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    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default The Strategic Corporal

    This is a special forum - reserved for tactical discussions on the day-to-day things our Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, Coasties and their coalition counterparts have learned in the conduct of Small Wars...
    Last edited by SWJED; 10-25-2005 at 10:16 PM.

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    Default The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield

    The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield - The Nexus Between the USMC's Three Block War Concept and Network Centric Warfare by James Szepesy. Tufts University Master's Thesis, March 2005.

    The modern international security environment has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. The nature of the battlefield has changed from rural to urban. New technology promises tremendous capabilities, and there are new actors on the scene. These changes have had an impact on the approaches used by U.S. security instruments to implement U.S. policy. The U.S. Marine Corps identified the changing battlefield in the later half of the 1990s and articulated its vision of future warfare as the Three Block War.

    Concurrent to Marine Corps’ development of the Three Block War was an explosive growth in information technology developments. The end of the Cold War, budgetary pressures, changing face of war, and technological advancements at the start of the 21st Century generated tremendous pressure upon the US military establishment to adapt. Emerging from these pressures was a desire to operationalize the information technology advancements realized at the end of the 20th Century in what is being called Network Centric Warfare.

    These two vectors, refining the Three Block War model and Network Centric Warfare, have come to be important elements to the strategies and tactics used to fight in Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom as well as components to the consequent debate about the appropriate structure and composition of the U.S. military for the 21st Century.

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    Council Member Stratiotes's Avatar
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    Default Urban/Rural

    Interesting. But, I'm not sure I understand how it has been decided that the emerging battlefield is more urban than rural. Iraq, perhaps. But not Afghanistan. I'm just not certain there is more evidence toward urban warfare now than there was before or less evidence of rural than there was before. Is there really a change based on data or is it a largely untested perception? And, is the data based on a changing definition of what urban and rural are or is it a static definition we used to compare the past with now? Just curious because it is something I've heard before but I just don't know that the evidence/data supports the assertion.
    Mark
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    "The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton

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    Council Member Stu-6's Avatar
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    More of the world is becoming urban. A century ago most of the population was involved in agriculture, rural guerillas had a ready supply of men and material, this is no longer the case. Also modern weapons give the established state forces a huge advantage in most terrain, the complexity of a city along with the collateral damage factor evens the playing field.

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    Council Member Stratiotes's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Stu-6
    More of the world is becoming urban. A century ago most of the population was involved in agriculture, rural guerillas had a ready supply of men and material, this is no longer the case. Also modern weapons give the established state forces a huge advantage in most terrain, the complexity of a city along with the collateral damage factor evens the playing field.
    I understand how the logic would seem to imply that we should expect more urban warfare - but I wondered if there was any data to support that assumption since I haven't seen it. The war in Iraq is predominantly urban but the wars in south and central Americas seem to have been predominantly rural. The war in Afghanistan is also predominantly rural. The Balkans conflicts have been predominatly rural too I believe. I just wondered if the data supported the presuppositions and I'm still not sure it does.

    As for the advantages, I'm not so sure technology has really given a significant advantage. I think people are smarter than most technology and tend to figure out ways to thwart technological changes rather quickly. At least, that seems to be the case historically. Technological advances in weapons are, at best, a very temporary advantage it would seem.
    Mark
    Discuss at: The Irregulars Visit at: UW Review
    "The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton

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    DDilegge
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    Default Go here...

    I've collected some background info and studies for you on our urban operations page. It's all there and supports what smart people have been saying about the future over the last two decades.

    More info can be found on the SASO, Transition, COIN, Threat, Interagency, Chechnya, Somalia and other pages in the SWJ Reference Library.

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    Default Strategic Corporal -- a terrible concept

    The “strategic corporal” seems to me an unlikely concept for a large force, such as the US Army, to achieve in practice. Nice dream, though.

