Sunni Political Participation in Iraq

[Strickland]

The Iraqi Sunni Arabs have yet to present a united political front, so we have a broad spectrum of factions we are dealing with: outright rejectionists, those who are openly attempting to derail the process, those who hope (vainly) to use it as an alternative enabler for the classic strategy of taking over from within, and then, what I personally feel is the tiniest group of them all, the ones who are ready to fully and legitimately participate in the process of creating a representative Iraqi government.

Sunni participation is a necessary metric that requires very close monitoring - their participation isn't an automatic indicator of success, but their failure to participate is an indicator of failure.

Is a failure of what?

[Jedburgh]

Is a failure of what?

Pardon me, I should have stated it more clearly. What I meant was, Sunni Arab participation in the new Iraqi government isn't an automatic indicator of that government's future success, but their failure to participate is an indicator of its ultimate failure. Which, at this point, could be catastrophic for our interests.

Without inclusion of Sunni Arabs in key decision-making processes, they will continue to perceive the new government as an exclusive regime bent on stripping them of everything (many of them have in their heads the way in which the Shi'a were treated over the years, and they are mirror-imaging the identical - or worse - retributive treatment being meted out to them). Too many Sunni Arabs feel that they have little left to lose, and even more feel that they don't have anything to gain by cooperating with the new government.

A careful reading of reporting that spouts optimism, will show that much of the touted "new levels of Sunni cooperation" is purely tactical, meant to ensure a better local comfort level by getting rid of elements that are rocking their boat or ensuring more equitable distribution of specific items and resources. Strategic cooperation, in the manner of active cooperation with the new government and working towards a truly representative Iraq just ain't happening. Yet.

Arguably, the appointment of a Sunni Arab as Minister of Defense has a greater potential to defuse elements of the insurgency than does the killing of Zarqawi. But to make a difference in the insurgency, the Sunni Arab members of the government who are elected/appointed need to be seen as active participants in all processes.

You better believe that the Sunni Arab population is observing all of this closely, to see if their participation is permitted to have a real impact upon policy/decision making processes or is condescendingly set up as a token intended to quiet them down (that's exactly what Saddam did with the Shi'a and Kurds several times in the past). They're not stupid. They are cynical and jaded by decades of Saddam's manipulations of political, tribal, clan and ethnic rivalries and allegiances.

[Strickland]

Would if be a good thing if Sunnis participated in the government simply as a means to check government progress? Is it possible that Sunnis have simply started participating in an attempt to "check" what they perceive to be a growing Kurdish/Shi'ite block? Is it possible that their inclusion will grid-lock the government?

[Jedburgh]

Would if be a good thing if Sunnis participated in the government simply as a means to check government progress?
No, of course not.

Is it possible that Sunnis have simply started participating in an attempt to "check" what they perceive to be a growing Kurdish/Shi'ite block?
You could word that statment another way: the Sunnis have started participating in order to ensure that that their voices are heard and their interests are taken into consideration. Will that "check" some aspects of what the Shi'a and Kurds are pushing for? Certainly. An example of that is the strained negotiations going on over distribution of oil revenues. But this give-and-take between democratically elected representatives is what representative government is all about.

Is it possible that their inclusion will grid-lock the government?
Sure. But the government is already faction-ridden - the Shi'a especially - and has not exactly been immune to grid-lock prior to Sunni inclusion.

In the end, good governance is something the Iraqis really have to work out on their own. Yes, we did apply a little pressure to force inclusion of Sunni Arabs - but elements within the government were already to the point where they appreciated the necessity of restoration over retribution to get the country moving in the right direction. However, there's still a very long way to go and plenty that could go wrong. A catastrophic break-up of the new government could initiate with Kurds refusing to compromise on demands for greater autonomy, or a bitter factional break-up among the Shi'a - problems linked to Sunni Arab inclusion are not the only potential tipping point.

[Stu-6]

The problem with evaluating “Sunni participation” it that there many different Sunni factions, which have some very different objectives. Some will participate simply in an effort to derail the formation of a new government and will never see a new Iraqi government as legitimate; even inside this group you will have different factions some with religious motivations some more nationalistic. Some will participate to either stop Shiite power, to stop US power, or to gain power for themselves; once again for a variety of reasons. Finally it is worth remembering that participation in government doesn’t rule out participation in the insurgency.

Bottom line, Sunni participation is probably by in large a good thing but don’t read too much into it.