Light Infantry and Afghanistan

[Fuchs]

There's a long history of "light infantry".

The distinction began when body armour and discipline were introduced (especially in Greece and its cultural influence zone, including Italy).
Skirmishers were quite important in the last generations before Alexander the Great. They were elusive enough to avoid decisive close combat (few horsemen in Greece) and armed with ranged weapons (slings, javelins or bows). Such skirmishers were quite quick on their feet and thus also useful for foraging, attacking enemies on mountain peaks and pursuit.

The idea of "light" infantry has other strong examples in the 18th century; less-disciplined Austro-Hungarian border militia infantry ("Grenzer") and German Jäger ("hunters") skirmishers. The standard line infantry weapons of the time were terribly inaccurate muzzle-loaded smoothbore muskets. Muzzle-loaded rifles were slower firing (unable to stop infantry charges), expensive and required more skills.
Units with recruits of forester descent were raised and equipped with rifles in order to produce skirmishers and because they (due to an elite status and privileges) did not desert as easily as normal line infantry. Army leaders avoided to march line infantry through forest areas, sending them to forage or on picket duty because they deserted too easily (much of Germany is mostly covered by forests, though!).

Technology changed and line infantry got breech-loaded rifles that fires accurate and quick. The line infantry also got more loyal thanks to nationalism and became able to do what light infantry was able to do before.
Light infantry morphed (with breaks) to "sharpshooters" and "snipers".

It's similar with the Stoßtruppen and Arditi of WWI; innovative at their time (and nowadays labelled as "light infantry", especially the Stoßtruppen), but their advantages were either obsolete or incorporated into line infantry till mid-WW2.


To sum it up; "light" infantry was post-Renaissance pretty much the vanguard in infantry development. The line infantry absorbed light infantry traits over time (without really being "lightweight").

[Sylvan]

Are tough. We tried several different ways to get into ambush positions without being compromised. In the absence of air assault, you are really limited. Every goat herder has a cell phone and anybody leaving a FOB is instantly known. We did drive-by drop offs, dismounted humps out of the FOB, false mechanical break downs and the best results we got were meeting engagements. While the ambush position themselves were never attacked, we never made contact after getting into position. Patrolling is critical, but the integration of ISR/Air and ground is where real success lies in Afghanistan. Otherwise, you are largely wasting time from a kinetic viewpoint. The act of patrolling is still critical, however for its own COIN value.

[Ken White]

Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down...

[Sylvan]

Are tough. Speaking from other wars, one without FOBs (but sometimes with, sometimes without, a MLR) and one with FOBs plus a couple of other excursions with a mixed case, the problem you're really having is the FOB concept. Same problem in Viet Nam, that's what led to the LRP development and employment and even to the development of freeze dried rations to provide lightweight sustenance for a week or two. Doubt we'll do that today for several reasons; fear of lack of control being paramount...

Ideally, you'd kick out for a couple of weeks at a time and thus, while still falling under observation, would have a better chance of a stealthy ambush placement. Can't do that because our equipment today wasn't designed for it and we haven't trained to do it -- given the risk aversion endemic in the USA today, we're not likely to do that for the GPF. The FOBs aren't going away for pretty much the same reason.

So the fact that ambushes are always tough is exacerbated by the condition of the US Armed Forces and of Afghanistan. Keep trying -- and keep your head down...

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

[Ken White]

Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

Some places in VN, yes, however most, probably about 2/3 to 3/4 at that time, not so on the out of sight. Not all triple canopy and mangrove swamps. Great deal of primary rain forest and even more ag and scrub land...

Also true on the Farmers. However, in Veet Nam as is true in those parts of the 'Stan without global comm, Farmers most always have kids who are used to doing what they're told...

Every war brings its own unique problems -- and solutions.

[Infanteer]

From my viewpoint, insurgent tactics in alot of areas in southern Afghanistan along with the nature of the terrain don't lend themselves to ambushes. Due to roaming death in the skies, insurgents walking around with weapons are likely to die from a Hellfire long before they stumble into a well-sited killzone. For this reason, they don't really walk around openly with weapons much which makes it hard to ambush insurgents. Others may have noticed different, but these were my observations. I understand that the terrain in RC(E) lends itself to open insurgent movement and small-unit ambushes have been much more successful.

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

[JMA]

As for light infantry in Afghanistan, the largest constraint is water. You simply aren't light if you have to sustain yourself in 40-50 degree celcius heat. As much as possible, the chain of command must plan on how to safely use local sources (which, in the dense green spaces of Afghanistan are often rife with Hep and other fun things). If you don't find a work around this, you are tied to a vehicle laager or a piece of tactical infrastucture.

Water? Why are the Light Infantry going to be required to walk around for days on end? Light Infantry by simple definition means they do not have the integral heavy support weapons and they have a light vehicle footprint. This of course does not mean that their mobility cannot be provided by choppers and their supporting weapons by air delivery. Find a target deal with it then move on.

[William F. Owen]

Modern communications and the wide open terrain of Afghanistan really ramp up the degree of difficulty. Vietnam at least you could manuever out of sight and every rice farmer didn't have instant world wide communication abilities.

True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

[JMA]

True, but today the average platoon has a far greater technological edge over the enemy than in 1969. TI, IINV and UAVs all mean working at night is an good option, and one the Taliban don't like.

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

[William F. Owen]

How many units will be capable of fighting at night in groups down to section level? Exactly how effective are the current night optics? 60% 75% 90% of daylight?

Every infantry Battalion in the British Army in my day and I guess nothing has changed.
Every major attack in the Falklands, bar one, took place at night.
I think almost every man in the rifle platoon now has some kind of night vision device.