The Strategic Corporal

[Stratiotes]

Gortex,

You confirm what I have suspected for some time. We ask you guys to do a peace-keeping mission but give you only rudimentary or no skills at all suited for that purpose. When it comes to killing and breaking things, I think our training is second to none - but when it comes to creating soldier-diplomats we fall on our faces. I temper what I say since I do not have the first hand experience, I appreciate your passion because it suits an individual that can speak first hand on the matter.

Given that, I gather language and culture skills would be useful to you. Can you elaborate on those a bit and tell us some of the lessons you have learned the hard way? Obviously you cannot go into details of particular operations but if you can be generic and still give enough detail I am interested.

[DDilegge]

We ask you guys to do a peace-keeping mission but give you only rudimentary or no skills at all suited for that purpose.

Not quite true. While I am more familiar with Marine Corps Training, there has been a lot of progress by both the Army and USMC in reference to SASO training. Broad sweeping statements like the one you made do injustice to the efforts by many to train for the complex "Three Block War" scenario.

Don't buy into the hype that all of our military leadership "doesn’t get it" - they do.

Moreover, considering the current op-tempo (deployment rate) I opine that our trainers are doing a damn fine job with minimal time and resources.

Consider that before 9-11 our forces were required to fight two major theater wars simultaneously while also putting out brush fires (Small Wars). There are only so many training hours in a day and only so many resources to replicate real world scenarios... Could they have been doing more prior to Iraq? Probably yes, but the military is adapting as fast as current conditions allow.

[Stratiotes]

Not quite true. While I am more familiar with Marine Corps Training, there has been a lot of progress by both the Army and USMC in reference to SASO training. Broad sweeping statements like the one you made do injustice to the efforts by many to train for the complex "Three Block War" scenario.

Don't buy into the hype that all of our military leadership "doesn’t get it" - they do.

That's good to know - I am glad to be corrected on that issue.

[CPT Holzbach]

Given that, I gather language and culture skills would be useful to you. Can you elaborate on those a bit and tell us some of the lessons you have learned the hard way? Obviously you cannot go into details of particular operations but if you can be generic and still give enough detail I am interested.

I have a few suggestions. First and foremost, you cannot have too much language training. Anyone who has ever had a customer come into their place of work who speaks little to no English understands how aggravating it is when someone you have to work with doesnt speak the local language. Now, imagine that customer has a gun and authority over you. Just makes the situation more exasperating. Terps are a pain in the ass to work with. Some are fantastic, many are not. Either way, the ability to speak the language is a huge advantage that cannot be overstated. It makes the job easier, and impresses the local nationals. Officers should receive intensive training in this, at all levels. Every officer in a leadership position, from platoon leader to division commander, will interact with locals regularly. We dont need to stand around and "supervise" the NCOs training the soldiers. They got it. We should be in language class. However, NCOs, especially those in team leader, squad leader, and platoon sergeant type positions, must also have heavy language instruction. And right out the window must go the old attitude of "I just train soldiers and kill people". Not anymore. For the soldiers, they need language training too, but theirs does not need to be too extensive. The basics of everyday communication are fine. Yes, no, please, thank you, courteous greetings, and common sense phrases that relate to life on a patrol, such as stop or halt, lay down, hands behind your back/on your head, etc. The soldiers wont be the diplomats out there.

Secondly, as far as culture goes, its the same story. What kills me is that this is not hard or time consuming to teach. Whats hard is the bizarre array of tribes and clans and families and imams and sheiks and loyalties that need to be understood. Knock yourself out, S-2! But culture is NOT HARD. Especially for the soldiers. For them, its far more about what they DONT do than what they do. DONT stare at women or ever touch them for any reason short of saving life and limb. DONT show the soles of your feet. DONT let the search dog go through the room with the Koran in it. DONT make the "ok" hand gesture or call someone over by curling your finger, etc etc. Whats more needed for them, is NCOs who will stomp their guts out for breaking the basic rules of courtesy. It absolutly cannot be tolerated. And the officers cannot tolerate it in themselves or their NCOs. The soldiers will follow your example and mirror your contempt. If the soldiers understand that they should act in Iraq almost like they would have acted in 1950s America, that helps a lot. A formal, courteous society. Culture is easy to understand. Oh, and leaders should have to eat the local food before they ever deploy. They should be introduced to chi (sweet tea), which actually quite a lot of guys end up really liking, and they should be made to eat Iraqi food as well. Now its also important to understand that the Iraqis know that we are Americans and come from a very different culture. They dont expect us to act like honorary Iraqis or something. Thats why what you DONT do is so imprtant. Just dont insult anyone; make no new enemies. But your still the guest in their country, and basic courtesy will be shown to you and expected from you.

And third, an understanding of the concept of insurgency is crucial. I had to tell my platoon, a mortar platoon, on several occasions (especially after one of my guys got killed), that no, shelling Zone 23 with HE and WP will NOT accomplish anything. The people will not give us information. We cannot bully the people into complying. Passive support of insurgents is still support for insurgents, but just keeping your mouth shut or claiming ignorance is not illegal. If soldiers have a basic understanding of what kind of fight their going into, it will help just as much as knowing some of the language and understanding the culture.

