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Thread: COIN -v- CT debate

  1. #21
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    Interesting little bug. Attempting to reply to tequila's post (#4), but quote is capture jmm's (#2). Anyways...

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila
    People who argue for CT are arguing for a total shift in strategy, where Afghanistan is basically written off. Who controls Afghanistan is not strategically important --- what is important is killing or crippling al-Qaeda.
    No argument here, and outside the NGO-sphere I don't think anyone considers any other objective remotely as important.

    The Taliban, in this frame, are not relevant nor a threat to the U.S. homeland. We should attempt to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda, under the theory that the Taliban only want Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and have no interest in warring with the U.S.

    CT advocates posit that COIN is too costly and politically unsustainable, with amorphous, pie-in-the-sky goal. CT represents a much more sustainable and less costly method in fighting the real threat, which is identified as the AQ organization.
    Only if you can cleave enough native insurgents from al Qaeda quickly and enough numbers to make a difference. And presumably you need to do it in a way so that you're not catching the same amount of grief from your (potentially former) host nation allies.

    AQI did half of the work for the Coalition in Anbar, and it helped that they were fighting a war not only against the Coalition and the host government, but going at it with a parallel Shia insurgency as well. Their relationships with their Triangle allies were only a few years in the making before the Awakening. AQC, on the other hand, appears well entrenched with the radical Deobandis on both sides of the AfPak line.

    I can accept in theory that coopting an adversary to get a bigger fish is a great idea, but I'd be surprised the execution didn't look a lot like counterinsurgency.
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  2. #22
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    Missed this before:

    People who argue for CT are arguing for a total shift in strategy, where Afghanistan is basically written off.
    I don't think that's necessarily the case, at least the writing off Afghanistan part. One could shift, for example, from a strategy designed to defeat the Taliban to a strategy designed to prevent the Taliban from from winning. We'd be ceding most of the Pashtun areas, but we could certainly prevent Taliban control over the non-Pashtun areas, which is a significant part of the country. In other words, it's not all or nothing. In my opinion, abandoning Afghanistan is not a wise move, but neither is trying to achieve everything without the resources and will to see it through. I don't think we have adequate resources and political will, just as important, a reliable partner in Kabul worth defending. If that is true, then the latter strategy is probably just a longer, bloodier road to eventual abandonment.

    What I think what really needs to happen is for the US to separate the strategy by separating the fight against AQ (and its associated movements) from the problem of what do to about Afghanistan. I think once one does that it becomes obvious that COIN and CT aren't mutually exclusive and that the "choice" between COIN and CT is a completely false one. For one thing, CT is going to happen regardless as long as we still perceive that AQ remains a threat: If we abandon Afghanistan we'll be doing CT and if we decide on a generational nation-building enterprise in Afghanistan we will be doing CT as well. I think our strategic problem is that we've put blinders on and can only see either-or solutions trying to simultaneously address what are really two different problems.

    TLDR version: We really need to see Afghanistan as a problem independent of AQ.

    Just my 2 pul.

  3. #23
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    What Entropy says. That is why I say the LE framework is better. People cause crimes and wars, not terrain. Go after the people and their assets that actually did something to us. The 3 most current threats happend on Amercian soil.....the Enemy is already here!!!! and we are talking about fighting over there?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    TLDR version: We really need to see Afghanistan as a problem independent of AQ.

    Just my 2 pul.
    How do you do cleave the two, though? You can't do it geographically; Afghanistan and Pakistan don't exist in separate bubbles and you face village and nomadic networks that cross minimally scores of thousands of square miles. You can't do it ethnically; there's no clear line of delineation between the FATA Pashtun and those in Afghanistan, and AQ apparently feels comfortable co-existing with both. You can't do it religiously; AQ's Islamists and the Deobandis are natural allies if not co-religionists. You're increasingly unable to do it linguistically.

    The physical and human terrain is rough, rugged, noisy and uneven. The Coalition doesn't have the convenience of fighting an enemy who concentrates, respects national borders or even declares his own territory. In many ways, you can say the bulk of the landscape is uncharted, if not currently unchartable given how sparsely and fluidly the enemy chooses to base himself. If defeating AQ and their diehard support requires you deal with hundreds of spatter pools individually, what can you possibly do except throw enough force to soak up the mess?
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  5. #25
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Entropy can of course speak for himself but I'd like to pose a few thoughts...

    Quote Originally Posted by Presley Cannady View Post
    How do you do cleave the two, though?
    They aren't the same thing so no cleavage is required. Our big error was in conflating the two initially. AQ is one problem, Afghanistan is another.That conflation still exists in the eyes of many and it excessively complicates things. Those are two separate problems and contrary to all the hotshot strategists, Pakistan is another. When all is said and done, the two separate nations who do share similar and related large, troublesome majorities are in fact recognized nations with polities and borders. Like it or not -- and the Pushtuns do not -- those two nations are not going away and neither is going to give up territory to the Pushtuns if for no other reason than to keep them divided and therefor easier to control.