    The following excerpt is from my review of the FMFM 1-A at
    http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/thoughts_on_fmfm_1-a.htm


    “Fourth Generation war demands not only the strategic corporal, but the moral corporal as well, enlisted Marines who think about every action they take in terms of its moral effects.”
    William Lind, et al, "FMFM 1-A" page 8
    http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_25_05.htm

    This seems implausible given the age, experience, and training of the average US Marine corporal, now or in any likely future. The courts martial of NCOs for mistreatment of Iraq prisoners suggest that we need more hands-on lieutenants and less freedom of action for corporals.

    We’ll be lucky to get an adequate number of First Lieutenants with such cross-cultural knowledge, capable of acting with such sophisticated strategic and moral reasoning.

    This illustrates a difficulty of recommendations given in FMFM 1-A. All wargame scenarios have easy solutions if one can conjure up sufficient resources. FMFM 1-A aspires to a US Marine Corps with the training and attributes of our elite Special Ops units.

    With an army of such men we could pacify Iraq. Equally so, with the Battlestar Galactica or Starship Enterprise the Germans could have won WWII.

    It’s not enough to dream of ways we can win. How can we evolve our current military apparatus to get there from here?

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    The strategic corporal concept is not only relevant, but a requirement in operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. While it increases the burden of leadership, and on recruit instructors, this is a price worth paying. Those individuals who claim that this is a "bridge too far" or "beyond reasonable expectations" are most likely the same individuals who believe that enlisting 37 and 39 years olds in the Army after bribing them with staggering enlistment bonuses is a good idea, that the National Guard is an elite fighting force, and that the abuses at Abu Gharib are unavoidable.

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    Council Member Stratiotes's Avatar
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    Default

    I think it is possible but requires a paradigm shift in our culture. We are, I think, still clinging to the old notion of creating automotons who follow orders above all else. Instead of rewarding initiative, we tend to look for where to pin the blame when things go wrong making individuals more afraid of failure than they are hungry for success. Instead of the attitude "he who risks wins" we seem to more often remember "he who risks might fail!" So we put the burden on the corporal to be strategic all the while implying that taking risks is not tolerated except when it works…implying that when it doesn't work, heads will roll. Rewards often come to those who make no decisions on their own. I think it is possible and essential as Major S. but it will be very difficult to achieve in our present culture. I think there have been improvements since I left the military back in the mid-80's but, from what I've seen since, the progress has been relatively slow in most services. Of course, all of that is simply my perception so I could be wrong - but I think it’s a perception shared by quite a few.
    Mark
    Discuss at: The Irregulars Visit at: UW Review
    "The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton

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    Default off topic

    Quote Originally Posted by Major Strickland
    that the National Guard is an elite fighting force,
    There were some elite forces in the guard, but the geriatric fatbastard good ole' boy network disbanded them.
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by GorTex6; 02-10-2006 at 12:25 AM.

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    Excerpt from
    "Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?"
    by Fabius Maximus.
    http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/fabius_..._militia-1.pdf


    Unfortunately there ... is a natural tendency to propose expanding on our strengths rather than addressing our weaknesses, taking us further down a dead end road.

    Note recent articles ... describing programs to improve the training of US troops, in the hope that we can win by fielding troops in which – to caricature it – each NCO and officer has the skills of Green Beret.

    Imagine a force of multilingual troops, all of whose leaders have a sophisticated understanding of foreign cultures, and ability to not only lead US troops but also navigate within foreign communities – gathering and using intelligence, playing both its elites and common people as an experienced angler does trout.

    At some point this becomes a search for the “super soldier serum” familiar to all who read Captain America comic books. ...

    We already have some of the best-trained soldiers that America has ever fielded, certainly among the best trained and educated in world history. Is increasing their effectiveness by adding even more intellectual skills the best course, or have passed the point of diminishing returns to training?

    However desirable a goal, adding to our strengths detracts attention from critical weaknesses in our current force structure. Seeking to increase our troops training and skills is nice, but the process has severe and perhaps immediate limits.

