Another Plan by Col. Macgregor

**slapout9** · 10-20-2009

Here is another plan for A'stan, link to Power Point is below.

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/

Gee I wish somebody would come up with a plan for America

if we changed our name to Bumfucistan maybe we would get all kinds of plans

**OfTheTroops** · 10-20-2009

America isn't very receptive to Military plans. Hey neither is anyone else. Ok I get it now Ken. Just gotta find a good stoppin place I suppose.

**Ken White** · 10-20-2009

For the US of A, I mean???

The MacGregor strikes again. He, as usual, has some good points and some not so good. Sounds a little like Krulak's idea...

Thanks for posting that.

I don't usually agree with Richard Haass on much but I do agree with his assessment of Afghanistan -- there are no good options.

**Ken White** · 10-20-2009

Originally Posted by OfTheTroops

. Ok I get it now Ken. Just gotta find a good stoppin place I suppose.

Just take a knee now and then, briefly and keep your Scouts out...

**reed11b** · 10-20-2009

I disagree with him strongly on all but one point. Yes a democratic centrally ruled A-stan is a nice to have, but not crucial to American interest. BUT, the Taliban IS a major de-stabilizer in the region, and does need to be eliminated. Plus a strong Taliban is a shelter for Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization. If we walk away now, the cost will be greater later. Look at Somalia.

**82redleg** · 10-20-2009

Originally Posted by reed11b

I disagree with him strongly on all but one point. Yes a democratic centrally ruled A-stan is a nice to have, but not crucial to American interest. BUT, the Taliban IS a major de-stabilizer in the region, and does need to be eliminated. Plus a strong Taliban is a shelter for Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization. If we walk away now, the cost will be greater later. Look at Somalia.

Most of the Taliban just want to run their little valley, and keep it in the 1300s. I give a #### less. When they piss enough of the other Afghans off, the other Afghans will run them out. Until then, they deserve however they choose to live.

That said, when they shelter international terrorists, we should ID and kill them, whenever they present themselves, without regard to collateral damage. Their culture- they will fight to protect their "guests", let them die with them. At some point, it will become too painful, and they will stop.

**IntelTrooper** · 10-21-2009

Originally Posted by 82redleg

Most of the Taliban just want to run their little valley, and keep it in the 1300s. I give a #### less. When they piss enough of the other Afghans off, the other Afghans will run them out. Until then, they deserve however they choose to live.

That said, when they shelter international terrorists, we should ID and kill them, whenever they present themselves, without regard to collateral damage. Their culture- they will fight to protect their "guests", let them die with them. At some point, it will become too painful, and they will stop.

I'm pretty sure we tried this approach through the 1990s.

**Ken White** · 10-21-2009

Originally Posted by IntelTrooper

I'm pretty sure we tried this approach through the 1990s.

The few Cruise Missiles launched into Afghanistan and Sudan did nothing -- they were akin to shooting a Bear with a BB gun.

I know of at least three cases where significant action by SOF people was in the advance planning or ready to launch phase and the National Security apparatus backed down.

My suspicion is the most US Presidents will lack the will to do that. Plus the San Francisco Congressional delegation would go berserk...

**MikeF** · 10-21-2009

Originally Posted by IntelTrooper

I'm pretty sure we tried this approach through the 1990s.

We had plenty of chances to go after UBL from 1996-2001. Steve Coll adresses some of the chances in The Case for Humility in Afghanistan. The failures had nothing to do with the military; the decisions rested on the Clinton and Bush Administrations.

There is much to be said for the two strategies of 1. Do nothing more, 2. Leave. Without the Host Nation support, Civilian Surge Capability, and political capital back home, we may only beat our head against a wall; however, if we look at it as a game of rugby rather than football, we can trade space for time- Let UBL come out of the hills, and then strike.

v/r

Mike

**IntelTrooper** · 10-21-2009

Originally Posted by Ken White

The few Cruise Missiles launched into Afghanistan and Sudan did nothing -- they were akin to shooting a Bear with a BB gun.

I know of at least three cases where significant action by SOF people was in the advance planning or ready to launch phase and the National Security apparatus backed down.

My suspicion is the most US Presidents will lack the will to do that. Plus the San Francisco Congressional delegation would go berserk...

Sorry, I oversimplified. You're right, we let lots of international terrorists do their thing for years without any negative consequences.

**IntelTrooper** · 10-21-2009

Originally Posted by MikeF

We had plenty of chances to go after UBL from 1996-2001. Steve Coll adresses some of the chances in The Case for Humility in Afghanistan. The failures had nothing to do with the military; the decisions rested on the Clinton and Bush Administrations.

