Eaton fires broadside at Cheney

[Fuchs]

Some domestic U.S. politics:

The record is clear: Dick Cheney and the Bush administration were incompetent war fighters. They ignored Afghanistan for 7 years with a crude approach to counter-insurgency warfare best illustrated by: 1. Deny it. 2. Ignore it. 3. Bomb it. While our intelligence agencies called the region the greatest threat to America, the Bush White House under-resourced our military efforts, shifted attention to Iraq, and failed to bring to justice the masterminds of September 11.

"The only time Cheney and his cabal of foreign policy 'experts' have anything to say is when they feel compelled to protect this failed legacy. While President Obama is tasked with cleaning up the considerable mess they left behind, they continue to defend torture or rewrite a legacy of indifference on Afghanistan. Simply put, Mr. Cheney sees history throughout extremely myopic and partisan eyes.

http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1442

[Ken White]

quietly shuffled aside for non-performance directing Iraqi training. Not that I'd suggest sour grapes from one who as Chief of Infantry and Commandant of the US Army Infantry School before going to Iraq was not known for being a COIN expert...

That said, your post is as you said, domestic US politics. If the thread discusses operations, fine -- it it veers into domestic politics, I'll shut it down.

There are plenty of discussion boards that relish that stupidity; this is not one of them.

[Abu Suleyman]

Once again fuchs, you have struck at our American system, and I for one am wounded to the core.

This indeed is a demonstration of what is wrong with America, although perhaps not in the way that you meant to illustrate. My question is, who on earth thought that this was a response to anything? Based upon reading MG Eaton’s statement, he gives no indication that he has even read what former-Vice President Cheney said. Given that his current ‘prominence’ derives primarily from being an outspoken critic of George Bush, I would be fairly surprised if he did. It seems as though this was a hip pocket statement to be whipped out whenever anyone in the past administration dared to voice dissent. Indeed, the provenance of the site on which this ‘response’ was posted is politically interesting, and perhaps relevant.

However, while it is easy to mock MG Eaton, he is not wholly responsible for the piss poor response, assuming that he wrote it. After all he is just following the grand tradition of military argumentation. For those who have not followed the link allow me to summarize “P1: You suck. P2: You Suck. P3: Here is my resume. P4: Therefore I am right.” I have seen this exact argument unfold over everything from work orders to national strategy and it always is the same. In fact, I am fairly sure that every single person in the military has had someone when arguing say “Well, if you had (been in combat/to ranger school/ in SF/ in supply/the right clearance) you would understand.” I have actually seen a conversation where one person was unaware of the resume of the other and they cycled through four of five ‘accomplishments’ before they found one they could rely upon. Indeed, I tell my non-military colleagues, that you know when you have won the argument when out comes the ‘combat’ card.

A real response would have raised points that Dick Cheney had made, and then refuted them with facts. This response is nothing more than an ad hominem attack on Cheney. But it doesn’t matter how wrong someone is, if her facts are right and her logic is sound, odds are in favor of her being right. Instead, in most political discourse, we get sophistry and logical fallacies left and right. It gets even worse when dealing with military issues.

Finally, while I am not defending Dick Cheney at all, my main take away from his speech was that the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement, be ready day one, will listen to his generals, and already issued the Afghanistan plan. I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing. If time were such an issue, then perhaps we could put Health Care, Global Warming, The Olympics, Harvard Professors et al. on the back burner for a couple of weeks, and sort this out. After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President.

[tequila]

After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President.

This is an interesting argument.

How many soldiers' and Marines' lives will be saved by the President making a decision on an Afghan strategy now versus thirty days from now?

[Abu Suleyman]

This is an interesting argument.

How many soldiers' and Marines' lives will be saved by the President making a decision on an Afghan strategy now versus thirty days from now?

Perhaps none, but lives are a scarce resource. If they die while waiting for a strategy, then it is wasted. At least, if they die once a strategy is in place they are contributing to that strategy, and to our knowledge of whether that strategy will work.

[Schmedlap]

I have actually seen a conversation where one person was unaware of the resume of the other and they cycled through four of five ‘accomplishments’ before they found one they could rely upon. Indeed, I tell my non-military colleagues, that you know when you have won the argument when out comes the ‘combat’ card.

It's even more fun when you only reveal the resume to certain people and then someone else tries to use it against you.

Example: Someone informs you that "maybe your opinion would change if you'd ever been to combat." This is great fun when you simply reply, "yeah, maybe," and leave it at that, when 10 people within earshot know that you've done about three years in Iraq but the person who makes the lame argument doesn't know... but finds out a week later.