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    Default Devils Advocate and Stirring up the Pot - I Hope

    Some would argue a clearly articulated commander's intent would be better served with 23 - 24 year-old small unit leaders with more training, education and experience as well as maturity vice 19 -20 year olds.

    The age of NCOs serving in our usual coalition partner’s forces is older – and they have more experience under their belt. Yes, I know we have PFCs, LCpls and Cpls on their second and third combat tours – but what has that gotten us? Some would submit a worn-out force and one that has led to some of the damning strategic consequences of tactical actions – Abu Graib and Haditha are but two examples. Yes, I understand that incidents like this are committed by a slim minority of the force and the vast majority perform heroically - but that minority still has the potential to completely derail any chances of executing successful Small Wars - and in particular COIN. Can't we find a way to weed them out before the damage is done?

    Moreover, why should the majority be required to learn the hard way?

    An often unsympathetic – sometimes hostile mainstream media as well as the IO efforts of our foes compounds this situation.

    Others would argue that the problem is not with the Strategic Corporal - but with the next higher leadership level up through and including the SECDEF. That argument partially supports the commander's intent thesis. I suspect that it is more than just a clearly articulated commander's intent - that other capabilities would give the Strategic Corporal more tools in his kit to carry out that intent - and in the absence of a clearly defined end-state and / or commander's intent carry-on successfully in a complex and changing operational environment that includes asymmetric foes in close proximity to the local populace.

    Don’t get me wrong, as I most certainly do not have an answer to this. An older force has a lot of implications for U.S. military conventional forces. A seasoned force from a smaller pool and increased longevity and retention rates are but a few of the variables we would have to overcome. Training and education costs are another consideration.

    The Strategic Corporal is here to stay – whether we like it or not – it is not something we can wish away or apply simple solutions to as we plod along in this IO-rich environment.

    I take exception to the view that training and education would be a waste of effort.

    That said, I am purposely stirring up the pot here and enjoin this board to begin posting possible solutions for debate – we all seem to have a handle on the problem set and apparently many of us are struggling to find answers.
    Last edited by SWJED; 08-01-2006 at 06:19 PM.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default Start working closer with law enforcement

    A Strategic corporal is more like a cop to me. Police officers are trained to make life and death decisions from day one. We have to do this without waiting for an operations order or some officer (supervisor) to tell us what to do. We have a lot of experience with doing it on camera, both good and bad. In the 28 articles for COIN and many other COIN writings you always here about acting like a beat cop. Do you know how to act like a beat cop??Do you know what a beat cop would do?? From what I have seen(which is limited )you have alot to learn. It hurts me to see such brave soldiers/marines get into such sh** because nobody has ever trained them on other options.


    One way to start is this. Cops don't think Ends,Ways,and Means we think Motive,Means,and Opportunity!!! We don't think about total victory we think about control to a reasonable level.

    OK now everybody take a shot!!(joke)

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    Quote Originally Posted by SWJED
    Some would argue a clearly articulated commander's intent would be better served with 23 - 24 year-old small unit leaders with more training, education and experience as well as maturity vice 19 -20 year olds.
    If a commander's intent type statement can work with a properly prepared 12 year old, it can work with a properly prepared 19-20 year old. The training and education piece is what we as an institution are lacking.

    Eyeballs........snap sir!!!!!!!

    Sir, the private doesn't know sir!?!?!

    From front to rear, count off!!!!!!!!!!

    This is my rifle, there are many like it.................

    SMEAC, BAMCIS, ADDRAC, METT T, IA Drills, TTPs, 6 line, 9 line.........

    Marines, today's period of instruction is on the AN PRC 119.............

    There is no requirement for the Marine to THINK in the above examples. This system worked great for a large draft army, it doesn't work in today's environment.

    Von Stueben had it figured out during the Revolutionary War, you need to tell the American soldier "why."

    Why don't we push critical thinking in bootcamp?
    Why don't we push executive level thinking at the L/Cpl level?

