First U.S. Official Resigns Over Afghan War

[Ken White]

I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.

That's far from true:

From the current CIA World Factbook;Urban population: 24% of total population (2008);Rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)

then from Global security:

"As of 2004 the urban population of about 6.4 million, i.e., 30% of the total population, is estimated to double by 2015 at a growth rate twice the average growth rate in the country. More than 70 percent of the urban population is concentrated in six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-ISharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Refugees choose to return to cities for the benefits offered by urban life; the population of Kabul has increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to at least 2.4 million in 2003. (LINK)

The UN puts it at 24%.(LINK)

I'd question all three figures as being high, if anything. The basic problem in planning and civilian expert assistance is that Afghanistan IS rural -- very rural -- and modern American city boys do not know how to play in the country...

Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.

Nor do the modern Army's mostly urban and technically skilled folks know precisely how to handle the situation.

Very confusing.

Welcome to Afghanistan...

[Schmedlap]

Anyone know how this resignation letter ended up published at the Washington Post?

I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

I have not been among the people to complain about the President's delay in making a decision. I would prefer a well-thought out plan next month rather than a half-assed one today. The old adage about "doing the wrong thing is better than delaying" doesn't apply when you're making a long-term change of plans at this level, imo. But all of this back-and-forth in the media suggests that the decision will be based far more heavily upon the polls and sentiment back home rather than upon the facts on the ground. Otherwise, I don't think we'd be seeing so much of this back and forth trying to shape the public opinion landscape. That is troubling.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

Apologies for inaccuracies. The only things I know about Afghanistan is from the UN Habitat Reports, and stuff I get open net.

Problems always exist in what UN Habitat defines as urban, and as informal urban settlements, and what others might define it as. The Afghan Minister's report to the Habitat conference was higher than the sources you cited (CIA Factbook, Global Security). Doesn't mean any of them are very accurate until somebody does some credible counting.

Also, how many people are in Afghanistan? (Somewhere between 26 and 33 million as best as I can understand the disagreements). Makes a big diff in figuring out the percentage urban.

Nice if somebody had some pop figures that meant something.

Schmedlap's got it right as to purpose and content.

I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

One thing that all of us on this board know is that none of us have all the pieces to really finalize anything, except maybe on a collective basis from many different and competing opinions.

I can't imagine that, based on even a heavy tour of one province, a final conclusion as to the whole country, and whole US effort, could be conclusively put forward.

The President is having meaningful and complex presentations from a lot of parties on a lot of different views. Glad when he is done and able to make a final decision, but sounds like it ain't over yet.

Fingers crossed for the right one.

[Ken White]

Apologies for inaccuracies. The only things I know about Afghanistan is from the UN Habitat Reports, and stuff I get open net.

that the figures -- as also you note -- are imprecise but that, regardless, Afghanistan is primarily a rural Nation to the hilt -- it poses different parameters in many senses than anyplace we've operated since the Indian wars in our own west -- and not even I am old enough to recall that...

It's also very xenophobic and very mountainous -- real mountains. the corridors and compartments mess up many things...

Schmedlap's got it right as to purpose and content.

"I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action."

True.

Fingers crossed for the right one.

Also true...

[wm]

that the figures -- as also you note -- are imprecise but that, regardless, Afghanistan is primarily a rural Nation to the hilt -- it poses different parameters in many senses than anyplace we've operated since the Indian wars in our own west -- and not even I am old enough to recall that...

It's also very xenophobic and very mountainous -- real mountains. the corridors and compartments mess up many things...True.Also true...

Ken,
I would be very hesitant to apply the term "nation" to the area we happen to call Afghanistan. I submit that the first order of business to getting on with business in that part of the world is to recognize that the place is nothing like a nation as Western Europeans understand that term. As I've previously posted, the closest thing to it that we might use as a basis for understanding is the amalgamation of efforts by ancient Greek city states in response to the Persian invasions or to the perceived slight against Menelaus of Sparta when Helen left for Troy with Paris.

Alternatively, to follow up on your point about Native Americans, we might consider the "cooperation" among the various Apache tribes, like the Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero under leaders like Cochise, Managas Coloradas, Geronimo and Victorio as more like what is happening in the socities that are the focus of our current fight. And as far as tactics in unforgiving terrain goes, I suspect we could learn some lessons from the Modoc Indian War.

