First U.S. Official Resigns Over Afghan War

[jkm_101_fso]

I know the SWJ blog mention this today, but I thought it was worth talking about.

State Dept. diplomat, former Marine, resigns in protest of the war in Afghanistan.

FULL STORY

WASHINGTON -- A former Marine who fought in Iraq, joined the State Department after leaving the military and was a diplomat in a Taliban stronghold in Afghanistan has become the first U.S. official to resign in protest of the Afghan war, the Washington Post reported early Tuesday.

Matthew Hoh, who describes himself as "not some peacenik, pot-smoking hippie who wants everyone to be in love," said he believes the war is simply fueling the insurgency.

"I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in Afghanistan," Hoh wrote in his resignation letter, dated Sept. 10 but published early Tuesday. "I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end."

Hoh's resignation letter

Doubt this will become an epidemic...but interesting.

[IntelTrooper]

I don't understand his point... in one paragraph he says that he doesn't understand why we are fighting the way, and in another paragraph he says "there are still plenty of dudes that need to be killed." Is he advocating the "CT" approach, or what?

[tequila]

I think he is.

... the United States is no more than a supporting actor, among several previously, in a tragedy that ... has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate, and traditional ... The Pashtun insurgency ... is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions, and religion by internal and external enemies ...

In both RC East and South, I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.

I'm pretty sure he's making the "antibody" argument --- foreign troops and central government forces based in Kabul are foreign antibodies to the Pashtuns, who will naturally fight any attempt to impose such a regime on them. I think somewhere in the article he says he would advise drawing down forces.

[Schmedlap]

I think somewhere in the article he says he would advise drawing down forces.

Well, that would explain why this even made the news. A nice counterpoint to administration critics. I'm curious to see what this guy's follow-on job is, in a year or so. Probably a good one.

[tequila]

This week, Hoh is scheduled to meet with Vice President Biden's foreign policy adviser, Antony Blinken, at Blinken's invitation.

If the United States is to remain in Afghanistan, Hoh said, he would advise a reduction in combat forces.

He also would suggest providing more support for Pakistan, better U.S. communication and propaganda skills to match those of al-Qaeda, and more pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai to clean up government corruption -- all options being discussed in White House deliberations.

Sounds like a pro-CT Biden guy to me.

[Ken White]

and Nod?

[Steve the Planner]

As a former Senior Urban Planning Adviser, Iraq PRT (2007/8), I was a bit taken aback.

I believe what he is saying, at it's core, is that he has lost faith that the military & civilian tools provided, or being considered, are going to create the result sought in Afghanistan.

In that context, my experience in Iraq was that, in general, the US civilian effort was a "lost ball in tall grass," especially at the higher levels, but, having said that, those actual civilian experts who signed up for the Iraq surge did so because we believed that, no matter how screwed up the current activities were, we came over to get the US out of a terrible jam in Iraq.

Especially in Northern Iraq, we always had to fight to get someone with stars on his shoulders to make any big changes and/or get critical projects done---often by-passing the DoS chain of command in Baghdad. What's new about that? All of us came from backgrounds where we had fought for projects in the civilian sector even against stiff political opposition. All experienced civilian experts worth their salt have thick skins, lots of arrows in our backs (the pioneers catch the arrows), and an ability to push past obstacles to get what needs to get done done.

In truth, most of us 50+ year olds were former military, like myself, and were just plain tired of seeing pictures in the paper every morning of kids that looked those for whom we had previously been responsible. So, Ambassador Crocker put out an urgent call for civilian experts to help put Iraq back on its feet---in order to get those troops safely home, and we came to do what we could.

Sure, the handful of us were like a drop of water in a very dry sponge, but we pushed where we could. And many of us, despite having to challenge the bureaucracy to accomplish anything productive, did contribute a lot, and came away from Iraq with a feeling of great accomplishment. Even if, like so many soldiers, our accomplishment was just one drop in a big puddle.

But the Afghan civilian surge always intrigued me because it was, in fact, totally different from Iraq:

Instead of actual US civilian experts (city managers, planners, heath/medical folks, transportation engineers) leaving life and wife behind for a particular urgent mission, the Afghan surge mostly seems to be populated by re-flagged military, or US federal agency staff filling call-up quotas for an otherwise on-going multi-decade effort.

