COIN -v- CT debate
I am sure amidst SWC threads, even before the current debate in the USA, there has been a discussion over the two alternative schools of thought Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism (CT), but I cannot locate a suitable thread.
Preamble aside.
There is a fascinating debate on the Kings of War blogsite on the issue: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009...stan/#comments
Since it is conceptual I posted here and not in the Afghan thread.
davidbfpo
Hi David,
I think there is a lot of non-logical thinking in this area - i.e., COIN vs(?) CT.
Here I'm positing a "terrorist" as a member of a violent non-state actor, who does things that some define as "terrorism".
Posit two different situations:
1. A nation is beset by a domestic insurgency which, as part of its toolkit, uses "terrorism".
In that situation, counter-terrorism is part of the incumbant's toolkit to defeat the insurgency. The incumbant's toolkit includes the military effort and the political effort. It includes an intellegence, counter-intelligence and criminal justice effort which can flop on either side of the military-political coin. In any event, while one can split up tasks, COIN and CT are intertwined.
2. A world is beset by a transnational violent non-state actor, which acts through its own forces (sometimes doing things that some define as "terrorism"), but also acts through domestic violent non-state actors (case 1) via a loose or tight connection.
This resembles unconventional warfare in the traditional sense, except that the violent groups may not be able to reach the stage where conventional forces arise and can conjoin with the irregular forces.
To the extent that domestic violent non-state actors (insurgents) are involved, COIN and CT are intertwined as in Case 1.
To the extent that we look at the TVNSA as something akin to a "SOF Base" and "SOF Teams", more direct CT is called for and COIN does not enter the picture. This can involve direct military intelligence and action (M), but also has to include civilian intellegence, counter-intelligence and criminal justice efforts, which provides a political aspect as well (DIE).
All in all, the COIN vs CT debate is in itself a "red herring" (rotting from the head) and is likely to go nowhere good. In such cases as present Astan, it's a cover for other agendas, which are thought not to be as likely to sell politically.
This, BTW, is strictly an opinion piece.
What do you think ?
Cheers
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 10-26-2009 at 01:15 AM.
Curious, what is the professional, serious argument for CT without counterinsurgency? The problem is stated simply enough. In the first order, your adversary is far more free to range, assemble and attack as he chooses, then scatter in the face of pursuit. The defender is already in his interior, with little to no depth to trade and responsibility for too many exposed targets to maneuver the enemy into concentrating for a defeat in detail. On top of that, insurgents get another handicap in that they're fighting newcomers on their native battlefield, amongst people who they share more in custom with and speak their language and theirs alone.
The solution, elegant or inelegant, is obviously extemely frustrating to arrive at, with eight years in Afghanistan and six in Iraq having yet to produce truly satisfying results. But it seems plain on inspection that counterinsurgency doctrine at least attempts to mitigate the insurgent's advantage. It looks like the popular notion of CT just concedes them wholesale.
Last edited by Presley Cannady; 10-27-2009 at 01:22 PM.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
People who argue for CT are arguing for a total shift in strategy, where Afghanistan is basically written off. Who controls Afghanistan is not strategically important --- what is important is killing or crippling al-Qaeda.
The Taliban, in this frame, are not relevant nor a threat to the U.S. homeland. We should attempt to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda, under the theory that the Taliban only want Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and have no interest in warring with the U.S.
CT advocates posit that COIN is too costly and politically unsustainable, with amorphous, pie-in-the-sky goal. CT represents a much more sustainable and less costly method in fighting the real threat, which is identified as the AQ organization.
A lot of people looking for an "easy button" solution out there.
Like if your best friend comes to you and he is having some troubles in his marriage to the point where he feels he is nearing a divorce. And he asks you, Should I buy her flowers or kick her ass to solve this problem?
Clearly neither will work in of itself, and he must take a far more holistic approach that will likely require major changes in his own behaveior if he is to be successful. Everyone understands that intuitively when it comes to a marriage relationship, yet in a very similar dynamic between a government and a popualce we seem to go completely brain dead.