[Stu-6]

CPT Holzbach comments are right on the money. As an enlisted infantry solider I was with the first group of US troops to go into Bosnia, training in peacekeeping was superficial, and language and cultural training was nonexistent. There were only a handful enlisted troops of in the entire company that had any real understand of the history and culture of the region and the only reason we did is because we had dug up a few books on the subject on our on initiative. The really sad part about that was there were a lot of soldiers who would have been really interested if anyone had carried enough to try to teach them.

[NDD]

I have a few suggestions. First and foremost, you cannot have too much language training. Anyone who has ever had a customer come into their place of work who speaks little to no English understands how aggravating it is when someone you have to work with doesnt speak the local language. Now, imagine that customer has a gun and authority over you. Just makes the situation more exasperating. Terps are a pain in the ass to work with. Some are fantastic, many are not. Either way, the ability to speak the language is a huge advantage that cannot be overstated. It makes the job easier, and impresses the local nationals. Officers should receive intensive training in this, at all levels. Every officer in a leadership position, from platoon leader to division commander, will interact with locals regularly. We dont need to stand around and "supervise" the NCOs training the soldiers. They got it. We should be in language class. However, NCOs, especially those in team leader, squad leader, and platoon sergeant type positions, must also have heavy language instruction. And right out the window must go the old attitude of "I just train soldiers and kill people". Not anymore. For the soldiers, they need language training too, but theirs does not need to be too extensive. The basics of everyday communication are fine. Yes, no, please, thank you, courteous greetings, and common sense phrases that relate to life on a patrol, such as stop or halt, lay down, hands behind your back/on your head, etc. The soldiers wont be the diplomats out there.

Secondly, as far as culture goes, its the same story. What kills me is that this is not hard or time consuming to teach. Whats hard is the bizarre array of tribes and clans and families and imams and sheiks and loyalties that need to be understood. Knock yourself out, S-2! But culture is NOT HARD. Especially for the soldiers. For them, its far more about what they DONT do than what they do. DONT stare at women or ever touch them for any reason short of saving life and limb. DONT show the soles of your feet. DONT let the search dog go through the room with the Koran in it. DONT make the "ok" hand gesture or call someone over by curling your finger, etc etc. Whats more needed for them, is NCOs who will stomp their guts out for breaking the basic rules of courtesy. It absolutly cannot be tolerated. And the officers cannot tolerate it in themselves or their NCOs. The soldiers will follow your example and mirror your contempt. If the soldiers understand that they should act in Iraq almost like they would have acted in 1950s America, that helps a lot. A formal, courteous society. Culture is easy to understand. Oh, and leaders should have to eat the local food before they ever deploy. They should be introduced to chi (sweet tea), which actually quite a lot of guys end up really liking, and they should be made to eat Iraqi food as well. Now its also important to understand that the Iraqis know that we are Americans and come from a very different culture. They dont expect us to act like honorary Iraqis or something. Thats why what you DONT do is so imprtant. Just dont insult anyone; make no new enemies. But your still the guest in their country, and basic courtesy will be shown to you and expected from you.

And third, an understanding of the concept of insurgency is crucial. I had to tell my platoon, a mortar platoon, on several occasions (especially after one of my guys got killed), that no, shelling Zone 23 with HE and WP will NOT accomplish anything. The people will not give us information. We cannot bully the people into complying. Passive support of insurgents is still support for insurgents, but just keeping your mouth shut or claiming ignorance is not illegal. If soldiers have a basic understanding of what kind of fight their going into, it will help just as much as knowing some of the language and understanding the culture.

Here ya go Sir:
The Dark Side

Come on over...

[GorTex6]

www.warrior-mentor.com

[Xenophon]

This thread seems to have become more of a debate on military training but I want to address the Strategic Corporal not as a good or bad concept but as an inevitable one.

In fact, it's the most recent evolution in a centuries-long process. As technological advancements have allowed the individual soldier to command more and more firepower and destructive force, strategic decision making has been pushed down the chain of command. In ancient times, the consul, general, or king would be making the strategic decisions on the battlefield. During the Napoleonic era, battalions were the major actors on the battlefield. Through WWI and WWII it moved from the company to the platoon level and in Vietnam, squad sized patrols were the most common deployment. Responsibility for immediate decision making on the battefield has steadily been pushed down the chain of command. Now it's moving to the fire team level.

But it's not just being driven by the technological capabilities of the military, but by the requirements put on it. We do not have enough boots for counterinsurgency warfare, and autonomous, independent fire teams will be able to cover a larger area, enabling us to do more warfighting with less people. Fighting small cells of terrorists with a platoon is like trying swat flies with a hammer. But spread that hammer out and you've got a much better chance of squashing bugs.