    Thus one solution is required for AQ who are simply in Pakistan (possibly) and Afghanistan (to a lesser extent) as a result of diplomatic failures by many including the US. As you point out, they have no infrastructure to protect -- nor any population. The key factor is that they can leave their current location and settle in elsewhere. They are essentially a law enforcement problem and military efforts will have only a marginal effect on them.

    Afghanistan is a military problem at this point but only because we foolishly made it one -- now we have to solve that.

    Pakistan is not a military problem and we should work very hard to avoid making it one. It is a diplomatic problem, purely and simply. Handled correctly, it can make life uncomfortable for AQ -- but that handling entails ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a destabilizing threat to Pakistan.

    We have not done well with any of the three -- but most of that failure stems from making Afghanistan a military problem in the false hope we could make it a friendly democracy. What happens when the folks in DC do not do their homework...
    If defeating AQ and their diehard support requires you deal with hundreds of spatter pools individually, what can you possibly do except throw enough force to soak up the mess?
    Realize that you aren't going to defeat AQ? That would be a good start. You can marginalize them, reduce their damage ability to a bearable level and it would help if everyone would realize they are not a military problem and they are not going to be defeated -- indeed, by upping their threat appearance and wrongly using military effort we merely enhanced their appeal temporarily.

    Neither is Pakistan a military problem. Afghanistan is only one because we made it so...

  6. #26
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    What happens when the folks in DC do not do their homework...Realize that you aren't going to defeat AQ? That would be a good start. You can marginalize them, reduce their damage ability to a bearable level and it would help if everyone would realize they are not a military problem and they are not going to be defeated -- indeed, by upping their threat appearance and wrongly using military effort we merely enhanced their appeal temporarily.

    Neither is Pakistan a military problem. Afghanistan is only one because we made it so...
    That is exactly right, the Ends,Ways and Means strategic framework will not work with criminal/terrorist groups like that because there is no end! LE is a process and as long as we have people it will continue forever. AQ can be suppressed through proper techniques to where they are a manageable threat and it would be a heck of lot cheaper then a military option. Through proper asset seizure it would almost be self funding. Evey once in awhile the History Chanel runs programs about Pablo Escabar and they have a lot of interviews with DEA agents that created the plan. And yes they attacked him with a 5 rings analysis and figured out which COG's they needed to attack. They new it would work but even they were shocked how well and how fast it worked. It would have been over in a matter of months it wasn't for interference by the Columbian government, which finally changed their tune.

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    Default Demographic line strategy

    This is written from a "We are there, dammit" viewpoint; has little or nothing to do with an independent strategy vs AQ (Astan & AQ are better considered as separate problems); and is suggested more to allow time to coldly consider whether an acceptable (note "acceptable") political effort can be mounted in a more limited geographical region.

    This pertains to Entropy's nugget (post #22):

    I don't think that's necessarily the case, at least the writing off Afghanistan part. One could shift, for example, from a strategy designed to defeat the Taliban to a strategy designed to prevent the Taliban from winning. We'd be ceding most of the Pashtun areas, but we could certainly prevent Taliban control over the non-Pashtun areas, which is a significant part of the country. In other words, it's not all or nothing.
    but is more particularly based on his maps to be found here.

    A demographic line approach was suggested for Vietnam (Krepinevich, The Army & Vietnam, pp.266-268). I floated a form of this using Highway 1 as a rough demographic line in another context - this post and this post (maps), forcing through a Peace Enforcement strategy (e.g., Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Chap III, as updated by more recent operations); and, in effect, offering the Taliban a limited truce if they stay south of the Tripfire Line.

    This Peace Enforcement strategy would be of little comfort to those who want either a minmum force increase, none or an immediate force drawdown. The 40K to 80K increase would be, if nothing else, a good PSYOPs move (by not indicating a current intent to withdraw - as we did with Vietnamization); that increase would be incremental and take a long-time (and could be halted at any time).

    This strategy does not in any way change my opinion that the prospects for an acceptable future political effort are lousy (a classy legal term ); but, if an acceptable political effort cannot be mounted in the "Northern Alliance" region (above the Hwy 1 line), it cannot be mounted.