How many soldiers' and Marines' lives will be saved by the President making a decision on an Afghan strategy now versus thirty days from now?

26

[tequila]

It's even more fun when you only reveal the resume to certain people and then someone else tries to use it against you.

My immensely interesting and varied biography tells me that the true number of lives saved will be 17. But this number skyrockets to 19 if the President delays a further week.

At least, if they die once a strategy is in place they are contributing to that strategy, and to our knowledge of whether that strategy will work.

Do you really believe this?

The gunner who dies because his hummvee rolls over while dodging an IED blast won't have contributed one whit to our knowledge of whether or not the strategy is working, and his death or life will not acquire any more meaning or lose any because of whatever strategic directive was in effect at the time. My friends who died in Iraq in 2007 did not die any more meaningful or meaningless deaths than my friends who died in 2005 because the strategy changed.

[Schmedlap]

My immensely interesting and varied biography tells me that the true number of lives saved will be 17. But this number skyrockets to 19 if the President delays a further week.

If you haven't been to Airborne School then you have no idea.

[Fuchs]

Afghanistan is very low priority in Germany and I am under the impression that it isn't even near top priority in the U.S. as well.
That is in my opinion a justified prioritization, if the numbers I've read about annual preventable deaths of ill-insured or uninsured patients are anywhere near correct. AQ would not kill that many U.S. citizens ever (much less the Taliban).

I despise ad hominem attacks (I've had my share as the target and usually expose them), but this doesn't exactly look like one. Cheney had a history of involvement in the conflict and the Bush/Cheney administration did reject a troops increase requested by McKiernan in 2008, right? So that's no good background for Cheney to criticize the current situation.

Cheney gets media attention due to the fact that he was in office as Vice President until recently, so his credentials-enabled publicity basically offers his credentials as a target.


Overall, the thread probably belonged more into the historical sub-forum, though.

[Shek]

Finally, while I am not defending Dick Cheney at all, my main take away from his speech was that the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement, be ready day one, will listen to his generals, and already issued the Afghanistan plan. I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing. If time were such an issue, then perhaps we could put Health Care, Global Warming, The Olympics, Harvard Professors et al. on the back burner for a couple of weeks, and sort this out. After all, soldiers are dying now, and Commander in Chief is actually a Constitutional responsibility of the President.

Abu S,

A few points/questions:

1. If the President made a decision two weeks ago to adopt a troop increase, when would the first brigade be available to deploy? Would it be time now? Would it be the brigade that just got pulled off the hook for Iraq? Would it be a different brigade based on matching task org with the required mission in Afghanistan? I'm not looking at a specific answer as we'd then be traveling down the OPSEC path, but it's quite possible that waiting for several weeks/months doesn't change anything at all.

2. If the assessment determines that the current strategy is the way forward based on the value of the object in view, the means required to work towards the object, and the risk that the strategy takes on, then how does the timing change anything?

3. Here's a potential scenario: The administration has already made their decision, but is delaying a pro-forma decision and is instead continuing to "deliberate" so that it builds political support for the decision. Doing this ensures that GEN McChrystal will be able to prosecute the strategy without major domestical political hindrance unless the 2010 elections create a mandate for "change." Not doing so means that the heat of the 2010 elections only gives GEN McChrystal six months to demonstrate success or else we abandon a superior strategy.

All of the above scenarios lead to the conclusion that an immediately executed decision may not change anything and in fact, may even cost more lives. What we are forgetting here is that strategy is not made and executed in a vacuum, but that domestic politics plays a role (and it should, after all, war is about pursuing policy/political objectives) both in shaping the strategy and assessing the strategy.

In fact, I'd offer that calls to make an immediate decision may actually harm the process. Right or wrong, the reality is that a quick decision could appear to be the result of the administration kowtowing to the military and the GOP, which only stands to discredit Obama amongst the base and make it less likely for a strategy to have staying power as it is executed.

[Ken White]

Wisdom from the Hudson. Amazing...

[Shek]

Wisdom from the Hudson. Amazing...

Oops, need to change the location. Gravitation pull has pulled me closer to the Beltway

[Fuchs]

There is also the possibility that Obama will wait with the press release (or *shock* even with the decision) till some NATO meeting this winter.

[Ken White]

Oops, need to change the location. Gravitation pull has pulled me closer to the Beltway

Sometimes the system pays back with a decent tour after building or ancillary time.

