First U.S. Official Resigns Over Afghan War

[IntelTrooper]

I don't understand his point... in one paragraph he says that he doesn't understand why we are fighting the way, and in another paragraph he says "there are still plenty of dudes that need to be killed." Is he advocating the "CT" approach, or what?

[tequila]

I think he is.

... the United States is no more than a supporting actor, among several previously, in a tragedy that ... has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate, and traditional ... The Pashtun insurgency ... is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions, and religion by internal and external enemies ...

In both RC East and South, I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.

I'm pretty sure he's making the "antibody" argument --- foreign troops and central government forces based in Kabul are foreign antibodies to the Pashtuns, who will naturally fight any attempt to impose such a regime on them. I think somewhere in the article he says he would advise drawing down forces.

[Schmedlap]

I think somewhere in the article he says he would advise drawing down forces.

Well, that would explain why this even made the news. A nice counterpoint to administration critics. I'm curious to see what this guy's follow-on job is, in a year or so. Probably a good one.

[tequila]

This week, Hoh is scheduled to meet with Vice President Biden's foreign policy adviser, Antony Blinken, at Blinken's invitation.

If the United States is to remain in Afghanistan, Hoh said, he would advise a reduction in combat forces.

He also would suggest providing more support for Pakistan, better U.S. communication and propaganda skills to match those of al-Qaeda, and more pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai to clean up government corruption -- all options being discussed in White House deliberations.

Sounds like a pro-CT Biden guy to me.

[Ken White]

and Nod?

[IntelTrooper]

and Nod?

Sailing off somewhere on their own, I imagine.

[Steve the Planner]

Cavguy:

I was kinda with you until you started psycho-diagnosing. Is anyone opposed to things a PTSD case? COL Gentile may way in as some have suggested his criticism of COIN is driven by PTSD.

Actually, I was trying to play nice. Absent something like that, I can not, in truth, understand why a committed professional would not, at the least, try to push for changes once the doors opened to that.

Too many people have too much on the line for a professional on the ground in Afghanistan to just blast off a letter of complaint on the way out the door, but then, once the letter has an effect, not pursue that...

Just my opinion.

Steve

Note: Prayers out for the wives and mothers who read that article in the Post. I remember what it was like in Spring/Summer 2008 trying to convince (lie to) my wife, as I returned from leave, that I would be safe as a PRT back in Iraq while the Embassy was routinely bombarded and two of our PRT colleagues had just been blown up in Baghdad. Now, the Afghan risks are front page, and a State Department person is quoted as saying "fegedaboudit." Not helpful for those on the ground.

[Steve the Planner]

As a former Senior Urban Planning Adviser, Iraq PRT (2007/8), I was a bit taken aback.

I believe what he is saying, at it's core, is that he has lost faith that the military & civilian tools provided, or being considered, are going to create the result sought in Afghanistan.

In that context, my experience in Iraq was that, in general, the US civilian effort was a "lost ball in tall grass," especially at the higher levels, but, having said that, those actual civilian experts who signed up for the Iraq surge did so because we believed that, no matter how screwed up the current activities were, we came over to get the US out of a terrible jam in Iraq.

Especially in Northern Iraq, we always had to fight to get someone with stars on his shoulders to make any big changes and/or get critical projects done---often by-passing the DoS chain of command in Baghdad. What's new about that? All of us came from backgrounds where we had fought for projects in the civilian sector even against stiff political opposition. All experienced civilian experts worth their salt have thick skins, lots of arrows in our backs (the pioneers catch the arrows), and an ability to push past obstacles to get what needs to get done done.

In truth, most of us 50+ year olds were former military, like myself, and were just plain tired of seeing pictures in the paper every morning of kids that looked those for whom we had previously been responsible. So, Ambassador Crocker put out an urgent call for civilian experts to help put Iraq back on its feet---in order to get those troops safely home, and we came to do what we could.

Sure, the handful of us were like a drop of water in a very dry sponge, but we pushed where we could. And many of us, despite having to challenge the bureaucracy to accomplish anything productive, did contribute a lot, and came away from Iraq with a feeling of great accomplishment. Even if, like so many soldiers, our accomplishment was just one drop in a big puddle.

But the Afghan civilian surge always intrigued me because it was, in fact, totally different from Iraq:

Instead of actual US civilian experts (city managers, planners, heath/medical folks, transportation engineers) leaving life and wife behind for a particular urgent mission, the Afghan surge mostly seems to be populated by re-flagged military, or US federal agency staff filling call-up quotas for an otherwise on-going multi-decade effort.

In Iraq, even with security challenges and background animus to the "occupier," there were substantial opportunities for engagement with either a "willing," or a "forced by necessity," relationship between local Iraqis and the US civ/mil structure. This, as Hoh points out, is not the case in many areas.

I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.

Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.

So, here we have a former US Marine officer with strong military experience in Iraq, but none in Afghanistan, foreign or civilian services, dual-hatted as a State Department temporary foreign service officer unable. But unable to adapt and/or find a way through, either by engagement (directly, indirectly) down low or up above.

Even when offered the chance to actively engage the highest levels of civilian strategy, he turns it down.

What do I make of the whole thing? PTSD?

Very confusing.

Steve

[Cavguy]

Steve,

I was kinda with you until you started psycho-diagnosing. Is anyone opposed to things a PTSD case? COL Gentile may weigh in as some have suggested his criticism of COIN is driven by PTSD.

I will quote from an OIF veteran friend (who shall remain anon) who responded on a closed forum to the same suggestion. He articulated it better than I could:

When you don't like the message, the easiest thing to do is to shoot
the messenger. The second-easiest thing is to undermine his/her
credibility with deductions about how their current views might
reflect "of psychoses or perhaps, a delayed PTSD."