    Because, we are lazy. It is a lot easier to have the Marine blurt out Situation, Mission, Execution, Admin & logistics, Command & signal then to explain how the current enemy/friendly situation could effect the mission and ultimately the commander's intent.

    What determines how a Marine becomes situational aware?

    Perception = something is happening........
    Comprehension = the alarm clock went off.....is this familiar?
    Projection = if I turn it off, I get to sleep longer......
    Prediction = if I sleep longer, I could get fired......
    Decision = go to work

    Our training takes the Marine to the Comprehension stage and then turns him loose with immediate action type decision making. This is the point where experience plays a critical function. Without teaching critical thinking he doesn't care about familiarity. His decision could very well be based on Hollywood, Soldier of Fortune, Sea Stories, video game.........

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    Default Training...

    Quote Originally Posted by nichols
    The training and education piece is what we as an institution are lacking.

    Our training takes the Marine to the Comprehension stage and then turns him loose with immediate action type decision making. This is the point where experience plays a critical function. Without teaching critical thinking he doesn't care about familiarity. His decision could very well be based on Hollywood, Soldier of Fortune, Sea Stories, video game.........
    This was also discussed heavily in JUW 06 - The need for more of the "how to think" about fluid and complex situations instead of “templated solutions on what to think".

    At this event it was our pleasure to have Brigadier Rod West (Australian Army) as one of our senior mentors. He talked about the value of "scenario-general" training over what we seem to do best - "scenario-specific" training. I thought that was a very valid point. Scenario-general training - with a range of problems to solve.

    This also proved true in my dealings with the Corps’ Project Metropolis experimentation that resulted in the USMC Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) package. Readers Digest version – the only Battalion Landing Team that received the package prior to OIF thought that the range of complex, and seemingly “off-the-map”, situations (scenarios) that were thrown their way were in the category of “yea fine – but we’ll never see this…”

    The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (Project Metropolis Team) sent a lessons learned team to Iraq after this same battalion completed the “March Up” to Baghdad. Funny thing, their assessment was - yep – we did not see the scenarios MCWL gave us – but sure enough the program sure taught us how to think and deal with the unexpected…

    That said, kudos to Mojave Viper (USMC training at 29 Palms) and the JRTC (US Army training at Ft. Polk) - it is my understanding that they, and others have picked up on the scenario-general... Let's hope all ground forces get this type of training and after it is all said and done - not s***-canned like some of the Vietnam-era lessons learned, programs and training programs were.
    Last edited by SWJED; 09-17-2006 at 02:56 AM.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Fellow Pot Stirrer

    I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my background.

    My key point is that we cannot teach or train experience. Maybe someday we will be able to "insert" it via brain chip. But in the interim, training, educating, and "experiencing" is an individual track, not a unit collective track. More unit stability is a good start.

    But I believe that the Army (and I can't speak for the Corps) has wasted the rank of Major for too long. A successful young Captain who succeeds at company command can wait more than a decade before that officer commands a battalion. I believe Majors should command companies, Captains, platoons, and that Lieutenants lead sections of 2 squads. Army squads (again speaking heretically) are too small. Operating in sections would go a long way toward strengthening units below platoon.

    We need to strengthen our NCOs and get away from making the NCO corps do the resume march of individual checkmarks that has long plagued the officer corps. Senior NCOs (E7 and up) should be rewarded and encouraged to remain tactical as long as possible. I would love to see the day when a platoon daddy was an E8 and a first sergeant an E9. Above that I would make SGMs and CSMs warrants like the Brits do.

    All of this I would see as building years of critical experience into small units versus simply producing experienced leaders whose advancement removes that experience from small units.

    I stand ready to be led to the stake; who has a match?

    Best
    Tom

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    Council Member nichols's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom
    I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my.........................to the stake; who has a match?
    Sir, I find myself in disagreement with you on your enlisted structure. The Army changed the SquadLeader to a SSgt after WW II as an incentive, I might be wrong on this.