[Steve Blair]

Alternatively, to follow up on your point about Native Americans, we might consider the "cooperation" among the various Apache tribes, like the Chiricahua, Jicarilla, and Mescalero under leaders like Cochise, Managas Coloradas, Geronimo and Victorio as more like what is happening in the socities that are the focus of our current fight. And as far as tactics in unforgiving terrain goes, I suspect we could learn some lessons from the Modoc Indian War.

This is why I've been contending for some time that our own experiences in Arizona are perhaps a touch more germane to discussions about Afghanistan than the oh-so-common Vietnam analogies. Even Hoh tried to drag out the Vietnam skeleton (poorly, in my view). All of our major post-CW Indian conflicts were against loose tribal confederations (and the emphasis in that line is on loose, not confederation), and many took place in difficult terrain. Most of the major Apache campaigns took place in rugged, mountainous country and required some major changes in the standard operational templates used at the time. The Modoc campaign was difficult for a number of reasons, terrain being one and poor leadership in the early stages on the part of the Army being another. And there are even similarities in the policy conflicts we're seeing now.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

I have to admit I had a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment when I read this article on the net last night, and then saw it again this morning on the front page of the Washington Post. If I threaten to quit, will I get offered a job at several grades above my current rank at Embassy Kabul (not that I would prefer a job there instead of one in the field) or a job in the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) office in the State Department? I am very skeptical of the implication that this officer is so much better than other FSOs serving in Afghanistan to merit such offers.

I respect the guy for backing up his convictions with action but I find it hard to believe that he can have everything figured out after only 5-6 months in country, and only 3-4 months at the PRT in Zabul. Given the limited interaction which PRT personnel have with the local population - due to security, cultural, and especially language, barriers - a few months, or even one year, does not present enough opportunities to really get a feel for what a typical rural Pashtun is thinking.

I agree with his observation that every valley is different, especially true in RC East due to terrain. However, I think he is is too quick to draw conclusions from the special case of the Korengal valley to make broader judgments about Pashtun hostility towards ISAF. Again, every province, and sometimes every district, is different. He also offers a keen observation - that is frequently missed by the Embassy and other international community reps living in Kabul - about the stark divide between the westernized urban Afghans (with whom we spend most of our time) and the rural Pashtun villagers (who are the center of gravity in this COIN fight).

I also fault the Washington Post reporter for hyperbole. "Senior civilian representative" in Zabul Province is not all that it appears to be - the guy has been a FSO for only one year (not tenured) and by virtue of his status as a FSO will almost inevitably be considered more senior to the USAID Field Program Officer at the PRT because until very recently almost all of the USAID FPOs at Afghanistan PRTs were contractors on one year appointments. And the third U.S. civilian in Zabul is a U.S. Department of Agriculture employee or contractor, or possibly a State contractor working rule-of-law issues. Finally, he deserves respect for being a Iraq combat veteran, but the same could be said of almost everybody in the Marine Corps with more than 4 years of service.

[pjmunson]

Long day, long week, probably should not enter the fray but can't help myself. I find some of the comments in this thread to be distasteful at best. I question just how much more of a leg to stand on a (fill in the blank, if the shoe fits, wear it) has than anyone else when putting forward an impassioned assessment of what you see as the strategic reality and what you feel as your moral obligation to point out and to opt out of. People love to throw the complexities of Afghanistan out as a card to discount pretty much anything they don't agree to, and that is getting old. Also, just because this guy is a non-tenured FSO, isn't 50+, may look like people you used to boss around, isn't a "civilian planning expert," etc., doesn't mean that he does not have the intelligence, experience, and insight to point out what he sees as broad strategic inconsistencies. While his letter does touch on some specifics of Afghanistan, it is an operational/strategic level assessment, not a tactical one. Therefore, many of the arguments put forth here to impeach his credentials show that the authors of the comments are actually less qualified to comment on the strategic issues than the author of the very well worded and well thought out letter. If you object to his analysis, rebut his analysis. He may have only been on the ground there for X months, but he, like many others, has been living this dream for nearly a decade. He's had a lot of time to think about it and a lot of ugly examples to contemplate. Again, he's not talking about the specifics of Zabul Province really. He's talking operational to strategic level "what are we doing"? There is a lot of room for disagreement with him, but few of the comments here demonstrate an understanding of what he's saying, much less an effort to counter that at the same level.

Finally, why not take the opportunity to stay on the inside and fix things? A cynic would see the offer to take up a high level position as an attempt to co opt you and your views. Even if he didn't take the offer to be such an attempt, if you don't fundamentally believe in the strategy and policy anymore, then why would you continue to serve it at any level?