But we were just waiting for him to turn himself into the FBI... then we would have totally prosecuted the hell out of him!

**jmm99** · 10-21-2009

My concern is with Mike's problem points "Host Nation support, Civilian Surge Capability" - that is, some reasonable probability of success (read that as an "acceptable" endstate) in the political struggle.

As to the military aspect, I would not second guess the recommendation that up to 80K troops be added (if the recommendation goes that high). It will take some months to see them coming from the pipeline - and I expect some years to ramp up 80K without drastic measures. I may be Pollyanna, but I have confidence that our military will do its mission. But, that mission to me does not include politics.

I also would not worry about "political capital back home". The people will follow strong leadership (read that as political will) if a clear military and political strategy is presented. We lack a clear political strategy.

The administration would have some months to consider coldly and rationally the issues of Host Nation Competency and Civilian Surge Capability. If the probability is that the political effort in Astan will not fully support the military effort[*], we should start withdrawal plans and discretely dump the Joint Strategic Partnership Agreement.

What I expect is something more akin to the LBJ dilemma of the Vietnam War screwing up his Great Society plans. So, I foresee some sort of compromise which will have no good end.

Sorry to be uncheerful.

----------------------
[*] I realize that the military effort should support the political effort. We are in a situation where the political effort must play catch-up with the military effort.

PS: Mike - thanks for the Coll link.

**Steve the Planner** · 10-21-2009

I was just re-reading Steve Coll's remarks from September 29 re: Afghanistan and the Russian strategies:

Those are a lot of ifs. The uncertainties point, like so many other factors in this conflict, to the central importance of politics in Kabul and Islamabad. The Soviets failed in Afghanistan for many reasons, beginning with the brutality of their military campaigns and the implausibility of their political strategy. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1980s, they had constructed a durable ink spot strategy, albeit one based on a more defensive and internally ruthless political-military strategy from the one McChrystal is proposing. The Soviets were unable, however, to convert that partial territorial achievement into a broader and more durable strategic success. Partly they just ran out of time, as often happens in expeditionary wars. Their other problems included their inability to control the insurgents’ sanctuary in Pakistan; their inability to stop infiltration across the Pakistan-Afghan border; their inability to build Afghan political unity, even at the local level; their inability to develop a successful reconciliation strategy to divide the Islamist insurgents they faced; and their inability to create successful international diplomacy to reinforce a stable Afghanistan and region. Does that list of headaches sound familiar?

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/

Of course, there are a raft of new Afghanistan Plans cluttering my inbox now: Stratcom, Andrew Exum, etc... Where is the time to read them all?????

If only we could get the Taliban engaged in writing these kinds of plans, reports, articles, blogs, they could become "virtual" creatures with no time left to actually do anything productive.

They seem to think they can just take a handful of rifles, RPGs and IEDs out into the countryside and establish dominance. What are they thinking? How can they possibly succeed with that simple strategy?

**Schmedlap** · 10-21-2009

Originally Posted by Steve the Planner

Of course, there are a raft of new Afghanistan Plans cluttering my inbox now: Stratcom, Andrew Exum, etc... Where is the time to read them all?????

If only we could get the Taliban engaged in writing these kinds of plans, reports, articles, blogs, they could become "virtual" creatures with no time left to actually do anything productive.

They seem to think they can just take a handful of rifles, RPGs and IEDs out into the countryside and establish dominance. What are they thinking? How can they possibly succeed with that simple strategy?

In Iraq, in 2005, I proposed dumping bootlegged copies of PowerPoint at known cache sites, in hopes that the insurgents would take them and use them as we have and then paralyze themselves by wasting all of their time making and giving briefings. People laughed. Now my rationale is being proven correct.

**Steve the Planner** · 10-21-2009

Schmedlap:

At one point in mid-2008, we had about five different civ. expert folks working hard to re-open banks in Samarra. We did the math on salaries and costs for these US experts, and the unlikeliness of success at that period, and figured we shoud, instead, just leave shoe boxes of cash around the walled city. (They thought we were kidding). Note: Al Warka opened its own branches as soon as things cooled down.

Same with one of those 2008 DoD initiatives to distribute refrigerated bongo trucks to farmers. Why not just load up a C-130 with open dumpsters of cash and stream it out the back door from, say, 5,000 feet. (they thought that was a joke, too.)

But that Powerpoint idea is really the best.

If only you had done that in 2005, the US, by 2008, could have just reviewed Iraqi powerpoints (maybe even by internet) instead of having to send so many military and civilian folks over there to create them in-country.

We just don't seem to be able to plan ahead...

Steve