    Could be that slowing down the enlisted ranks promotion but increasing the pay based on time in service vice time in grade could help.

    With that said, I'm done working for today, reading your book excerpt gave me some flashbacks of Bangui.....I'm off to the MCA Bookstore to get a copy.

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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom
    I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my background.

    My key point is that we cannot teach or train experience. Maybe someday we will be able to "insert" it via brain chip. But in the interim, training, educating, and "experiencing" is an individual track, not a unit collective track. More unit stability is a good start.

    But I believe that the Army (and I can't speak for the Corps) has wasted the rank of Major for too long. A successful young Captain who succeeds at company command can wait more than a decade before that officer commands a battalion. I believe Majors should command companies, Captains, platoons, and that Lieutenants lead sections of 2 squads. Army squads (again speaking heretically) are too small. Operating in sections would go a long way toward strengthening units below platoon.

    We need to strengthen our NCOs and get away from making the NCO corps do the resume march of individual checkmarks that has long plagued the officer corps. Senior NCOs (E7 and up) should be rewarded and encouraged to remain tactical as long as possible. I would love to see the day when a platoon daddy was an E8 and a first sergeant an E9. Above that I would make SGMs and CSMs warrants like the Brits do.

    All of this I would see as building years of critical experience into small units versus simply producing experienced leaders whose advancement removes that experience from small units.

    I stand ready to be led to the stake; who has a match?

    Best
    Tom
    You are describing the rank structure for an SF company. The commander is a Major and his senior enlisted adviser is a Sergeant Major. Each of the teams is lead by a Master Sergeant and his senior commissioned adviser is a Captain. Of course SF does not have Lieutenants. Certainly, this structure could work in the the conventional army but with the Lieutenants as assistant platoon leaders rather than leading squads.

    SFC W

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    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Default In addition...

    To hinge off this, I, along with a friend of mine, am working on a project to provide the US Army and Marine Corps with a book that captures tactical lessons learned in combat. This project is intend to transcend branch of service, as the Transportation Corps soldier may have as much to lend on convoy operations as the Civil Affairs officer has to bilateral engagement as the infantry or armor soldier has to direct fire engagements. We're looking for some submissions. That's where you come in.

    Attached is the concept brief and an example. There is imagery attached to the vignette, though including such would not meet the council's filespace requirements. Feedback is welcome. So are submissions. I must say, however, that we're in more need of submissions than feedback, so fire away. Thanks.
    Attached Files Attached Files
    Last edited by RTK; 12-31-2006 at 11:43 PM. Reason: spelling error

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    Default Not a tactical lesson, but...

    Discussion of the strategic corporal, specifically his training and education, can be shaped by leaning back on Clausewitz's concept of coup d'oeil, or "stroke of the eye".

    From an online Air and Space Power Journal article by Majors Caraccilo and Pothin: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...araccilo2.html

    The 19th Century military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote that, "the aspect of war that always attracted the greatest attention is the engagement."1 To gain and maintain the initiative, as Bergerud states above, is based on the commander’s ability to make quick and knowledgeable decisions. Clausewitz calls this quick recognition of the truth the commander’s coup d’oeil or intuition. It is the leader’s ability to recognize at the precise moment in battle the truth, or in other words, a high level of situational awareness "that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection."2
    I think many confuse the concept of the strategic corporal because they feel the military is trying to hoist responsibilities on them typically appropriate to a platoon commander. I would agree that even within the Marine Corps, we confuse the issue to some extent.

    In the realm of a strategic corporal's decision-making process, perhaps we need to focus on developing his cou d'oeil, or ability to recognize the pattern of what is happening before him. When I was an infantry officer in training, pattern recognition was a theme used to justify the volume of reading required of us, as well as the repeated iterations we conducted on the sand-table.

    Having said this, I'd like to offer a question in this thread: Are the tactical lessons we are looking for actually supporting pattern recognition?

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