In sum, I'm not going to say whether I agree or disagree with him, but I think that, if he truly believes what he wrote, then he is right to have written it and right to have resigned. If he was surrounded by people who were going to cry "PTSD," inexperience, "not tenured," etc. when he voiced his views as opposed to reasoned argument, then I can see why he would not want to stick around, even had he agreed with the grand strategy.

[Ken White]

Aside from the inappropriate and uncalled for branch off into the PTSD issue, no one really knocked him. One guy did say he disagreed with him and another, a FSO with a year in country, did comment that Hoh would not have time to gather a tremendous amount of knowledge of the country. That's an opinion and not a knock. You can say 'the complexities of Afghanistan' are getting old but they are there, they're not going away because some don't think they are...

Several of us asked why that letter is surfacing at this time -- that is not a reflection on Mr. Hoh at all but rather on the Washington Post and politics inside the beltway.

You said you aren't going to say whether you agree or disagree with him. I'm not bashful; I agree with his thrust but not with some facets of his rationale. That, practically speaking, means I agree with his position.

However, I'm still concerned with Winken's location...

[Pol-Mil FSO]

To make a military analogy about the State Department reaction: suppose Mr. Hoh was a Company Commander in the 2nd MEB in Helmand and decided that the war sucked and notified his chain of command that he was going to resign. He then gets called up to Kabul for a meeting with GEN McChrystal, who offers him a promotion to Colonel and a job on the ISAF HQ staff. When that doesn't work, he gets flown to Tampa for a meeting with GEN Petraeus and an offer of a position (again as a Colonel or maybe even BG) on the CENTCOM staff. Wouldn't that generate a WTF reaction or at least raise eyebrows?

I do not believe that Steve the Planner was out of line in mentioning the PTSD issue. Mr. Hoh raised it himself in the WaPo article and stated that he suffered from it due to his experience in Iraq (mentioning that his initial reaction was to "drink myself blind").

Finally, I have to go back to my point in a previous post that Afghanistan is an extremely complicated issue that defies easy understanding or comprehension. Maybe it's a generational issue, but my gut reaction is that Mr. Hoh is naive and/or egotistical for having the moral certainty to not only resign but also publicly speak out against USG policy in Afghanistan. (In the WaPo article he states that "I want people in Iowa, people in Arizona, to call their congressman and say, Listen, I don't think this is right.") I can accept resignation for disagreement with policy, but taking a public position against policy when he hasn't been around long enough to understand all of the nuances is something that I feel to be close to a betrayal of his oath as a commissioned officer in the Foreign Service. But then again, to offer a criticism of Mr. Hoh - and I'd argue that he is now fair game for criticism since he has entered the political arena - it doesn't look to me like he was a Foreign Service Officer long enough to understand the ethos of the Foreign Service nor the messy and ambiguous realities of foreign policy formulation and execution.

[Bob's World]

This guy appears to have performed his duty with honor.

When he couldn't square what he was being told to do with his own personal assessment and values, he risigned when he found his personal and professional honor in conflict. Sadly Afghanistan is a political hot button right now, mostly for reasons that have little to do with either Afghanistan, GWOT, or the larger security concerns of the US, so such statements will be used as fodder in that game of political power between the Dems and Reps.

I see no news here. Hopefully those working on policy for this don't just dismiss this guy for disagreeing, and take a moment to step back and conisder if there are other options than approaches currently on the table for debate. They probably won't though.

Worth remembering is that American interests and security concerns are global and multi-facted, and to keep Afghanistan as whole, as well as the US role there in the proper perspective.

[desrtrat6]

I could understand the State Department leadership and the media making a big deal over his resignation if he was an SES or political appointee or if he had an extensive background in Afghanistan and counter-insurgency; however, none of that was the case. He was simply a foreign service officer that decided to quit when the going got tough.

-Tom

[Schmedlap]

From Greyhawk's post, above...

He signed on March 29th of this year and his employment lasted up until September 28. He submitted his letter of resignation a few weeks before that.

He couldn't gut it out for 18 more days?

There is so much about this case that just reeks of someone trying to make a news story, rather than report one. Everyday, we learn another detail that begs the question: why does this guy's opinion merit billing in the WashPo? I suspect that anyone with similar experience and credentials would be lucky to have their 300-word letter to the editor published.