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Mohmand

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Bajaur

The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Swat

Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency

Al-Qaeda's Allies: Explaining the Relationship Between Al-Qaeda and Taliban Factions After 2001

Financing the Taliban: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Pakistan's COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani Military Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA

[JMA]

This allegation comes as no surprise given the history of Pakistan and its military. Starts with:

The HRW report is due to be published next month. Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2010040501618

If true it is easy to fear that winning 'hearts & minds' is not on the Pakistani Army's agenda. How will this affect the local population?

Just so I can understand the context here how many extrajudicial killings did the Taliban carry out in Pakistan before the Swat Valley campaign?

[davidbfpo]

I am sure there are some stats on the Taliban's reign in the Swat Valley, but this recent report gives an indication albeit wider than one valley, 'Socio Economic Cost of Terrorism: A case study of Pakistan', by the Bradford University (UK) based Pakistan Security Research Unit (PRSU) which has tables on the human cost and from one for 2009: Civilians 2307 Security Forces 1011 Insurgents 8267 Total 11585.

Link:http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/downlo.../Brief+57B.pdf

PRSU website:http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Home

It was the grim reality of Taliban rule, including one You Tube video of a young girl being beaten by the Taliban, that was reported as giving the Army a popular mandate to take action (probably on one of the Pakistani threads here).

A quick response.

[davidbfpo]

Ahmed Rashid's latest comment for the BBC, which ends with:

The deteriorating security in North Waziristan is now having a global impact and creating a vast and multi-faceted militant hub. Meanwhile other areas are on the verge of falling back into the hands of the Taliban. Pakistan's civil and military need to formulate a coherent counter-insurgency strategy to provide security and an administration, so that development can reach the people and the militants can be isolated. Without such a strategy, an ad hoc approach is leading to an ever-worsening security situation.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8665657.stm

[Tukhachevskii]

...aparently, Eric Breininger has been killed by Pakistani forces in Waziristan according to a jihadist group while German Jihad colonies take root in Waziristan:

The Recruits are quickly becomming radicalised and, in some cases, entire families are departing hotbeds for terrorism. it is belived that colonies catering to German Islamists have taken shape in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Surely, they were already "radicalised" (whatever that means) before they got there?

[davidbfpo]

The cited Der Spiegel co-author Yassin Musharbash is always worth reading, partly as it appears his investigative journalism discovers matters others do not find.

The German authorities were not aware of the 'German colonies' in the FATA, nor were the Pakistanis, partly as they were based on the Uzbek group, the IJU (?). A group that may have eluded ISI tutelage and so low profile.

During the Saeurland Plot it was reported that going on Jihad was fun and could be done in a summer vacation; I am sure I've posted on this before, with links.

[davidbfpo]

A succinct, open source commentary:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._training_camp

[omarali50]

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english201...c_13321818.htm

Terrorists (almost certainly Punjabi Taliban) simultaneously attacked two Ahmedi sect mosques in Lahore during Friday prayers and killed over 80 people.
My first comments:
1. The choice of target is easy to understand. Ahmedis are a persecuted and vilified minority in Pakistan and "mainstream" news organizations feel no compunction about attacking them, so the ground is already prepared. e.g. GEO TV's religion presenter Amir Liaqat Hussain, a former minister under the buffoon Musharraf, encouraged people to kill them if they "overstepped their bounds" and an Ahmedi doctor was promptly killed; there was some fuss in the liberal press but Hussain is still on TV and writes a particularly vicious column in a major newspaper.
2. The day is also significant. its the anniversary of Pakistan's nuclear explosion and is a national day of jingoism, so appropriate for such an action.
3. There will be talk of stepped up security and other such BS, but the fact is that such terrorism is unstoppable until you get at the head. There is an infrastructure of support and guidance and its known to everyone in Pakistan, but decisive action is difficult because:
A. The army set up and protected this monster and knows better than anyone how big the operation is. Even if some of the top brass now want to proceed against them, they would prefer to do so slowly and in small increments. That also ensures a long-term American GWOT subsidy, so go-slow is a win-win situation for the top brass.
B. Because the army does not like to admit mistakes, it has never really let the general public know that mistakes were made and enemies within were created by the blessed armed forces themselves. So they rely on the narrative of "foreign hand" and "Indian-zionist agents" rather heavily. This means the "information war" is a total mess and the general public (whose cooperation is essential for any counter-insurgency) remains confused about who is fighting whom and for what purpose. Again, the confusion suits the general staff just fine (letting them hang on to some shred of their jihadi bona-fides while slowly fighitng jihadis) but is not helpful to anyone else.
C. Several decades of jihadist propaganda (nurtured officially) has created a significant jihadist constituency in the educated classes. What the Marxists of yore would call the "class interests" of this segment force them to be anti-jihadi (those "class interests" being intertwined with a capitalist global economy and the modern world in general) but their ideological vocabulary is almost entirely Islamist and Jihadist. The resulting cognitive dissonance must give migraines to the American embassy and undermines (but does not stop) the anti-terrorist effort.
D. And ALL THIS is layered on top of the "baseline" level of insurgency one expects in any mismanaged, unequal, unfair, over-populated, under-represented, mis-educated, illiterate, discriminated against third world population (which shows up in the Hindu kingdom of Nepal, the secular republic of India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, etc in various forms, from large scale criminality to Maoist insurgencies). Which would be a large enough set of headaches for any country, but thanks to our brilliant general staff, we have added an islamist insurgency on top of it (and of course, the two merge in various creative ways).

My predictions for the future:
1. Very slowly, painfully and very very incompetently, the ruling elite will fight the jihadist insurgency, and some of them will get very rich doing so.
2. The baseline "Maoist" component of the insurgency could potentially have grown into a serious problem, but Islamism will coopt all other grievances and will save the ruling elite in the long run because they are so insane, the corrupt and vicious ruling elite will look better by comparison.
3. More of the same for many years to come. But humpty dumpty will not fall because India, China, Iran and America will spend sleepless nights figuring out how to keep humpty together...

[omarali50]

This comment grew up and became the following article:

http://wichaar.com/news/284/ARTICLE/...010-05-29.html

[omarali50]

And now the article got a shave and a haircut and moved on to Outlookindia.com.

At this rate, it will soon dress up in an expensive suit and appear on WSJ...just kidding.

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?265617

[davidbfpo]

I am sure something has been occurring in North Waziristan, but have missed any reports until this (Hat tip to Watandost): http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=29358

Situation in the troubled North Waziristan tribal region has witnessed a gradual improvement following an agreement on Monday that led to the release of 20 Taliban by the government and in return the militants allowed an Army convoy, stranded in Miramshah for the last 45 days, to proceed.

Sounds like the 'Stop & Go' policy of the recent past.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 20 Jun 10: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

This document examines counterinsurgency efforts in Pakistan and asks several questions:

• What are the roots of the militant challenge in Pakistan?

• What have Pakistan’s primary operations against militants been?

• How effective have these operations been in achieving their goals?

• And what are the policy implications?

To answer these questions, the document combines field research in Pakistan with a review of the literature on counterinsurgency and other relevant areas. While there have been numerous policy reports on Pakistan and its militant challenges, there has been little effort to systematically analyze the effectiveness of Pakistan’s operations and to apply relevant theoretical lessons.