New essay: “The Shadow COA or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NSC-68"

[kotkinjs1]

Light bathroom reading....

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2009/10/21/...d-love-nsc-68/

A little shameless self-promotion. I'd appreciate any constructive feedback.

Essay primarily focuses on a way ahead for the US Government in Central Asia by dissecting flawed political-military strategic assumptions to date. It then ties this together to a new understanding of geopolitics and global challenges to generate a new grand strategy by modernizing Kennan’s writings for the 21st century.

The essay covers four main points:

1) That although GEN McChrystal’s assessment calls for one of two courses of action in Afghanistan, there is a third, more suitable course not being debated;
2) That current plans and concepts developed after 9/11 are, in fact, causing many of the national security issues we face now and will in the future;
3) Argument against the conventional wisdom that Afghanistan or wars like it are a vital national interest (as a point to formulate a subsequent US grand strategy);
4) Proposal and recommendations for a new grand strategy.


The views expressed are my own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

[Hacksaw]

I plan to read if for no other reason the title plays on my unending love of the movie and George C. Scott's analysis of a cave gap

[Ken White]

With respect to your four points:

1) I think there are many more than three courses of action and we do not know what is being debated at the decision level. My personal view is that we should not stay indefinitely but that we cannot leave too precipitously -- or by any announced date. Credibility is in the eye of the beholder and many beholders do not share your western view of what's important.

2) A correct statement but in part caused by simply a need to use what was available -- I see nothing in your paper that truly addresses that practical shortfall. You do attempt to sidestep the capability issue but I'm not all sure that is possible. A 'grand strategy' require a marriage of ways, means and ends. You provide an idealized -- and perhaps not totally achievable - end but do not discuss ways and the all important means.

3) Agree Afghanistan is not a vital national interest. It is, however, an important national interest. As an aside, comparison of Viet Nam and Afghanistan are, as you say, superfluous -- but I suggest the allusions to British and Russian experience there are equally flawed.

4) Americans can do grand strategy as you say; there are hundreds of examples of that. However, the American political system is decidedly inimical to a grand strategy. I have on this board many times made the point that the 'Cold War' was not nearly the monolithic good thing / grand strategy some appear to like to believe. Got to be careful which myths you subscribe to. You really need to figure out how to fix the interface of a 'grand strategy' and the US political process -- specifically, elections every 2,4, 6 and 8 years that can significantly change directions -- as occurred repeatedly during the Cold war (simply look at canceled weapons systems...). I believe that interface needs to effected and cleaned before you push too much grand strategy. If you really want it to work, that is...

I'd also argue that DoD does not by any means excel in direct actions necessary against imminent threats. In fact, the track record in that is far from good. MDMP is a terrible strait jacket and it totally discourages innovation. Our practice of having 'Planners' is also dangerous. Bunch of guys sitting around in air conditioned comfort and absolutely no situational awareness in far too many cases end up prematurely second guessing guys who are on the ground doing the work. Afghanistan offers numerous examples of that and the terrible flaws it engenders. Flaws that get people killed unnecessarily. That stupidity did not end with Shah i Kot in 2002...

That's a nice, idealistic paper. Not least your prescription for getting the SCO, India and Iran on board for a program that is inimical to all their interests. I'm curious to know why you think they might want to do that without also insuring that the Great Satan takes a hit or two? You might also want to look far more deeply at the idea that bad governance causes insurgency or the like. That, as the Scots say, is 'Not proven.' Far from it.

* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.

[slapout9]

Major Kotkins, I read your paper on that other thread where it was posted Ahhh it might be just a little bit to idealistic.....but you are thinking differently. So do you have anything else written?

* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.

Some Strategic Stuff Here.

[slapout9]

Hacksaw, we must prevent the Mine Shaft Gap!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iesXU...eature=related

[jmm99]

of the Piggly-Wiggly Gap.

This:

from Ken
* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

seems brilliant in concept - eliminates the "Transition Gap" () between operational planning and tactical execution.

What would it look like ? E.g., MAGTF "A" under OpCell A command for current operation; MAGTF "B" under OpCell B command for next operation ?

I can visualize something akin in my profession. Trial Team A does trial; Trial Team B does appeal. There it depends on how much redundancy can you afford. Usually, the same lawyers both plan and execute the trial and the appeal. Since law is a micro-affair compared to a military effort, this example is not claimed to be transferrable.

-------------------------
To be frank, MAJ Kotkin's article left me struggling for understanding.

The Cold War containment strategy (as opposed to the alternative roll-back strategy) was aimed at containment of communism (the threat). It had its instances of armed conflicts; but, in the end, boiled down to an ideological and economic struggle - in their terms, more of the Political Struggle than the Military Struggle. The Sovs also made more mistakes than we made.

