COIN -v- CT debate

[Presley Cannady]

They aren't the same thing so no cleavage is required. Our big error was in conflating the two initially. AQ is one problem, Afghanistan is another.That conflation still exists in the eyes of many and it excessively complicates things. Those are two separate problems and contrary to all the hotshot strategists, Pakistan is another. When all is said and done, the two separate nations who do share similar and related large, troublesome majorities are in fact recognized nations with polities and borders. Like it or not -- and the Pushtuns do not -- those two nations are not going away and neither is going to give up territory to the Pushtuns if for no other reason than to keep them divided and therefor easier to control.

But there you have it, how could we not conflate AQ, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan? AQ lives, eat, sleeps, bathes, and travels with the former ruling clique of Afghanistan, a group which in turn works, plays, fights, trades and intermarries within a Pashtun landscape spread from Kandahar to Miranshah.

Pashtun radicals likely overreach in Pakistan, but let's be frank. They did once hammer their Afghan neighbors across 90 percent of that country's territory and ruled for almost five years, a situation Islamabad found extraordinarily positive from their security point of view. If that's no longer to be the case, then how do you achieve it without building an Afghan state that can secure its territory?

Thus one solution is required for AQ who are simply in Pakistan (possibly) and Afghanistan (to a lesser extent) as a result of diplomatic failures by many including the US. As you point out, they have no infrastructure to protect -- nor any population. The key factor is that they can leave their current location and settle in elsewhere. They are essentially a law enforcement problem and military efforts will have only a marginal effect on them.

They have no infrastructure, but they certainly have population--14 million in Afghanistan and 28 million in Pakistan. Surely they have lowered expectations when it comes to population security, and as we seem to agree they have little infrastructure to protect, and if they lived in pockets the size of Los Angeles with 30,000 police watching over them then yes, I'd agree we're talking about a police problem. But that's just it, the 400+ clans aren't just gangs fighting a turf war. Their semi-nomadic, ranging across vast tracts of hostile terrain. If your lawmen need to be supplied from the air to deal with even a decent sized cluster of heavily armed fighters, then I think we've effectively blurred the line between law enforcement and military operation.

Afghanistan is a military problem at this point but only because we foolishly made it one -- now we have to solve that.

The Pashtun did rule almost the whole of Afghanistan when the war started--city and countryside. Exactly how is law enforcement adequate to that problem?

Pakistan is not a military problem and we should work very hard to avoid making it one. It is a diplomatic problem, purely and simply. Handled correctly, it can make life uncomfortable for AQ -- but that handling entails ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a destabilizing threat to Pakistan.

I've no argument here, but as you point out preventing the war from spilling unendingly into Pakistan requires securing Afghanistan. Is this not counterinsurgency?

We have not done well with any of the three -- but most of that failure stems from making Afghanistan a military problem in the false hope we could make it a friendly democracy. What happens when the folks in DC do not do their homework...

So what was the alternative, negotiate with Mullah Omar whose starting position was that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was to "try" Osama bin Laden? Did we have a chance in hell of putting together a Taliban-FBI joint task force to stamp out AQ's leadership, training camps, and access to points of entry and departure?

Realize that you aren't going to defeat AQ? That would be a good start. You can marginalize them, reduce their damage ability to a bearable level and it would help if everyone would realize they are not a military problem and they are not going to be defeated -- indeed, by upping their threat appearance and wrongly using military effort we merely enhanced their appeal temporarily.

So how does law enforcement deal with a gang that had the means and will to kill thousands of Americans on their homeland in a matter of hours and lives in an area where the threat of WMD proliferation is extraordinarily high?

[slapout9]

Wilf,
1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime. Something that Police Officers are trained to deal with from day one, and we also understand deescalation as opposed to escalation,Armies are not good at those things. The Strategic Framework is Motive,Methods and Opportunities. The main motives are Greed,Power and Revenge. Because of the human condition I see no end to be achieved but you can establish a process to suppress it (crime) to an acceptable level.