Bottome line, you can neither buy nor fight your way out of this one, you (your COIN buddy, as you surely can't do this for him and should not try) must actually take your role in the relationship seriously and perform.
(And for those who enjoy exploring a good analogy further, you, as the buddy providing advice are conducting FID. Your buddy is conducting COIN, his spouse is the subversive/insurgent, and her lover or even her girlfriends who validate her every notion, are conducting UW. If you just go after the UW actor (the CT option on the table currently) you will do little to address the insurgency and the UW actor will be quickly replaced by others ready to fill that role. If you merely work to be the most effective spouse ever (though you possess no real history of being one) without actually asking your spouse what is bothering her and working to make changes in your behavior to addres those specific concerns regardless of how irrational you or your FID conducting friend think they are, you will likely fail as well.
Maybe this is why COIN is so hard. We screw it up in our own daily lives constantly, what hope do we have of working it at a governmental level? But the principle dynamics are largely the same.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Bob's World, I think COIN is so hard because like LE there is a certain class of people that are going to be criminals(predators) no matter what. I think a lot COIN leaders fall into that category. Just like predators you could give them everything they want and they would still be causing problems.
Bob's World,
Your analogy assumes that the husband wants to save the marriage or preserve through changing himself and compromise with the wife. It may be the case that the husband isn't interested in the marriage or is only interested for his own benefit. For Afghanistan I think the Afghan government is not only incompetent at governing but also isn't much interested in governing.
Interesting little bug. Attempting to reply to tequila's post (#4), but quote is capture jmm's (#2). Anyways...
No argument here, and outside the NGO-sphere I don't think anyone considers any other objective remotely as important.Originally Posted by tequila
Only if you can cleave enough native insurgents from al Qaeda quickly and enough numbers to make a difference. And presumably you need to do it in a way so that you're not catching the same amount of grief from your (potentially former) host nation allies.The Taliban, in this frame, are not relevant nor a threat to the U.S. homeland. We should attempt to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda, under the theory that the Taliban only want Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and have no interest in warring with the U.S.
CT advocates posit that COIN is too costly and politically unsustainable, with amorphous, pie-in-the-sky goal. CT represents a much more sustainable and less costly method in fighting the real threat, which is identified as the AQ organization.
AQI did half of the work for the Coalition in Anbar, and it helped that they were fighting a war not only against the Coalition and the host government, but going at it with a parallel Shia insurgency as well. Their relationships with their Triangle allies were only a few years in the making before the Awakening. AQC, on the other hand, appears well entrenched with the radical Deobandis on both sides of the AfPak line.
I can accept in theory that coopting an adversary to get a bigger fish is a great idea, but I'd be surprised the execution didn't look a lot like counterinsurgency.
PH Cannady
Correlate Systems
Missed this before:
I don't think that's necessarily the case, at least the writing off Afghanistan part. One could shift, for example, from a strategy designed to defeat the Taliban to a strategy designed to prevent the Taliban from from winning. We'd be ceding most of the Pashtun areas, but we could certainly prevent Taliban control over the non-Pashtun areas, which is a significant part of the country. In other words, it's not all or nothing. In my opinion, abandoning Afghanistan is not a wise move, but neither is trying to achieve everything without the resources and will to see it through. I don't think we have adequate resources and political will, just as important, a reliable partner in Kabul worth defending. If that is true, then the latter strategy is probably just a longer, bloodier road to eventual abandonment.People who argue for CT are arguing for a total shift in strategy, where Afghanistan is basically written off.
What I think what really needs to happen is for the US to separate the strategy by separating the fight against AQ (and its associated movements) from the problem of what do to about Afghanistan. I think once one does that it becomes obvious that COIN and CT aren't mutually exclusive and that the "choice" between COIN and CT is a completely false one. For one thing, CT is going to happen regardless as long as we still perceive that AQ remains a threat: If we abandon Afghanistan we'll be doing CT and if we decide on a generational nation-building enterprise in Afghanistan we will be doing CT as well. I think our strategic problem is that we've put blinders on and can only see either-or solutions trying to simultaneously address what are really two different problems.
TLDR version: We really need to see Afghanistan as a problem independent of AQ.