Now I'm not saying we're capable of pulling this off right now. For one thing, our communications equipment is going to have to get smaller and easier, even if it sacrifices some security. And we're definitly going to have to make major changes in the way we train people. As it stands, our training and education is woefully inadequete. Hell, I can vouch that our training in the Marine Corps is almost inadequete to even have strategic lieutenants. And we get six months of leadership training before we do anything, Army lieutenants get nothing. That and the Army's size makes me think this is not the concept for them (they haven't even figured out that EVERYONE needs combat training, not just grunts), but there needs to be a move in the strategic corporal direction. Even though it requires major paradigm shifts in both the military and in society. History is replete with examples of what happens to those who are unwilling to change. We're going to be fighting insurgents and guerillas more in the future than anything else. Mao said that the population is the sea in which the guerilla swims. The strategic corporal is going to be the shark.

[Xenophon]

Anyone out there read that? I was hoping I'd get some feedback.

I also wrote an essay on it on my blog at xenophonblog.blogspot.com

[Fabius Maximus]

Well, as the one who started this thread, I disagree.

I gave my points of disagreement at the start, but will recap specific to your post.

1. Is the US soldier on patrol in Iraq doing much different than a Roman centurian on Patrol in Israel circa 50 AD? Does the extra firepower help? True, he can call down firepower to destroy the neighborhood -- making enemies by the hundreds. As could the Centurian, although it would take longer.

2. Does improved communication empower the corporal, or the opposite? Does better commo move authority up or down the chain? Clearly the local commander -- the capain on a ship, an area commander, or an ambassador -- has suffered a great loss of autonomy since 1900.

3. Are our NCOs in line units becomming more or less educated and capable? It's not clear, but I doubt that there is great improvement vs. 1960 for the Army. Esp. with respect to ability to understand foreign cultures -- probably not even with respect to understanding our own culture. If recognition of rap tunes or other US culture "Trivia Persuit" could make Strategic Corporals, we'd be set.

I would be interested to see data on this.

[Razor]

Xenophon, I've only recently joined this board, so forgive me if I come across as a wet-behind-the-ears contrarian, but while reading one of your posts on this thread I found some information to which I wanted to provide a respectful counterpoint.

Hell, I can vouch that our training in the Marine Corps is almost inadequete to even have strategic lieutenants. And we get six months of leadership training before we do anything, Army lieutenants get nothing.

As a former US Army infantry officer, I'd disagree that we received no leadership training prior to leading our first platoon. If you want, I suppose you can discount the four years of pre-commissioning general leadership training that both ROTC and service academy cadets receive, as its not always combat leadershp specific, but I believe that in terms of basic leadership principles, its not as ineffective as some would like to claim, and is delivered over a rather long period, with significant reinforcement of fundamental skills and concepts.

Following commissioning, an infantry officer (this is my area of experience, so I will relate to this specific officer branch training) attends a 4-month long Infantry Officer Basic Course. Following this, a vast majority of infantry 2LTs attend the US Army Ranger Course, a rather intense 61-day leadership training program. I would argue, therefore, that new Army infantry 2LTs do indeed receive general, branch-specific, and combat oriented leadership training prior to reporting to their first operational unit.

...(they haven't even figured out that EVERYONE needs combat training, not just grunts)...

That actually isn't true, either. The Army has created a 7-week long, combat oriented leadership course for new 2LTs of every Army branch called Basic Officer Leadership Course II. It is an attempt to ensure that regardless of branch (transportation, quartermaster, finance, etc.), all new platoon leaders receive basic infantry-related combat skills training at the squad and platoon level prior to training in their specialty branch. You can find more information on BOLC II at: https://www.infantry.army.mil/BOLC/content/mission.htm

Certainly, this isn't the desired objective state for new officer leadership training, but I believe its a step in the right direction.

[nichols]

There is no doubt that the Officer side of the house gets leadership training in all services.

The Corps has a pretty good system with The Basic School followed by MOS school. By the time the officer gets to the fleet he or she has had the leadership training & education pieces, how they apply it is a different subject.

Slight rudder adjustment.

now back to Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word.....

Rudy goes to Boot Camp and is trained to follow orders, his Drill Instructors have the training schedule in their covers that breaks down the day into micro-managed minutes.

Rudy is taught history, first aid, and what it is to be a Marine.

Rudy reports to his MOS school (non infantry Marines first attend a very basic infantry course called MCT) Rudy is infantry so he finds himself at SOI still not getting the word. Rudy is still following orders, no critical thinking involved. If Rudy decides to question the validity of this or that concept he is usually given a name like Private Brain or something of that nature. He isn't ridiculed but his place in life is pretty pointed out as being in the third rank.

Rudy is now checking into his first fleet unit for he is a full fledged Infantry Marine with his red & gold libo jacket. What will Rudy notice?

Chances are he will see micro-management (traditional C2) in effect. The Plt Commander will be leading him in PT, check writing, inspections.......

Rudy will probably take note that the NCOs are treated better but he really won't be able to explain how.

Rudy has a few of choices; reading/studying military history, get married, buy a car, live payday to payday buying beer/pizza......

The next morning Rudy will again see the Plt Commander micro managing or the NCO saying "because the CO/1st Sgt said so." Rudy will then go back into the third rank.

The mirace of all of the Rudyisms is that we still manage to have some unbelievable outstanding NCOs that break out of the third rank.