Eaton fires broadside at Cheney

[John T. Fishel]

if it takes longer to decide on strategy but rather what the risks are to achieving our objectives. We know - as much as can be known - what it takes to defeat an insurgency. We have solid quantitiative and qualitative evidence. We know, for a fact, that a strategy built around a purely (or mainly) enemy centric approach will fail in Afghanistan on numerous counts. We can predict, with reasonable accuracy, what will happen if troop strength is not increased and we rely more and more on targeted drone strikes - and it is not a positive outcome. With a little less assurance, we can predict a negative outcome if additional troops are fed in too small increments over too long a time - we fail. So, the presidential decision is really whether the strategy GEN McChrystal has proposed meets the Acceptability component of the FAS test. Essentially, if it does not - if President Obama chooses not to resource it properly - then we must choose not merely a different strategy but a totally different objective and build a strategy to achieve it. I, for one, am not sure that any other objective is acceptable, nor am I sure it would be feasible. In the end, if we want to achievethe objective stated by President Obama, we really need to give GEN McChrystal the resources he says he needs. So, this debate over resouces is the wrong debate. The debate needs to be over ends/objectives. IMO changing the objective means accepting defeat.

On that cheery note...

JohnT

[slapout9]

So, this debate over resouces is the wrong debate. The debate needs to be over ends/objectives. IMO changing the objective means accepting defeat.

On that cheery note...

JohnT

Hi John, yes that is the real question. Even more so on the grand strategy level. This apparent policy of invading countries because their terrain was used as a launching platform for an attack can get us into a lot of trouble. Instead of whack a mole it is turning into whack a country. I don't see how that can be in our long term best interest. Thoughts on this? from anyone? Any merit to this line of reasoning or did I fall off the boat

[John T. Fishel]

Different invasion rules for countries with real governments and thos without. You really can hold a govt responsible for its actions - if that govt has effective control of (most of) its sovreign territory, eg Panama or Iraq. But if there is no real govt - Somalia and Afghanistan in 2001 - then you are playing by different rules. Deterrance is a real policy when there is a govt - it is indeed an option for say Iran. But deterrance is not an option for an Afghanistan or a Somalia.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

Different invasion rules for countries with real governments and thos without. You really can hold a govt responsible for its actions - if that govt has effective control of (most of) its sovreign territory, eg Panama or Iraq. But if there is no real govt - Somalia and Afghanistan in 2001 - then you are playing by different rules. Deterrance is a real policy when there is a govt - it is indeed an option for say Iran. But deterrance is not an option for an Afghanistan or a Somalia.

Cheers

JohnT

Thank You,Sir

[Ken White]

For those chaotic neighborhoods, we need the capability (which is easy, already have the gear and people, just need to train 'em better) and the WILL (the hard item...) to go in a do some minor destruction and havoc stuff then leave quickly. Have to get some more gear and train up some more people to do the covert entry surgical stuff but we can do that as well.

Need to be prepared to leave some bodies and possibly prisoners behind. Goes with the territory; not doing that is nice, it also is a relative rarity. Only the last three wars failed to produce bunches of both.

Creating more chaos, sowing hate and discontent is a USA specialty, we do that well...

P.S.

I agree with you, Slap, on the be careful where you go and why -- we lost the bubble on that...

P.P.S

No, the public won't get upset (other than the usual suspects who get upset at practically everything and cannot believe everyone isn't nice) -- IF the raids are successful.

[jmm99]

Perhaps, we should spend less time on "COIN" theory and practice; and more time on Raid Operations theory and practice - e.g 1993 FMFM 7-32, Raid Operations (3 parts, pubs are in numerical order - so about 1/2 down the page).

From which (File 2, Chap 1), this nugget:

Nothing is so devastating as to pounce upon the enemy in the dark, smite him hip and thigh, and vanish silently into the dark.

Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate
Burma, 1943

Best to all

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mike--

Some of the argument about how to fight COIN - enemy v population centric - is simply nonsense. You can't win a COIN without defeating the insurgent whether he is the Continental Army and Congress (yes Marc, it was an insurgency), Sendero Luminoso, the FMLN, the Taliban, or AQ. That point was well made by Sir Robert Thompson reflecting on Malaya. COIN is, after all, war and war is messy, as Gian Gentile keeps on reminding us - correctly, I might add. Wingate, therefore was absolutely right, for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. The critical tactics of the ESAF fight against the FMLN were the GOE (Special Operations Group) intelligence driven raids against specific FMLN targets. Those raids were high pay off actions compared to the equally necessary 24/7 patrols of the Immediate Reaction Battalions, and the fixed site defenses of the regular brigades. What makes COIN different is that the purpose of all these actions is to provide room and time to develop legitimate governance in an environment that is secure for the population. In other words, you can't conduct a population centric COIN without waging an enemy centric fight. It isn't a question of either/or but of how you integrate both.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

strategic raids for those nations like Afghanistan and Somalia where the disadvantages to intervention in the conventional sense and / or a COIN effort outweigh the advantages. That per your earlier comment:

But if there is no real govt - Somalia and Afghanistan in 2001 - then you are playing by different rules. Deterrance is a real policy when there is a govt - it is indeed an option for say Iran. But deterrance is not an option for an Afghanistan or a Somalia.

Thus he, I believe, is referring to raids in lieu of, as opposed to an adjunct in, COIN efforts