[SteveMetz]

the president should stop pondering his navel and do something. For all the Bush administrations many flaws, it was decisive. I was always taught, and continue to believe, that in war the best thing you can do is the right thing. Then next best thing you can do is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. Put another way, it is hard to correct your course, if you aren’t moving at all.

In other words, get the lead out and make a decision, before someone else makes it for you. Indeed no decision is a decision all to itself. I don’t think that this is an unrealistic request since this is the president who was supposed to have superior judgement be ready day one will listen to his generals and already issued the Afghanistan plan[/URL]. I don’t buy the ‘we need more time’ thing.

My thoughts on this.

[jmm99]

Somehow, you and I have to get into the same chapter, if not on the same page. So, in that endeavor, what follows is a snip from an email to someone on what perhaps is common ground.

---------------------------
Anyway, that's a segue into AQ waging unconventional warfare on a global basis (COL Jones' concept, which I have appropriated - wink); rather than AQ being a "global insurgency" as some want to define it. Not to get into Warden's Ring Theories too far, but here is how I visualize it:

10 Ring - AQ Leadership

9-6 Rings - AQ middlemen - could be their special operations forces (e.g., 9/11), financing folks, propaganda folks, and their special forces (aimed at force multiplication from groups in the lower numbered rings) - all networked back and forth (general counter tactic is to find and neutralize the nodes).

5-1 Rings - Insurgent groups which share common belief systems, common enemies, etc., which can be supported by the AQ SF (as the chatter is about Mr Zazi - see my last post in War Crimes). While these groups can be targeted in one way or the other, we are shooting at the rings that at most give us a score of 50.

0 Ring (outside the target rings) would include parallel thinkers who mimic insurgent tactics, but who are not linked to any of the target rings (e.g., DC snipers). And, of course, the people who have nothing to do with either side, and the people who are anti-AQ, etc.

But, as COL Bob says, there ain't no counter unconventional warfare doctrine - but plenty of counter-insurgency doctrines.
-------------------------------

The email itself then goes on with a long blah-blah about insurgency warfare vs unconventional warfare in Vietnam which is omitted here.

The above is not a set of problem solutions, but a way of visualizing problems to a former half-assed target shooter.

Your thoughts ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Somehow, you and I have to get into the same chapter, if not on the same page. So, in that endeavor, what follows is a snip from an email to someone on what perhaps is common ground.

---------------------------
Anyway, that's a segue into AQ waging unconventional warfare on a global basis (COL Jones' concept, which I have appropriated - wink); rather than AQ being a "global insurgency" as some want to define it. Not to get into Warden's Ring Theories too far, but here is how I visualize it:

10 Ring - AQ Leadership

9-6 Rings - AQ middlemen - could be their special operations forces (e.g., 9/11), financing folks, propaganda folks, and their special forces (aimed at force multiplication from groups in the lower numbered rings) - all networked back and forth (general counter tactic is to find and neutralize the nodes).

5-1 Rings - Insurgent groups which share common belief systems, common enemies, etc., which can be supported by the AQ SF (as the chatter is about Mr Zazi - see my last post in War Crimes). While these groups can be targeted in one way or the other, we are shooting at the rings that at most give us a score of 50.

0 Ring (outside the target rings) would include parallel thinkers who mimic insurgent tactics, but who are not linked to any of the target rings (e.g., DC snipers). And, of course, the people who have nothing to do with either side, and the people who are anti-AQ, etc.

But, as COL Bob says, there ain't no counter unconventional warfare doctrine - but plenty of counter-insurgency doctrines.
-------------------------------

The email itself then goes on with a long blah-blah about insurgency warfare vs unconventional warfare in Vietnam which is omitted here.

The above is not a set of problem solutions, but a way of visualizing problems to a former half-assed target shooter.

Your thoughts ?

Regards

Mike

Several key thoughts:

1. Ensure that you make it clear that you are not dividing a single "threat" into bands, but rather using bands to highlight and differentiate distinct, but related intities that combine to make a common problem.

2. To apply "Defeat-Disrupt-Deter" I would apply Defeat to the 10-ring; Disrupt to the 6-9 rings; and Deter to your 1-5 rings.

3. You may want to make your "Target" look more like a Dartboard than a Bullseye to help clearly communicate that even within each ring there are esential differences that must be addressed uniquely.

4. Strategic success lies in the 1-5 rings, as this is the base of support that makes the whole thing work. The soulution-set for this ring must also be rooted far more in Civilian led policy than anything the security community would offer in support. Take these rings away and the rest withers (though like a weed, is prepared to spring back to life if nurtured by conditions of poor governance as assessed by each of these distinct populaces own perspectives).

