NYT: U.S. to Protect Populous Afghan Areas, Officials Say

[davidbfpo]

CitadelSix,

Welcome aboard and another current thread discusses the rural -v- urban population in Afghanistan: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8797

I am wary of a strategy that reduces even further the Allied role in rural areas and seems to be a return to the Soviet option. Cities and main roads, with frequent expeditions and raids into the rural 'Chaos Country'.

What did your studies conclude about Allied and Afghan government in the non-Pashtun areas? A cities first strategy needs to be balanced with retaining those areas, just look at recent events around Kunduz (with a Pathan minority).

What about those areas where we have tried to intervene, from a UK perspective Helmand Province, can we pullback to campaign in more important areas? The eastern mountain valleys e.g. Korengal now appear to be a "valley too far".

All from a faraway "armchair".

davidbfpo

[tequila]

Our students at SAMS, who have been looking at the problem closely over the last 10 months, in coordination with planners on the ground, have seen the same problem and came to essentially the same conclusions that the McChrystal report came to. Were their own ideas to be implemented, the strategy would focus on winning in the villages by focusing development and building good governance at the local level in order to rebalance the role of local / tribal leadership with that of the central government.

But the question remains, even if we plus up by 40k in additional to the 60k already there, is that enough to sustain a village-centric strategy?

Can we build good governance at the local village level if we can't even get it in the cities? Shouldn't we try to build some capacity where the GiROA at least can recruit officials?

I totally agree that we cannot just abandon the villages to Predators and Taliban, but if we can't at least secure Kandahar, what good is it to plant Marines in a few dozen Helmand villages?

[Rank amateur]

We didn't give a @#$% about the villages before 9/11. Long as they don't attack America from there, I don't see why we should care about them now.

The trick is to make sure AQ doesn't slip back in. But even if you occupy the villages, Astan is so vast and sparsely populated, you still have to figure out a way to make sure AQ doesn't use Astan as a base. Instead of top 10 cites, make it the top 100. What do we get for our increased investment and longer supply lines that can never be secured?

[jmm99]

Based on this:

from CitSix
Were their [Our students at SAMS] own ideas to be implemented, the strategy would focus on winning in the villages by focusing development and building good governance at the local level in order to rebalance the role of local / tribal leadership with that of the central government.

1. What does their model of local governance look like ?

2. What does their model of the local justice system look like (judges, prosecutors and police in the criminal sector; judges and "juries" - shuras & jirgas - in the civil sector) ?

3. How does that model interface with the national government (at district, province and national levels) ?

4. How does that model interface with local and regional "power people" (warlords in UnkindSpeak) ?

5. Is this an "all or nothing" model (all being Astan's some 40,000 villages), or would a more modest approach be taken ? If the latter, what portions of Astan would be the better choices for implementation ? See this post in another thread for links to some possibly relevant maps.

6. Who would implement the local governance model (e.g., military, civilian; e.g., US, Astanis - in what mix in this laudable political effort) ?

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Just came back from a really good conference from some of the best of the DC world.

Schieffer Series: A Discussion of U.S. Policy in Afghanistan

http://csis.org/event/schieffer-seri...cy-afghanistan

Bob Schieffer (former CBS Anchor) moderated Bob Woodward, Kim Dozier, Anthony Cordesman, and Mariam Nawabi, and Afghan/American Broadcaster.

Woodward and Dozier explained a lot of what they can glean from the President's deliberations. Most of what has been heard here, but with more background, details and play-by-play.

Next, they got into background issues. Mr. Woodward was just back from Afghanistan and talked about the need for more police, if we are fighting a civil insurgency and domestic attacks. According to him, the number of police are declining while the need is growing. He also talked about the US past process of nine years, one year at a time.

Ms. Nawabi talked about the background Afghan perspective, and the need for long-term development/capacity assistance. They need a relationship.

All talked about the lack of effective Central government, and against that backdrop, what needs to happen on the civilian side.

Universal criticism for the civilian effort as ineffective. Prof Cordesman does a roundhouses the problems at the end of the presentation: need to start from scratch with the civilian side.

Ms. Dozier talked about the military audience response to the President's speech about taking his time before putting them in harm's way. She said the cheers that interrupted the speech were, for many, unexpected, but indicates that the military would rather he get it right than get it fast.

Prof. Cordesman's roundhouse on the need to start from scratch with the civilian effort comes at the very end. Insightful for those who are interested in the non-kinetic side of things.

Worth a listen if you want to get the DC perspective from some serious and studious insiders.

Steve

[S-2]

I've looked at the demographics a bit and if you add the sum total of Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Lashkar Gal, Herat, Konduz, and Mazur-I-Sharif, secure them (but for shabnamah) you will have have ceded to the taliban a vast in-country sanctuary along with most of the population of Afghanistan (and they AREN'T in the above cities) and made vulnerable the LOCs connecting these cities.