  8. #28
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    That is exactly right, the Ends,Ways and Means strategic framework will not work with criminal/terrorist groups like that because there is no end! LE is a process and as long as we have people it will continue forever.
    Huh? So what you are saying is "Strategy" doesn't work against criminals? Maybe true. Strategy to me is the use of force to achieve a policy. As criminals can only be "defeated" by the rule of law, then I guess you mean, the "the enforcing of laws to achieve a policy." If so then the law will have to be applied for instrumental purposes and within the framework of a strategy - thus ends, ways and means.
    AQ can be suppressed through proper techniques to where they are a manageable threat and it would be a heck of lot cheaper then a military option. Through proper asset seizure it would almost be self funding.
    Whose funds? Money found in Pakistan can fund the DEA?
    ..... the History Chanel runs programs about Pablo Escabar and they have a lot of interviews with DEA agents that created the plan. And yes they attacked him with a 5 rings analysis and figured out which COG's they needed to attack. They new it would work but even they were shocked how well and how fast it worked. It would have been over in a matter of months it wasn't for interference by the Columbian government, which finally changed their tune.
    To me, the death of Pablo Escobar plays out along classical and ancient strategy lines, similar to that of the demise of Napoleon. Escobar was an idiot. His demise was determined the day he tried to gain office. DEA or no DEA, the Colombians (some worse than Escobar) were never going to let it happen.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    Pressley,

    Ken saved me a lot of typing (thanks Ken!). I think that AQ and Afghanistan, as distinct policy issues, are certainly related, but not enough that they can be coherently combined into a single policy issue.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    They aren't the same thing so no cleavage is required. Our big error was in conflating the two initially. AQ is one problem, Afghanistan is another.That conflation still exists in the eyes of many and it excessively complicates things. Those are two separate problems and contrary to all the hotshot strategists, Pakistan is another. When all is said and done, the two separate nations who do share similar and related large, troublesome majorities are in fact recognized nations with polities and borders. Like it or not -- and the Pushtuns do not -- those two nations are not going away and neither is going to give up territory to the Pushtuns if for no other reason than to keep them divided and therefor easier to control.
    But there you have it, how could we not conflate AQ, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan? AQ lives, eat, sleeps, bathes, and travels with the former ruling clique of Afghanistan, a group which in turn works, plays, fights, trades and intermarries within a Pashtun landscape spread from Kandahar to Miranshah.

    Pashtun radicals likely overreach in Pakistan, but let's be frank. They did once hammer their Afghan neighbors across 90 percent of that country's territory and ruled for almost five years, a situation Islamabad found extraordinarily positive from their security point of view. If that's no longer to be the case, then how do you achieve it without building an Afghan state that can secure its territory?

    Thus one solution is required for AQ who are simply in Pakistan (possibly) and Afghanistan (to a lesser extent) as a result of diplomatic failures by many including the US. As you point out, they have no infrastructure to protect -- nor any population. The key factor is that they can leave their current location and settle in elsewhere. They are essentially a law enforcement problem and military efforts will have only a marginal effect on them.
    They have no infrastructure, but they certainly have population--14 million in Afghanistan and 28 million in Pakistan. Surely they have lowered expectations when it comes to population security, and as we seem to agree they have little infrastructure to protect, and if they lived in pockets the size of Los Angeles with 30,000 police watching over them then yes, I'd agree we're talking about a police problem. But that's just it, the 400+ clans aren't just gangs fighting a turf war. Their semi-nomadic, ranging across vast tracts of hostile terrain. If your lawmen need to be supplied from the air to deal with even a decent sized cluster of heavily armed fighters, then I think we've effectively blurred the line between law enforcement and military operation.

    Afghanistan is a military problem at this point but only because we foolishly made it one -- now we have to solve that.
    The Pashtun did rule almost the whole of Afghanistan when the war started--city and countryside. Exactly how is law enforcement adequate to that problem?

    Pakistan is not a military problem and we should work very hard to avoid making it one. It is a diplomatic problem, purely and simply. Handled correctly, it can make life uncomfortable for AQ -- but that handling entails ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a destabilizing threat to Pakistan.
    I've no argument here, but as you point out preventing the war from spilling unendingly into Pakistan requires securing Afghanistan. Is this not counterinsurgency?

    We have not done well with any of the three -- but most of that failure stems from making Afghanistan a military problem in the false hope we could make it a friendly democracy. What happens when the folks in DC do not do their homework...
    So what was the alternative, negotiate with Mullah Omar whose starting position was that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was to "try" Osama bin Laden? Did we have a chance in hell of putting together a Taliban-FBI joint task force to stamp out AQ's leadership, training camps, and access to points of entry and departure?