2-I am not sure about your money question. Many LE organizations (not just DEA) seize assets both local and foreign on a regular basis. Criminal organizations are like insurgencies in that they need people,guns,and money to exist. When you focus on those three, mostly people and money you can suppress it effectively.

3-Pablo may or may not have been dumb but he acted like most criminals and rich people he became drunk with power and felt he was above the law. Which led to his downfall.

4-I am not surprised you see a CvC parallel with attacking Pablo's supply lines the more I read CvC again and again the more I am convinced he would have made a better Cop then General. The first targets against Pablo were his Lawyers and Bankers an adaption of what I call the Shakespeare Method of crime control.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime.

So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."

[slapout9]

So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."

Wilf,
The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.

So the Northern Alliance were criminals until the US declared war on the Taliban, at which point they became lawful in the eyes of the US?

When did the US declare War on the Sandinistas? - and when did the Contras become legal and illegal?

Point being, none of this helps characterise the issue in a way that instructs guidance. It's a "so what?" categorisation.

[slapout9]

So the Northern Alliance were criminals until the US declared war on the Taliban, at which point they became lawful in the eyes of the US?

When did the US declare War on the Sandinistas? - and when did the Contras become legal and illegal?

Point being, none of this helps characterise the issue in a way that instructs guidance. It's a "so what?" categorisation.

Wilf,
To see just how important the "so what?" factor is read the link below, the Contras became illegal from a US point of view in 1984 with the Boland amendment, after this it nearly cost Reagan his Presidency with the Iran Contra scandal.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contras

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
To see just how important the "so what?" factor is read the link below, the Contras became illegal from a US point of view in 1984 with the Boland amendment, after this it nearly cost Reagan his Presidency with the Iran Contra scandal.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contras

Well aware. So the "so what" is that giving "legal" status creates the condition where your own branches and representatives in government can effectively work against each other. - thus an example of how not to do it!

So assigning legal status is not actually good a policy as it makes the implementation of strategy far more difficult. Assuming most folks know this, how much further along are we?

[Fuchs]

Wilf,
The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.

It's not April, 1st yet!
Seriously, you cannot believe this *certainly not allowed language*.

To quote Schmedlap:

If there is a government that has a monopoly on the lawful use of force and some private organization comes along and decides that it is going to violate that monopoly arrangement, then yes. They're criminals.

THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT except if it's happening on U.S. territory.

It's far beyond my limits of understanding how certain Americans think. Seriously, far beyond. It's like how Monty Python invented its sketches - I cannot imagine and I know nobody personally who can imagine how that works. It's too absurd.


I mean; think of it: Would you consider AQ a legal force if it gets endorsed by PR China? That idea is so absurd - it exceeds my English vocabulary.

[Bob's World]

All insurgent movements are, I believe, by definition "illegal."

To add confusion to that, the U.S. officially recognizes the "unalianable" right and duty of a populace to rise up in insurgency when it believes its government has become "despotic."

Complicate it one step further, when the US comes to town it does so with a broad proclamation that it is "bringing the rule of law" (of note, all Americans, King George was similarly bringing the rule of law when he sent his Army and Navy to Boston to quell the illegal insurrection there a few years back...).

Law is a tricky thing. Emposing your laws on others trickier still. Might does make right, but it doesn't make many friends.

We live in interesting times.

[Schmedlap]

I mean; think of it: Would you consider AQ a legal force if it gets endorsed by PR China?

Not sure if that is directed to me or Slap. If AQ were operating within Chinese territory, then yes.

[Schmedlap]

1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime.

So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."

If there is a government that has a monopoly on the lawful use of force and some private organization comes along and decides that it is going to violate that monopoly arrangement, then yes. They're criminals. If we are talking about an ungoverned space where there is no lawful monopoly on the use of force then the private organization is not necessarily criminal in nature (though it probably is violating some international law), but it almost certainly uses tactics very similar to those employed by a criminal organization.