Originally Posted by
jmm99
Somehow, you and I have to get into the same chapter, if not on the same page. So, in that endeavor, what follows is a snip from an email to someone on what perhaps is common ground.
---------------------------
Anyway, that's a segue into AQ waging unconventional warfare on a global basis (COL Jones' concept, which I have appropriated - wink); rather than AQ being a "global insurgency" as some want to define it. Not to get into Warden's Ring Theories too far, but here is how I visualize it:
10 Ring - AQ Leadership
9-6 Rings - AQ middlemen - could be their special operations forces (e.g., 9/11), financing folks, propaganda folks, and their special forces (aimed at force multiplication from groups in the lower numbered rings) - all networked back and forth (general counter tactic is to find and neutralize the nodes).
5-1 Rings - Insurgent groups which share common belief systems, common enemies, etc., which can be supported by the AQ SF (as the chatter is about Mr Zazi - see my last post in War Crimes). While these groups can be targeted in one way or the other, we are shooting at the rings that at most give us a score of 50.
0 Ring (outside the target rings) would include parallel thinkers who mimic insurgent tactics, but who are not linked to any of the target rings (e.g., DC snipers). And, of course, the people who have nothing to do with either side, and the people who are anti-AQ, etc.
But, as COL Bob says, there ain't no counter unconventional warfare doctrine - but plenty of counter-insurgency doctrines.
-------------------------------
The email itself then goes on with a long blah-blah about insurgency warfare vs unconventional warfare in Vietnam which is omitted here.
The above is not a set of problem solutions, but a way of visualizing problems to a former half-assed target shooter.
Your thoughts ?
Regards
Mike
Bookmarks