In Iraq, even with security challenges and background animus to the "occupier," there were substantial opportunities for engagement with either a "willing," or a "forced by necessity," relationship between local Iraqis and the US civ/mil structure. This, as Hoh points out, is not the case in many areas.

I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.

Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.

So, here we have a former US Marine officer with strong military experience in Iraq, but none in Afghanistan, foreign or civilian services, dual-hatted as a State Department temporary foreign service officer unable. But unable to adapt and/or find a way through, either by engagement (directly, indirectly) down low or up above.

Even when offered the chance to actively engage the highest levels of civilian strategy, he turns it down.

What do I make of the whole thing? PTSD?

Very confusing.

Steve

[Cavguy]

Steve,

I was kinda with you until you started psycho-diagnosing. Is anyone opposed to things a PTSD case? COL Gentile may weigh in as some have suggested his criticism of COIN is driven by PTSD.

I will quote from an OIF veteran friend (who shall remain anon) who responded on a closed forum to the same suggestion. He articulated it better than I could:

When you don't like the message, the easiest thing to do is to shoot
the messenger. The second-easiest thing is to undermine his/her
credibility with deductions about how their current views might
reflect "of psychoses or perhaps, a delayed PTSD."

Small wonder that the SecDef noted the stigma of combat stress
yesterday in a speech to the VA/DoD mental health summit: "despite our
best efforts, there is still a stigma associated with seeking help for
psychological injuries." I'm disappointed in the response this story
has received from senior officers with combat experience who ought to
know better.

It may be fair and accurate to argue that this officer sees
Afghanistan through the prism of his Iraq experience. But, I would
suggest that this officer's past experience improves the quality of
his observations today, rather than diminishes them in the manner
suggested. And that it may be possible that this officer's
observations are, in fact, accurate representations of the situation
on the ground in Afghanistan, and that we ought to carefully consider
them as such, notwithstanding any other factors in this officer's
personal life which may have steered him towards a particular career
choice.

[Ken White]

I have always been aware, for example, that half of Afghanistan's population is heavily urban, but believed that the US strategy was just focused on agriculture and issues related to hard-scrabble Pashtun areas. Thus, there was no reason for me, as an urban planning expert, to leave wife and life to get involved.

That's far from true:

From the current CIA World Factbook;Urban population: 24% of total population (2008);Rate of urbanization: 5.4% annual rate of change (2005-10 est.)

then from Global security:

"As of 2004 the urban population of about 6.4 million, i.e., 30% of the total population, is estimated to double by 2015 at a growth rate twice the average growth rate in the country. More than 70 percent of the urban population is concentrated in six cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-ISharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Refugees choose to return to cities for the benefits offered by urban life; the population of Kabul has increased from 1.7 million in 2000 to at least 2.4 million in 2003. (LINK)

The UN puts it at 24%.(LINK)

I'd question all three figures as being high, if anything. The basic problem in planning and civilian expert assistance is that Afghanistan IS rural -- very rural -- and modern American city boys do not know how to play in the country...

Moreover, much of the urban technical skills that served my productive engagement in Iraq would be of little value in Pashtun areas---any more than the US should appoint me, a 50-something civilian planning expert, as a temporary Marine Major to lead a patrol up a hostile Afghan valley.

Nor do the modern Army's mostly urban and technically skilled folks know precisely how to handle the situation.

Very confusing.

Welcome to Afghanistan...

[Schmedlap]

Anyone know how this resignation letter ended up published at the Washington Post?

I find the assertions that he made to be of little interest. I'm more interested in knowing who had this letter released and why. This appears to be little more than a PR stunt in the ongoing back and forth between folks who want different courses of action.

I have not been among the people to complain about the President's delay in making a decision. I would prefer a well-thought out plan next month rather than a half-assed one today. The old adage about "doing the wrong thing is better than delaying" doesn't apply when you're making a long-term change of plans at this level, imo. But all of this back-and-forth in the media suggests that the decision will be based far more heavily upon the polls and sentiment back home rather than upon the facts on the ground. Otherwise, I don't think we'd be seeing so much of this back and forth trying to shape the public opinion landscape. That is troubling.