    Realize that you aren't going to defeat AQ? That would be a good start. You can marginalize them, reduce their damage ability to a bearable level and it would help if everyone would realize they are not a military problem and they are not going to be defeated -- indeed, by upping their threat appearance and wrongly using military effort we merely enhanced their appeal temporarily.
    So how does law enforcement deal with a gang that had the means and will to kill thousands of Americans on their homeland in a matter of hours and lives in an area where the threat of WMD proliferation is extraordinarily high?
    Last edited by Presley Cannady; 10-28-2009 at 02:13 PM.
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  11. #31
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Wilf,
    1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime. Something that Police Officers are trained to deal with from day one, and we also understand deescalation as opposed to escalation,Armies are not good at those things. The Strategic Framework is Motive,Methods and Opportunities. The main motives are Greed,Power and Revenge. Because of the human condition I see no end to be achieved but you can establish a process to suppress it (crime) to an acceptable level.

    2-I am not sure about your money question. Many LE organizations (not just DEA) seize assets both local and foreign on a regular basis. Criminal organizations are like insurgencies in that they need people,guns,and money to exist. When you focus on those three, mostly people and money you can suppress it effectively.

    3-Pablo may or may not have been dumb but he acted like most criminals and rich people he became drunk with power and felt he was above the law. Which led to his downfall.

    4-I am not surprised you see a CvC parallel with attacking Pablo's supply lines the more I read CvC again and again the more I am convinced he would have made a better Cop then General. The first targets against Pablo were his Lawyers and Bankers an adaption of what I call the Shakespeare Method of crime control.

  12. #32
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Wilf,
    1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime.
    So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime.
    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."
    If there is a government that has a monopoly on the lawful use of force and some private organization comes along and decides that it is going to violate that monopoly arrangement, then yes. They're criminals. If we are talking about an ungoverned space where there is no lawful monopoly on the use of force then the private organization is not necessarily criminal in nature (though it probably is violating some international law), but it almost certainly uses tactics very similar to those employed by a criminal organization.

  14. #34
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."
    Wilf,
    The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Wilf,
    The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.
    So the Northern Alliance were criminals until the US declared war on the Taliban, at which point they became lawful in the eyes of the US?

    When did the US declare War on the Sandinistas? - and when did the Contras become legal and illegal?

    Point being, none of this helps characterise the issue in a way that instructs guidance. It's a "so what?" categorisation.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  16. #36
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Wilf,
    The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.


    It's not April, 1st yet!
    Seriously, you cannot believe this *certainly not allowed language*.

    To quote Schmedlap:
    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    If there is a government that has a monopoly on the lawful use of force and some private organization comes along and decides that it is going to violate that monopoly arrangement, then yes. They're criminals.
    THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT except if it's happening on U.S. territory.

    It's far beyond my limits of understanding how certain Americans think. Seriously, far beyond. It's like how Monty Python invented its sketches - I cannot imagine and I know nobody personally who can imagine how that works. It's too absurd.


    I mean; think of it: Would you consider AQ a legal force if it gets endorsed by PR China? That idea is so absurd - it exceeds my English vocabulary.

  17. #37
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    All insurgent movements are, I believe, by definition "illegal."

    To add confusion to that, the U.S. officially recognizes the "unalianable" right and duty of a populace to rise up in insurgency when it believes its government has become "despotic."

    Complicate it one step further, when the US comes to town it does so with a broad proclamation that it is "bringing the rule of law" (of note, all Americans, King George was similarly bringing the rule of law when he sent his Army and Navy to Boston to quell the illegal insurrection there a few years back...).

    Law is a tricky thing. Emposing your laws on others trickier still. Might does make right, but it doesn't make many friends.

    We live in interesting times.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I mean; think of it: Would you consider AQ a legal force if it gets endorsed by PR China?
    Not sure if that is directed to me or Slap. If AQ were operating within Chinese territory, then yes.

  19. #39
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So the Northern Alliance were criminals until the US declared war on the Taliban, at which point they became lawful in the eyes of the US?

    When did the US declare War on the Sandinistas? - and when did the Contras become legal and illegal?

    Point being, none of this helps characterise the issue in a way that instructs guidance. It's a "so what?" categorisation.
    Wilf,
    To see just how important the "so what?" factor is read the link below, the Contras became illegal from a US point of view in 1984 with the Boland amendment, after this it nearly cost Reagan his Presidency with the Iran Contra scandal.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contras

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Wilf,
    To see just how important the "so what?" factor is read the link below, the Contras became illegal from a US point of view in 1984 with the Boland amendment, after this it nearly cost Reagan his Presidency with the Iran Contra scandal.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contras
    Well aware. So the "so what" is that giving "legal" status creates the condition where your own branches and representatives in government can effectively work against each other. - thus an example of how not to do it!

    So assigning legal status is not actually good a policy as it makes the implementation of strategy far more difficult. Assuming most folks know this, how much further along are we?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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