Steve Metz has published a valuable article.

[Surferbeetle]

The underpinnings of effective governance lie in the ends, ways and means of delivering it.

Assuming the night of long knives occurred, what then?

The quote from Rick's Blog sounds like equal parts frustration and tried & true tactical solution...a relief for cause if you will, but of incompetent Afghan civilian technocrats.

Not having been to Afghanistan I subscribe to a different view in that I believe that if we commit to this mission we must work with what we have. My observation of the interactions between type-A infantry bubba's and local technocrats in Iraq and Latin America reveals consistent misunderstandings as to what is possible, what is wise, what is sustainable, and what will actually be accomplished inspite all of the strum und drang...

A handful of MSI contractors might engage the Afghan ministries to show them what they know? How to optimize profit performance under a US AID contract mechanism? How to capture a greater share of CERP?

At its core, our civilian effort (both by DoS and DoD) is an "expeditionary" one. Short-term people with quick objectives facing a country with long-term development needs that, in part, are not helped by pushing billions of US dollars into the current civilian reconstruction bureaucracy.

Appropriate coaching combined with realistic expectations management is what is called for and will, as you also note, require more than a 12 month time-frame for sustainable results.

Leaving the strategic question aside (Is Afghanistan worth the effort?), my operational/tactical suggestion is to increase the numbers of the CA/CMO mission folks outside the wire (no FOB's, no commuting to work) by using reserve CA force's (USAR/ARNG, Marine, and re purposed Navy & AF - with vetted/certified required civilian skill sets - direct commissioning as required), DoS, USAID, USACE, USDA, DOJ, contractors, and ISAF CA/CMO types. All would answer to a modern day GEN Lucius Clay for unity of command. Our hypothetical GEN Clay could be required to answer to a higher ranking DoS Czar depending upon who has the lead DOD or DoS. A dedicated three or four-star with no-#### hire/fire power over mil, civ, and contractor would be focused upon ends, ways, and means and would have the horsepower needed to ride herd upon the cats while integrating all efforts into the ongoing security mission.

Long term, the necessity for a five year plan, ten year plan, or twenty year plan is beyond the capabilities of the crystal ball here on my desk...

[Surferbeetle]

Jim Gant: One Tribe at a Time

When a Chinese bamboo tree is planted, the grower
must water and nurture it. The first year, it does not
grow more than one inch above the ground. During
the second year, after more watering and fertilizing,
the tree does not grow anymore than it did during year
one. The bamboo tree is still no more than one inch
high after four years. Nothing tangible can be seen by
any outsider.

But, on the fifth year the tree can grow more than
eighty feet. Of course, the first four years the tree was
growing its roots, deep into the ground. It is the roots
that enable the tree to create an explosion of growth in
year five.