The Strategic Corporal

[SSG Rock]

It's interesting to watch the army rehash this, especially when one looks back to the Army after the Civil War. At that time, the NCOs had heavy company-level responsibilities, and were looked upon in many cases as the backbone of their units. These NCOs were not, generally speaking, formally educated, but they were repositories of military information and skill that many officers relied on. They often took out patrols on their own, and in the case of first sergeants at times commanded the company when all their assigned officers were absent.

Precisely! What is the benefit of a staff sergeant with a masters degree? If I had not been counseld by my mentors that getting a civilian education would increase my promotion potential, I probably would have waited untill later to do it. The NCO Corps does not necessarily need a college education, we don't need an NCO Corps whose formal education mirrors the Officer Corps. There should be a very clear divide in the roles of the officer and NCO, thats what makes the Army work. The Officers need to get an education so they can discuss doctrine, theory, write campaign plans and etc. The NCO needs to spend his time becoming an expert at every task he must supervise his Soldiers perform and taking care of the health, welfare and training of those Soldiers, period.

[nichols]

IMHO...

The Strategic Corporal is not about education level, ability to call a 9 line, or level of responsibility. It's about making dynamic decisions NOW in context of the Commander's Intent without having to wait for authorization.

[Steve Blair]

At the risk of flogging the proverbial dead horse here, I think one of the main tenants of the strategic corporal idea that tends to get lost is its external impact. By this I mean that, given the immediacy of media, what used to be a routine decision (or non-decision) by a corporal can have an immediate and at times strategic impact. It's not so much a matter of formal education as it is making people aware that in today's environment their decisions (or, again, non-decisions) can have an impact that is much wider than they might assume.

[fas_et_gloria]

Gents, first post here, so I hope I'm not going to step on too many toes.

It occurs to me that from my reading of the thread thus far, that there is a distinction between the strategic corporal being discussed and that envisaged by Krulac. His point, surely, is not that we need to train our soldiers and junior commanders to act in a strategicly positive way as an end in itself: rather he is proposing that the globalisation of information exchange means that the actions of any soldier are going to have strategic consequences no matter whether the Chain of Command actively prepares and trains our junior leaders for the role. Especially in the current assymetric environment, the actions of the section commander/squad leader (depending on which side of the pond you start...) are inevitably going to have strategic consequences.

The televisation of the death of Mohammed al-Durah by IDF fire at the begining of the Al-Aqsa intifada is a case in point. Arguably, the current events in the ME would not be taking place had the junior leader at the time had other options for dealing with stone-throwing youths than .762 calibre ones.

[SWJED]

Gents, first post here, so I hope I'm not going to step on too many toes.

It occurs to me that from my reading of the thread thus far, that there is a distinction between the strategic corporal being discussed and that envisaged by Krulac. His point, surely, is not that we need to train our soldiers and junior commanders to act in a strategicly positive way as an end in itself: rather he is proposing that the globalisation of information exchange means that the actions of any soldier are going to have strategic consequences no matter whether the Chain of Command actively prepares and trains our junior leaders for the role. Especially in the current assymetric environment, the actions of the section commander/squad leader (depending on which side of the pond you start...) are inevitably going to have strategic consequences.

The televisation of the death of Mohammed al-Durah by IDF fire at the begining of the Al-Aqsa intifada is a case in point. Arguably, the current events in the ME would not be taking place had the junior leader at the time had other options for dealing with stone-throwing youths than .762 calibre ones.

I think the vast majority here would agree with you - maybe it just wasn't expressed as such. We explored this issue during Joint Urban Warrior 06 (USMC - JFCOM program). Participants included representatives from the US Army, USMC, British Army, Royal Marines, Australian Army, Canadian Army, French Army, Netherlands Army, Israeli Army, German Army, New Zealand Army, and other ground forces. Issues ranged from training, professional education for SNCO's and NCO's, age and maturity, balancing warfighting skills with other skill sets, capabilities (organizational, doctrinal and technological) and of course the implications of today’s 24 / 7 instant news environment. Your comment on the globalization of information and its effects were echoed by the vast majority of the participants.

Where it gets much more complicated is developing and implementing solutions to improved "Strategic Corporal" capabilities (after careful examination to gauge "true value") along the lines of those other issues I listed above.

Many schools of thought abound and can be taken to extremes at times - from doing nothing because there are no real solutions to training conventional forces to Special Forces standards. Neither of these two extremes is viable though... That’s why this issue will be top and center as the major theme for Joint Urban Warrior 07.

[Tom Odom]

The issue goes beyond that of individual soldier training; in some ways the issue relates directly to the key word, "individual". Training and development systems focus on individuals and we develop good Soldiers and ultimately great leaders. The problem is that they never practice their skils at the level where they gained them. The result is we do not increase the collective experience of our units so that the "strategic corporal" idea can grow in the fertile ground of an experienced company, platoon, and even squad.

See my article in Mil Review May-June 2005.

Best
Tom

[SWJED]

Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates, Retired; Command Sergeant Major Jack Hardwick, U.S. Army, Retired; and Specialist First Class Robert Ehrlich, U.S. Army.

[nichols]

From my limited perspective.

The key is in a clearly articulated Commander's Intent. When the CO can give a no kidding operationally sound intent and Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word understands that intent then you have the Strategic Corporal.

The only thing that high speed low drag schools will guarantee is the T-shirt.

Invest time and effort in learning the art of the Commander's Intent.