CNAS policy brief

[tequila]

They are not even able to control Swat anymore, for example, and that was once a peaceful area. I think a lot of their reluctance to try to actively control the frontier areas is because they know their own limits.

Well, I think that is a bit far. There have been some attacks in Swat and undoubtedly some Taliban still left there, but heck there are attacks in Lahore and Islamabad as well --- the Pak Army still controls those cities. The relatively successful resettlement of refugees into Swat (as well as the surfeit of dead bodies showing up on roadsides, blamed on the Pak security services) shows that the Pak Army has made some progress in settling in and securing Swat.

I don't think it's so much a question of limits as political capital and will. The, shall we say, energetic response to insurgencies in Baluchistan and East Pakistan previously show that the Pakistani Army is perfectly willing to deploy massive force to perceived insurgent threats. The problem is that politically the Pashtun population in Pakistan is not seen in the same way as the marginal, unruly Baluchs. Pashtuns are far more integrated in the national polity and are seen as a "loyal" population by the military and the power structure (excepting MQM-type Mohajir fanatics in Karachi, of course), as opposed to Sindhis and Baloch. Pashtuns serve in the Army and the officer corps out of proportion with their population. This plus the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets and the longtime use of tribals for war in Kashmir conditions the Pak military to look at Pashtuns in a certain way.

That being said, the continued terror attacks inside Pakistan are definitely altering the political situation. As ugly as they are, they are only hurting the TTP's cause inside Pakistan. Public support for the Army is only rising with each attack.

[Entropy]

I agree with you to a certain extent, but the Baluch's are not actively administered either and outside of a few areas there is little official government presence. So while the Pak Army certainly can go on a punitive campaign if things get bad enough that wouldn't equate to central government control. And the Pak Army in some cases hasn't done so well fighting in the Pashtun areas.

So I think the lack of will is at least partly because they (Pakistan) think it's simply not worth it to fight a bloody conflict for what would be temporary effect.

[omarali50]

I'll disagree with this:



I think there are some obvious problems with it:

1. How does propping up an Afghan government keep AQ out of the "pak" part of af-pak?

2. Why is it assumed that an Afghan government will be able to keep AQ out of the "af" part of "af-pak" since Pakistan is not able to keep AQ out of the Pak part? Let's assume nation-building is successful - is there any reason to believe an Afghan government will be able to really control all of its territory to prevent AQ from operating on Afghan soil? After all, the Pakistani government is much more powerful, much more capable and is unable to do that on their side of the border.

3. It assumes that Pakistan wants what we want for Afghanistan and there seems to be a lot of evidence that is not the case.

I think point three is accurate but the first two imply that completely vaporizing every nutcase is somehow part of the plan. That will never happen. Terrorists will continue to carry out isolated terrorist acts even if EVERYTHING goes well (whatever "goes well" is taken to mean). In my opinion, the US knows (or should know) that the big prize is Pakistan. Its an internationally connected, large, populous nation with significant technological abilities, a modern army and about 50 nuclear bombs (which probably work more reliably than the 37 that India has). Afghanistan is a sideshow in comparison. A barely functional regime that can keep control of the country with modest foreign assistance is about the best you can hope for in the foreseeable future in Afghanistan and THAT WOULD BE GOOD ENOUGH. Arabs wandering into it to find "alqaeda" will be more likely to find some kidnapper who will sell them to the highest bidder. It will not be an international threat. On the other hand, Pakistan has a military and an intelligence agency that is barely one degree of separation away from Jihadi terrorism right now and could slip back into full jihadi mode if the pressure is off. Arabs and Western Muslims who wander into Pakistan find airports, hotels, madressas with longstanding arab links, and remote regions where their dream of jihad training and blowing themselves up can be pursued in a land with internet connections and at least 37 mechanical engineers with bright ideas about the next butt bomb. What is keeping all this from going back to the good old days of the nineties is a war next door where America is involved and keeps asking the ISI to "do more". Leave Afghanistan and the vast Jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan, built up over two decades, will feel vindicated and will want all their priviliges back AND an army that still likes the idea of using these jihadis as their proxies will take the first opportunity to "stop fighting America's war" and will go back to its policy of supporting one set of jihadis to conquer Afghanistan ('strategic depth") and another to conquer India ("manifest destiny"). A lot of people have a few drinks with Musharraf and feel like this army could never have anything in common with the jihadis anymore. Those people have no idea that Musharraf was drinking the same scotch when he was actively running the jihadi operation 10 years ago. Others feel like the army cannot forgive those who have killed its own officers and men in the last few years. These others are also mistaken. The army does not like the fact that officers and men have lost their lives in this struggle, but 98% of them feel that its all America's fault anyway.
Dont believe me? withdraw and see what happens...