The Strategic Corporal

[GorTex6]

Are our NCOs in line units becomming more or less educated and capable?

In the army guard side, the rank of e-5 is now what e-4 should be- I have never seen so many e-5s. They are conditionally promoted, meaning that they have to attend PLDC within a year of their date of rank; if deployed, they have a year after REFRAD(think years!). PLDC has also been decreased from 4 weeks to 2 on the active side. E-6s are conditionally promoted for BNCOC. I have also yet to see anyone legitimately pass a freakin APFT-H&W/tape in a long time(too chickensht to hold a fatbastards feet to the fire). Despite lipservice to regulations, promotions are accually based on behind closed door "drug deals" and "good ol' boy" politics.

[Xenophon]

Fabius Maximus

1. I'd agree that they are doing much the same thing. But even without the added firepower available to the Corporal, decision making is being pushed down to the absolute lowest level. Look at the case of Pfc. Lynddie England. A PFC normally would only be involved in the tactical level of war. But her participation in the Abu Ghraib scandal greatly hurt our strategic considerations. Or look at the Marine Lance Corporal who allegedly shot an injured Iraqi and the media scandal that followed it. Situations like this prove that, due to any number of factors, every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine is a strategic player on the battlefield. Whether we like it or not, or intended it to be this way or not, corporals have now become a strategic asset. It's up to us to properly train and prepare them so that they can succeed in that role.

2. I must have stated my reasoning for better comm poorly. I don't believe comm abilities will empower the Corporal at all. But if a fire team is going to be an independent actor on the battlefield, they need to have comm with higher. Our current assets are insufficient to this task.

3. I agree our NCOs are probably getting letting capable. But due to new realities of warfare, we need to reverse this trend.

[Reid Bessenger]

I was concerned to read the assessment of the quality of junior noncomissioned officers above. I don't agree with it. I see a pervasive and opposite trend. I don't disagree with anyone else's assessment of the folks they see, but I know that whatever else it is, the trend is not universally negative.

The inevitablity of the operative Strategic Corporal was addressed above. That's the point I think - it's happening. The issue is more about how do we facilitate the success of the strategic corporal than it is about how can we possibly make every corporal comparable to SF in maturity, education, training and capablility.

[Strickland]

For those that believe the strategic corporal concept is a bridge too far, or places unnecessary burdens on limited resources to include the Marines and soldiers themselves, please take note. During a recent meeting of 20 veterans of OIF, OEF, Somalia, and the Balkans, ALL agreed that we must demand more from our junior enlisted personnel. In addition, all agreed that this concept was neither unnecessary, nor placed unrealistic expectations on our junior troops. Many suggested that those that held negative views about the potential of this concept were handicapped by experiences with the Draftee Army of the 60s and 70s.

[GorTex6]

For those that believe the strategic corporal concept is a bridge too far, or places unnecessary burdens on limited resources to include the Marines and soldiers themselves, please take note. During a recent meeting of 20 veterans of OIF, OEF, Somalia, and the Balkans, ALL agreed that we must demand more from our junior enlisted personnel. In addition, all agreed that this concept was neither unnecessary, nor placed unrealistic expectations on our junior troops. Many suggested that those that held negative views about the potential of this concept were handicapped by experiences with the Draftee Army of the 60s and 70s.

"More often than not the line soldiers are unaware of what is happening or supposed to happen. They Rely on NCOs and officers in all eventualities. They are trainied to fight as cogs in an intricate and vast machine embracing perhaps millions like themselves"
-Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army, 1956

[Xenophon]

"Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets."- General George S. Patton

[SSG Rock]

I must admit, unfortunately, that within the Army NCO Corps, too much emphasis was placed on civilian education, holding the right duty positions, getting a perfect NCOER etc, for too long. I fell for it, and I ended up becoming a very small member of the NCO Corps with an MA, I completed my masters program as an E6. I languished at E6 for a long time, and was picked up for E7 after I had made the decision to retire. This is a topic for another thread, but IMHO, Brigade level commanders should be given the authority to promote staff sergeants to sergeant first class had that been a reality when I became eligible for E7, my brigade commander would have promoted me immediately, the centralized promotion system is broken and we are not promoting the best candidates. During my last six or seven years on AD, I definately saw a decrease in the quality of the NCO Corps, not that they weren't capable, but emphasis for promotion was misguided. Promotion to SFC should be based almost solely on core competence and MOS skills, less so on job positions and NCOERs, there are not enough duty positions for all NCOs to get a fair shot, I'm sure the officer corps suffers from the same problem to a somewhat smaller scale. NCO quality decline is not the fault of junior and mid level NCOs, (they hunger for more responsibility) but due to their leaders. For some reason, at least here at Fort Leavenworth, the Sergeants Majors that I had contact with acted more like officers then NCOs and they expected everything except traditional NCO behavior from the NCOs under their charge and when I was on AD, my fellow NCOs sincerely felt there was nobody in their corner and that the senior NCOs on post were derilect in this duty. It was maddening for me to watch NCOs get called on the carpet time after time to explain themselves in simple leadership matters such as conducting a barracks party because his Soldiers living quarters were below standard or writing a negative counseling statement for missing a formation etc. Another, more serious problem is, senior officers have also lost touch with the duties and responsibilities of the NCO. The zero tolerance atmosphere impeded the NCO in carrying out his duties, phasing out the SQT, especially the hands on portion, and a generally risk averse officer corps have all had a detrimental impact on the NCO Corps. It has been a while since I have been in a combat unit, and I assume these problems exist in those units as well although to a lesser degree perhaps, but that it is still a detriment to TO&E units as well. If the Army wants its NCOs to be NCOs then they have to give them the authority we had in the 1980s. I think the Army would be served well in putting more faith in the NCO Corps as well as the autonomy to run their little corner of the Army.