What is the present threat that we are to contain ?

What military efforts should be used to implement that containment ?

What political efforts should be used to implement that containment ?

Since I've been a consistent member of the "Never Again but School" (credits: the two Daves, Kilcullen & Petraeus) since the Korean War, a change in approach from both the Cold War and the New World Order would not break my heart.

But, I genuinely do not understand the salient thrust of the article. Thus, I can scarcely critique the article.

Regards to all, including MAJ Kotkin - sorry to be so dense.

Mike

[Major Riptdie]

* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.

No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.

Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision.

The root problem here seems to be a disconnect between planners and reality. This is not new, having been previously called "Fog of War", "Friction" , "Know the Enemy, Know Yourself", etc. There are other ways to enhance the situational awareness of those planning operations without a wholesale remodel of the staff.

Still, I do see merits in your solution (possibly at lower echelons). I also see some potential problems.

First, this assumes contiguous operations with definitive start and stop times, presumably when the whistle would blow and Team A would stand up and Team B would sit down. This is not always the case, especially in what I would call "Counter" Operations - counter-sniper, counter-IED, counter-terrorist, and even a popular one called counter-insurgency. The word "counter" being key because it implies reacting to enemy action, and thus having ceded the initiative. The wisdom of making such operations the mainstay of your strategy is debatable (and beyond this discussion). Attempting to figure out when Team A stops and Team B starts may be problematic during "counter" operations.

Second, it seems that your solution may lend itself to operations at the tactical level, since that is really where the operations cell plays a direct role in the execution (i.e. command and control) of an operation. At the operational and strategic levels, however, I would argue that the primary function of OPS is not to directly command and control (having the Division or Corps Commander in your truck, tank, or cockpit is annoying), but rather to maintain situational awareness to feed operational and strategic planning.

Your fundamental contention stands - planners without situational awareness are like blind men. They are trying to solve problems they don't fully understand. However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.

MR

[MikeF]

Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision....Your fundamental contention stands - planners without situational awareness are like blind men. They are trying to solve problems they don't fully understand. However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.

It's a form of cognitive dissonance. In his blog, Schmedlap summed up the problems that many of us faced back in May/June 2003 well,

We have seen what happens when the tough questions are not asked. I saw it up close and personal when I arrived in Baghdad in April 2003 and was tasked with providing security for an entire district of Baghdad with 43 Soldiers, including myself. I still remember talking to a CA officer in Baghdad who tried to reassure me, tongue-in-cheek, that all was well.

“Don’t worry,” he said, “BDE’s CA plan is nested in Division’s.”
“What’s Division’s CA plan?” I asked.
“Division’s CA plan is to wait for BDE to think of something.”

I like Ken's idea, and I'd take it a step further. During the future planning process, the planners should take David Kilcullen's lead- leave the windowless rooms, jump on an aircraft, and visit the patrol bases to take in all the sights and sounds of the current fight from the commander on the ground. I'm sure they would return with different views that would only assist their planning in a vacuum.

Mintzberg would call that skipping/bypassing the dysfunctional vertical, stove-pipe communications system.

I'll provide my own example. Back in Feb 2007, when we were planning re-entry into the DRV, I briefed my BDE CDR on the current situation in Zag (about a 50% version of what I published in the Break Point). When I was done explaining how AQI had taking over Zaganiyah, my BDE CDR replied,

"Mike, my S2 tells me that Zaganiyah is controlled by JAM."

I replied, "Sir, when was the last time that she went there? Um, Never? The 5000 Shia in Zag were expelled or murdered a month ago."

Imagine if the future planners had visited Wanat a year ago. There probably would have been a bit more urgency in the withdrawal from Nuristan.

We've seen a gross lack of responsibility and accountability in these two wars.

v/r

Mike

[Gian P Gentile]

yeah Hack, you are slipping! "Caves" instead of mineshaft gaps; that would have never happened back in the days of Sams.

gian

[Ken White]

Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision.

Been there done that -- seen it work in peace and war.

There are other ways to enhance the situational awareness of those planning operations without a wholesale remodel of the staff.

True -- why aren't they used?

Still, I do see merits in your solution (possibly at lower echelons)...

If you mean Bde and below in combat, I agree. I'd do away with the Division, useless level IMO, A Corps should be able to control up to nine BCTs with no problem. Corps probably needs planners -- but they also should have dual Ops teams.

First, this assumes contiguous operations with definitive start and stop times, presumably when the whistle would blow and Team A would stand up and Team B would sit down.