Just my 2 pul.
In reading the Long proposal, it looks neat and clean, and almost sterile of sorts...nice little packages that are able to employ significant freedom of maneuver in order to get the job done. It also makes me think on Takur Ghar mountain, and the challenges faced by similarly-equipped task forces going into a prepared action against particular targets.
It also makes me think of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, C Sqdn SAS, and Selous Scouts...but those folks were fighting pure COIN in a very classical sense. And the insurgents still "won". There were a ton of other factors at play, but they still won.
Long seems to totally wave off the arguments presented by Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon in their Op-Ed piece, and I've seen that trend apparent in other folks who opine that we should transition to a CT effort. That we can transition to said effort isn't so much the question (we've become particularly adept at dropping from the sky in the dark of night to spirit bad guys away or kill them outright), as is the issue of "well, so what?"
I don't buy into everything presented in the O'Hanlon and Reidel argument, but the Long piece seems...just odd. The outline of his CT force reads like something I could find in a Popular Mechanics article, or worse yet, on some Call of Duty clan board. I've seen how this works at the pointy tip of the spears, and it takes a lot of "beat cop" sort of work that comes from patrolling, key leader engagements, patrolling, project work, patrolling, security force training, patrolling...you get the picture by now. Bottom line is that it requires a ton of intelligence that I don't think Long can really appreciate because he simply hasn't been part of a targeting cycle for a mission that really counts.
I like your points Entropy, as I like this snippet from one of the posters to the KOW thread:the debate is now so intense that it’s in danger of also acquiring a cartoon-like quality to match it’s blind-faith style structure.
Last edited by jcustis; 11-11-2009 at 06:28 AM.
What often gets missed is that by 1979 the Rhodesians had inflicted such appalling casualties on the Insurgents and wrecked the economies of every neighbouring country that harboured them, that
a.) The Insurgents were going to transition to becoming a regular force with aircraft and armour - and might still loose!
b.) The UK, US and SA were no longer able to stand by and watch things get worse if the insurgency used regular armies.
Rhodesia was proof of classic Clausewitz. Rhodesia solved the military problem. The Insurgents had to negotiate their way into power Power was going to change hands. It was just when and how.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I've always wondered if the AQ/Taliban link is as absolute and unbreakable as some propose. There seems to be a natural cause of internal conflict there: I'm sure at least some in the Taliban have noted that if Osama hadn't taken his show to America - an act which did nothing at all for the Taliban - they'd be running the show in Kabul today, instead of hiding in caves.
I've also wondered what might have happened if we'd got to Kabul in the first place, seen the Taliban off, and left... with a widely distributed statement that we are leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans, it's none of our business what they do with it, leave us alone and we'll leave you alone... but if you attack us or harbor those who do, we will be back, and if we have to come back we are going to level every structure that stands more than 6" above ground.
Impossible to assess a road not taken, but I wonder if the point would have gotten across.
My basic reservation with COIN in Afghanistan is that ultimately the success of COIN rides on the development of an Afghan government that has the capacity to govern the entire nation in an effective - or at least functional - manner, and I'm not sure we have the capacity to make that happen.
Even after we had slaughtered them and driven the survivors across the border, the Taliban did not turn on al-Qaeda. They instead turned to them to provide the funding, the weapons, the leadership, and the training to take us on again.I've always wondered if the AQ/Taliban link is as absolute and unbreakable as some propose. There seems to be a natural cause of internal conflict there: I'm sure at least some in the Taliban have noted that if Osama hadn't taken his show to America - an act which did nothing at all for the Taliban - they'd be running the show in Kabul today, instead of hiding in caves.
This dream that somehow we can sever the link between the Taliban high command and the al-Qaeda leadership always strikes me as severely misguided. What in the history of the Taliban makes anyone believe that these people (senior leadership) are believers or practicioners of realpolitik? That would they abandon a key ally of decades to satisfy an infidel power?
The Taliban made deals with many past Afghan enemies on their climb to power, but that was always on their terms and to assist their own rise to power --- not compromising their own ideals, but forcing others to compromise theirs to assist them.
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