Small wonder that the SecDef noted the stigma of combat stress
yesterday in a speech to the VA/DoD mental health summit: "despite our
best efforts, there is still a stigma associated with seeking help for
psychological injuries." I'm disappointed in the response this story
has received from senior officers with combat experience who ought to
know better.

It may be fair and accurate to argue that this officer sees
Afghanistan through the prism of his Iraq experience. But, I would
suggest that this officer's past experience improves the quality of
his observations today, rather than diminishes them in the manner
suggested. And that it may be possible that this officer's
observations are, in fact, accurate representations of the situation
on the ground in Afghanistan, and that we ought to carefully consider
them as such, notwithstanding any other factors in this officer's
personal life which may have steered him towards a particular career
choice.

[Ken White]

I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.

That's far from true:

From the current CIA World Factbook;Urban population: 24% of total population (2008);Rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)

then from Global security:

"As of 2004 the urban population of about 6.4 million, i.e., 30% of the total population, is estimated to double by 2015 at a growth rate twice the average growth rate in the country. More than 70 percent of the urban population is concentrated in six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-ISharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Refugees choose to return to cities for the benefits offered by urban life; the population of Kabul has increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to at least 2.4 million in 2003. (LINK)

The UN puts it at 24%.(LINK)

I'd question all three figures as being high, if anything. The basic problem in planning and civilian expert assistance is that Afghanistan IS rural -- very rural -- and modern American city boys do not know how to play in the country...

Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.

Nor do the modern Army's mostly urban and technically skilled folks know precisely how to handle the situation.

Very confusing.

Welcome to Afghanistan...

[Schmedlap]

Anyone know how this resignation letter ended up published at the Washington Post?

I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

I have not been among the people to complain about the President's delay in making a decision. I would prefer a well-thought out plan next month rather than a half-assed one today. The old adage about "doing the wrong thing is better than delaying" doesn't apply when you're making a long-term change of plans at this level, imo. But all of this back-and-forth in the media suggests that the decision will be based far more heavily upon the polls and sentiment back home rather than upon the facts on the ground. Otherwise, I don't think we'd be seeing so much of this back and forth trying to shape the public opinion landscape. That is troubling.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

Apologies for inaccuracies. The only things I know about Afghanistan is from the UN Habitat Reports, and stuff I get open net.

Problems always exist in what UN Habitat defines as urban, and as informal urban settlements, and what others might define it as. The Afghan Minister's report to the Habitat conference was higher than the sources you cited (CIA Factbook, Global Security). Doesn't mean any of them are very accurate until somebody does some credible counting.

Also, how many people are in Afghanistan? (Somewhere between 26 and 33 million as best as I can understand the disagreements). Makes a big diff in figuring out the percentage urban.

Nice if somebody had some pop figures that meant something.

Schmedlap's got it right as to purpose and content.

I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

One thing that all of us on this board know is that none of us have all the pieces to really finalize anything, except maybe on a collective basis from many different and competing opinions.

I can't imagine that, based on even a heavy tour of one province, a final conclusion as to the whole country, and whole US effort, could be conclusively put forward.

The President is having meaningful and complex presentations from a lot of parties on a lot of different views. Glad when he is done and able to make a final decision, but sounds like it ain't over yet.

Fingers crossed for the right one.

[Ken White]

Apologies for inaccuracies. The only things I know about Afghanistan is from the UN Habitat Reports, and stuff I get open net.

that the figures -- as also you note -- are imprecise but that, regardless, Afghanistan is primarily a rural Nation to the hilt -- it poses different parameters in many senses than anyplace we've operated since the Indian wars in our own west -- and not even I am old enough to recall that...

It's also very xenophobic and very mountainous -- real mountains. the corridors and compartments mess up many things...

Schmedlap's got it right as to purpose and content.

"I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action."

True.

Fingers crossed for the right one.

Also true...

[Pol-Mil FSO]

I have to admit I had a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment when I read this article on the net last night, and then saw it again this morning on the front page of the Washington Post. If I threaten to quit, will I get offered a job at several grades above my current rank at Embassy Kabul (not that I would prefer a job there instead of one in the field) or a job in the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) office in the State Department? I am very skeptical of the implication that this officer is so much better than other FSOs serving in Afghanistan to merit such offers.

I respect the guy for backing up his convictions with action but I find it hard to believe that he can have everything figured out after only 5-6 months in country, and only 3-4 months at the PRT in Zabul. Given the limited interaction which PRT personnel have with the local population - due to security, cultural, and especially language, barriers - a few months, or even one year, does not present enough opportunities to really get a feel for what a typical rural Pashtun is thinking.

I agree with his observation that every valley is different, especially true in RC East due to terrain. However, I think he is is too quick to draw conclusions from the special case of the Korengal valley to make broader judgments about Pashtun hostility towards ISAF. Again, every province, and sometimes every district, is different. He also offers a keen observation - that is frequently missed by the Embassy and other international community reps living in Kabul - about the stark divide between the westernized urban Afghans (with whom we spend most of our time) and the rural Pashtun villagers (who are the center of gravity in this COIN fight).

I also fault the Washington Post reporter for hyperbole. "Senior civilian representative" in Zabul Province is not all that it appears to be - the guy has been a FSO for only one year (not tenured) and by virtue of his status as a FSO will almost inevitably be considered more senior to the USAID Field Program Officer at the PRT because until very recently almost all of the USAID FPOs at Afghanistan PRTs were contractors on one year appointments. And the third U.S. civilian in Zabul is a U.S. Department of Agriculture employee or contractor, or possibly a State contractor working rule-of-law issues. Finally, he deserves respect for being a Iraq combat veteran, but the same could be said of almost everybody in the Marine Corps with more than 4 years of service.