Not in mid to high intensity combat. Just adapt it to other control measures.

...The word "counter" being key because it implies reacting to enemy action, and thus having ceded the initiative. The wisdom of making such operations the mainstay of your strategy is debatable (and beyond this discussion). Attempting to figure out when Team A stops and Team B starts may be problematic during "counter" operations.

Agreed, as all such operations entail adaptation, this is just one more. The intensity and degree of stasis are the guiding factors.

I also strongly suggest that a tenet of our future doctrine and training should be an orientation that emphasizes and trains to be the intitiator of action in such operations -- reacting to the enemy is a losing game. Yes, I understand the difficulties and I know that good units can do the initiating...

Second, it seems that your solution may lend itself to operations at the tactical level, since that is really where the operations cell plays a direct role in the execution (i.e. command and control) of an operation. At the operational and strategic levels, however, I would argue that the primary function of OPS is not to directly command and control (having the Division or Corps Commander in your truck, tank, or cockpit is annoying), but rather to maintain situational awareness to feed operational and strategic planning.

First, I suggest that having a Bn S3 or Cdr or even in some cases, a Co Cdr in your tank is just as annoying -- and more importantly, distracting -- as is a Corps Cdr (we can dispense with Div Cdrs...). Secondly when the Bn Staff's need to maintain situational awareness, exacerbated by the foolishness at the major TCs, get into the 'Car 54, where are you?' mode -- which it does way too frequently -- they are not helping. Impatience and lack of trust in subordinates will not last in a real war so why do we encourage it in training and in 'counter' operations?

Having pontificated, I strongly agree that in combat, as you say, the focus of the staff should by upward, not downward. They should be gathering information and feeding it upstream and they should not be doing this by hassling the operating units due to a fear of being asked a question they cannot answer. That is a significant training and PME shortfall. Very significant.

However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.

Always true, all generalizations are subject to situational modifications. I suggest that better training coupled with the always critical assessment of the METT-TC factors can handle those adaptations.

[jmm99]

from Kot
And briefly, to jmm99; understand it's a stretch to revive NSC-68 to the present day but:

It might not be a stretch to revive "containment" (but then we need to know what that present-day containment looks like); just as it might not be a stretch to revive "roll-back" (but then we need to know what that present-day "roll-back" looks like).

I still do not have a clear picture of what you are proposing, but some aspects are becoming clearer. Please understand that I am not expressing distaste for some of your rhetoric; and I welcome new approaches to problems, especially where the problems are, on some levels, in the words of a young French officer from 55+ years ago, "What a hopeless mess."

Taking these one by one:

"What is the present threat that we are to contain?"

"Jihadistan" and the assumption that what happens politically inside AFG or PAK matters to us. Illiterate zeolots aren't going to get the keys to Pakistan's nukes. If the nukes are somehow "stolen," well, I just think that the strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost end up being cheaper in the long run than pumping $7.5B into a country who's national interests are not mutual to ours.

As a definition of a threat, I find this incomprehensible - I glean nothing from this that defines a threat to the US; except by assuming what you might mean and speculating from there (which I won't do).

"What military efforts should be used to implement that containment?"

None; that's one of my main points; we're fighting a war to solve a problem that's not military in nature.

I thought you were going in that direction; but again what is the problem that's not militrary in nature ? I have to at least see the problem before I can develop a solution. Non-military solutions are my first choice anyway. But, unless you explain the problem in nice, clear terms, I cannot see the problem you see. I'd prefer not to guess at the problem, make "assumptions" and from them make a "strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost".

Next one:

"What political efforts should be used to implement that containment?"

That's the key; the other aspects of DIME are more appropriate. If we 'got real' with our traditional 'partners,' akistan-pay and audi-arabia-say come to mind, and truly work with Russia, India, China, and Iran, there is a better way ahead but it requires an open and honest way of dealing with them to reach shared interests. Because we view RU, CN, and IR as threats themselves, we fail to see a different route.

OK, I"ve removed the "M" from DIME, which leaves me with a DIE strategy. I don't recognize the states akistan-pay and audi-arabia-say, but I do recognize the major Indian Ocean powers - Australia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and South Africa; two interested Muslim powers, Turkey and Egypt; and Russia and China (whose birds have global reach).

So, what are the political efforts that we should be aiming at those powers. E.g., should we act like daddy, or nanny ?

Or, should we simply say, folks you have a piss pot mess developing which is going to harm each of you far more than it will harm us. So, it's up to you to fix it, if you think it's a problem. You can have our "good offices" (a "D" term) if you want them; but if you don't, that's OK with us also.

I really don't know where you are aiming between those two quite different courses of action.

Regards

Mike