Sunni Political Participation in Iraq

[Strickland]

While on leave, I am doing my best to read the 30+ articles that I stacked on my desk in my "read" pile. In doing so, I have read much about the significance of the Sunni participation in the political process over the past 7 months. All the "smart-guys" seem to disagree as to whether this is a good sign or not. Cordesman asserts that Sunni political participation in no way indicates that they chose politics over violence, but rather, demonstrates their desire to follow the IRA model, which could complicate things considerably. Are Iraqi Rejectionists truly trying to "derail" the political process or simply using it as an alternative enabler/campaign? Is Sunni participation truly a metric of success for the coalition? Any thoughts?

[Jedburgh]

Are Iraqi Rejectionists truly trying to "derail" the political process or simply using it as an alternative enabler/campaign? Is Sunni participation truly a metric of success for the coalition? Any thoughts?

The Iraqi Sunni Arabs have yet to present a united political front, so we have a broad spectrum of factions we are dealing with: outright rejectionists, those who are openly attempting to derail the process, those who hope (vainly) to use it as an alternative enabler for the classic strategy of taking over from within, and then, what I personally feel is the tiniest group of them all, the ones who are ready to fully and legitimately participate in the process of creating a representative Iraqi government.

Sunni participation is a necessary metric that requires very close monitoring - their participation isn't an automatic indicator of success, but their failure to participate is an indicator of failure.

[Strickland]

The Iraqi Sunni Arabs have yet to present a united political front, so we have a broad spectrum of factions we are dealing with: outright rejectionists, those who are openly attempting to derail the process, those who hope (vainly) to use it as an alternative enabler for the classic strategy of taking over from within, and then, what I personally feel is the tiniest group of them all, the ones who are ready to fully and legitimately participate in the process of creating a representative Iraqi government.

Sunni participation is a necessary metric that requires very close monitoring - their participation isn't an automatic indicator of success, but their failure to participate is an indicator of failure.

Is a failure of what?

[Jedburgh]

Is a failure of what?

Pardon me, I should have stated it more clearly. What I meant was, Sunni Arab participation in the new Iraqi government isn't an automatic indicator of that government's future success, but their failure to participate is an indicator of its ultimate failure. Which, at this point, could be catastrophic for our interests.

Without inclusion of Sunni Arabs in key decision-making processes, they will continue to perceive the new government as an exclusive regime bent on stripping them of everything (many of them have in their heads the way in which the Shi'a were treated over the years, and they are mirror-imaging the identical - or worse - retributive treatment being meted out to them). Too many Sunni Arabs feel that they have little left to lose, and even more feel that they don't have anything to gain by cooperating with the new government.

A careful reading of reporting that spouts optimism, will show that much of the touted "new levels of Sunni cooperation" is purely tactical, meant to ensure a better local comfort level by getting rid of elements that are rocking their boat or ensuring more equitable distribution of specific items and resources. Strategic cooperation, in the manner of active cooperation with the new government and working towards a truly representative Iraq just ain't happening. Yet.

Arguably, the appointment of a Sunni Arab as Minister of Defense has a greater potential to defuse elements of the insurgency than does the killing of Zarqawi. But to make a difference in the insurgency, the Sunni Arab members of the government who are elected/appointed need to be seen as active participants in all processes.

You better believe that the Sunni Arab population is observing all of this closely, to see if their participation is permitted to have a real impact upon policy/decision making processes or is condescendingly set up as a token intended to quiet them down (that's exactly what Saddam did with the Shi'a and Kurds several times in the past). They're not stupid. They are cynical and jaded by decades of Saddam's manipulations of political, tribal, clan and ethnic rivalries and allegiances.

[Strickland]

Would if be a good thing if Sunnis participated in the government simply as a means to check government progress? Is it possible that Sunnis have simply started participating in an attempt to "check" what they perceive to be a growing Kurdish/Shi'ite block? Is it possible that their inclusion will grid-lock the government?

[Jedburgh]

Would if be a good thing if Sunnis participated in the government simply as a means to check government progress?
No, of course not.

Is it possible that Sunnis have simply started participating in an attempt to "check" what they perceive to be a growing Kurdish/Shi'ite block?
You could word that statment another way: the Sunnis have started participating in order to ensure that that their voices are heard and their interests are taken into consideration. Will that "check" some aspects of what the Shi'a and Kurds are pushing for? Certainly. An example of that is the strained negotiations going on over distribution of oil revenues. But this give-and-take between democratically elected representatives is what representative government is all about.

Is it possible that their inclusion will grid-lock the government?
Sure. But the government is already faction-ridden - the Shi'a especially - and has not exactly been immune to grid-lock prior to Sunni inclusion.

In the end, good governance is something the Iraqis really have to work out on their own. Yes, we did apply a little pressure to force inclusion of Sunni Arabs - but elements within the government were already to the point where they appreciated the necessity of restoration over retribution to get the country moving in the right direction. However, there's still a very long way to go and plenty that could go wrong. A catastrophic break-up of the new government could initiate with Kurds refusing to compromise on demands for greater autonomy, or a bitter factional break-up among the Shi'a - problems linked to Sunni Arab inclusion are not the only potential tipping point.

[jcustis]

http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/...eat/index.html

From Nic Robertson
CNN

Adjust font size:
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Iraq's top Sunni official has set a deadline of next week for pulling his entire bloc out of the government -- a potentially devastating blow to reconciliation efforts within Iraq. He also said he turned down an offer by President Bush to visit Washington until he can count more fully on U.S. help.

Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi made his comments in an interview with CNN. He said if key amendments to the Iraq Constitution are not made by May 15, he will step down and pull his 44 Sunni politicians out of the 275-member Iraqi parliament.

Seems we are going to find ourselves over a barrel shortly...

[tequila]

GEN Petraeus already noted what should be obvious to all:

Moreover, it is not a government of national unity. Rather, it is one comprised of political leaders from different parties that often default to narrow agendas and a zero-sum approach to legislation.

[Danny]

Maliki has not only helped the enemies of the U.S., but has worked to undermine Iraqi security, if security is defined as reconciliation. But as long as the U.S. administration (and in particular, the State Department) has an irrational devotion and commitment to Maliki, we may be doomed. Best to throw our weight in behind Allawi and a secular government. Time is so very short. So very short.

Iraqi Governing Coalition Set to Collapse

[tequila]

Looking towards Allawi and a "secular" coalition may not be the answer. AQI and the Sunni insurgents are both dedicated to defeating the U.S. first and foremost. Meanwhile if the U.S. looks as if it is behind the ejection of the UIA and the Maliki government, we may spark an open Shia rebellion from both SCIRI and the Mahdi Army. Iran would feel free to come in heavy on the Shia side. Large parts of the Iraqi Army and Interior Ministry would become untrustworthy, to say the least.

We could very well trade what is mostly a Sunni insurgency now for a much more violent Shia/Sunni insurgency combined with a multisided civil war, with only a tattered secular Iraqi coalition (most of whose constituents have already fled the country) and the Kurds on our side.

[jcustis]

I mulled this over on the way to work, and started to ask myself what the Sunni leadership would actually stand to gain with a move like this. It would seem to outweight the gains they have made thus far, and pulling out would only send the embryonic government into cardiac arrest.

Thoughts?