[jmm99]

than to discourse apart - ships passing in the night are not productive. That having been said, let's go through your points.

from BW
1. Ensure that you make it clear that you are not dividing a single "threat" into bands, but rather using bands to highlight and differentiate distinct, but related entities that combine to make a common problem.

The 10-ring is self-explanatory. It is not static, but folks in more lower rings may jump up; and folks in that ring may move down to lower rings. E.g., the guy who was running the middleman, who was running Zazi according to DoJ, was an AQ top finance man who was shifted into Astan operations. Rather than a dartboard, I'd view the construct more in terms of quantum chemistry or physics where particles move back and forth between energy levels (quantum jumps).

My 9-6 rings (4 rings) were based on positing four different components which I somewhat arbitrarily assigned to AQ: special operations forces (e.g., 9/11), financing folks, propaganda folks, and their special forces (aimed at force multiplication from groups in the lower numbered rings). Any particular component is not assigned to a specific ring, but can jump between rings - closer to or further from the leadership ring, or closer to or further from the "insurgent" groups in rings 5-1.

My 5-1 rings were completely arbitrary - simply to fill out a 10-ring target. Again, there will be quantum jumps between rings, moving closer or further away from the AQ "groups & teams" (rings 9-6).

Keep in mind that all of these folks are loosely networked (a given because of the jumps between rings) and fluid. Hence, nodes and connections will always exist, but they will appear to be transitory. That's why the Internet is a key element. E.g., as an example, a webpage is here today, but gone tomorrow; however, another webpage will exist somewhere, which will key folks into the new url address.

In short, we are dealing with an open, complex system which is resilient to linear tactics or effects based operations.

from BW
2. To apply "Defeat-Disrupt-Deter" I would apply Defeat to the 10-ring; Disrupt to the 6-9 rings; and Deter to your 1-5 rings.

I'd view this a bit differently, but we might end up the same. As to the 10-ring, "Defeat" is the ultimate objective and obvious. But, a clear head or heart shot is unlikely (although we almost had one at Tora Bora, and several times before 9/11). If we get one, fine; but don't count on it.

Moreover, in reading Zawahiri's Knights' discussion of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the publicly known figures (in AQ's case, UBL & Zawahiri) are not necessarily AQ's real top figures - there may be a small number of "shadow partners" who are very secure. If that sounds conspiratorial, it is - AQ is a conspiracy.

On that theme, you crack a conspiracy by identifying it and cracking it from the outside in. The principal attack, which will be time-consuming, is to attack rings 9-6 (their "groups and teams") - realizing we are shooting at a moving and jumping target. So, "Disrupt" is probably as good as any tag word for that process.

As to the 5-1 rings (the "domestic insurgents"), the major practical problem to "Deter" is the sheer variety of motives and causes for what are in effect brush fires. Huge amounts of energy, lives, money and lost opportunities are eaten up in putting out brush fires (e.g, Vietnam, Iraq and Astan). In the end, at best, you will be shooting 50/100 by taking on the 5-1 rings (ave. is 2.5). The average in taking on the 9-6 rings is 7.5.

from BW
3. You may want to make your "Target" look more like a Dartboard than a Bullseye to help clearly communicate that even within each ring there are esential differences that must be addressed uniquely.

I think the concept of quantum jumps handles the interchanges between rings by the varied "particles" in the rings. Just think of the visual patterns illustrating quantum mechanics and quantum chemistry. You need not the higher math.

from BW
4. Strategic success lies in the 1-5 rings, as this is the base of support that makes the whole thing work. The soulution-set for this ring must also be rooted far more in Civilian led policy than anything the security community would offer in support. Take these rings away and the rest withers (though like a weed, is prepared to spring back to life if nurtured by conditions of poor governance as assessed by each of these distinct populaces own perspectives).

No, strategic success vs. AQ lies in disruption of the 9-6 rings (the higher value targets, albeit not the highest value target) - their "groups and teams". How would you disrupt SOCOM ? Not a question to be answered publicly, but that is the counterpart analogy.

There are non-"M" things that could be done (the "DIE" options), and that we probably could agree on, that would help a "Deter" strategy in rings 5-1; and perhaps even more so in ring 0 - which is the far larger part of the World (and from which rings 5-1 come). However, those are tied up in what considers the better (note I didn't say "best", which is Utopian) Worldview that the US should have in the future. That is a more difficult geo-political topic.

Your thoughts ?

Regards as always

Mike