Time to withdraw. We can't get there from here while saddled with allies whose objectives and operational tempos/methods aren't in full accord, NGOs and our own dysfunctional civilian side completely out of alignment, and an afghan government and army who we underwrite to achieve next to nothing. In eight years they've not affirmed the social contract between themselves and the afghan people. That's being TOO KIND in any case. They still won't in another eight.

Reverse it? Don't kid yourselves. Train that army and you'll have a well-armed, well-trained bunch of brigands and hooligans six months after we leave.

None of you will like this but pull out en toto now. Cancel all aid to the GoA and GoP. Embargo all purchases of Pakistani goods and services and ENCOURAGE the full take-over of Afghanistan by the afghan taliban and their A.Q. cronies.

We in the west will be attacked, as sure as the sun rises in the east, by A.Q. More to the point, the afghan taliban and A.Q. will turn their tender ministrations upon Pakistan once the conquest of Afghanistan is complete.

The P.A. will 1.) finally fight full-throttle for the lands they freely aborgated in late 2001-2002 and win, 2.) fight and lose, or 3.) cut a deal that embraces a new and more firmly-grounded irhabist vision for Pakistan.

NOW return and exercise what it is we actually do quite well- the professional application of violence on a massive state scale to neuter their nukes. Do it right and they don't get a shot off at India. Do it wrong and they do where upon India finishes what we've began-the dismemberment of an utterly disfunctional Pakistani state.

Then permit the KSA and the UAE to clean up the mess...or not as THEY see fit. Not our job.

If anything has been learned in the last eight years it is that we are utterly incapable of nation building-not in Iraq and not in Afghanistan. Meanwhile we've conditioned the Pakistani gov't to believe it is OUR responsibility to underwrite their defense while their vaunted strike corps sits picking its noses on their eastern Punjabi border with India while knowing FULL WELL that India possesses NO irridentist ambitions within Pakistan.

This is a condition of utter B.S. Count me as a deeply disillusioned neo-conservative who saw our window of opportunity close about as quickly as it opened and it's been all downhill from there leaving me now firmly in the neo-isolationist camp.

Thanks.

[Steve the Planner]

S-2:

Just because you are right doesn't mean it is going to happen.

So much of this stuff seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with circumstances on the ground (at least in Afghanistan).

In the back of my mind in the "moving to the cities" option, whether implemented or threatened, was to put the marker down to say the US is not there as a national babysitter, or to build a "dream nation" in the far-far-away future.

Cities is an obvious interim phased pull-back to get US troops off the line while sending a clear signal to the Afghan administration and people that it is time for tough decisions and engagement on their part. No?

Isn't opening the door to a possible Taliban return the same as opening the door to a Najibullah-like experience for the current administration?

Is that a good or bad outcome?

One scenario suggests some bad actors would just stay until the last minute to soak up what they can before a fall, then, it's off to Dubai or Switzerland.

Another might be that, once a US vacuum were threatened, any number of other actors might step in, for good or bad, but certainly to change the game. No?

I am forever scanning for news stories on China, with its string of pearls of ports, and India pulling out the stops on Afghan reconstruction. Obviously, the Big Game is not just about Pakistan, nor one between the old Anglo-Russian players. I'll bet the scenario builders have their work cut out for them.

Even under your scenario, regardless of its logic, how do they safely disengage other than by multiple steps over some months/years?

I guess the question is: How?

[CitadelSix]

Based on this:



1. What does their model of local governance look like ?

2. What does their model of the local justice system look like (judges, prosecutors and police in the criminal sector; judges and "juries" - shuras & jirgas - in the civil sector) ?

3. How does that model interface with the national government (at district, province and national levels) ?

4. How does that model interface with local and regional "power people" (warlords in UnkindSpeak) ?

5. Is this an "all or nothing" model (all being Astan's some 40,000 villages), or would a more modest approach be taken ? If the latter, what portions of Astan would be the better choices for implementation ? See this post in another thread for links to some possibly relevant maps.

6. Who would implement the local governance model (e.g., military, civilian; e.g., US, Astanis - in what mix in this laudable political effort) ?

Regards

Mike

Mike - great questions, and as mentioned in another post, I don't have much in the way of answers because the students did not have the time to fully develop their plan before we had to move on to the next thing in the curriculum. The students could probably answer some of those questions based on their work, even if the specifics did not make it into their written products.

In general though, the discussions indicated at local governance would look like whatever they want it to look like although we'd be driving to some sort of order. What does the village need? A sheriff? A magistrate? Basically, we would be promoting self organization, letting the village elders decide what works best for them- after all, every village doesn't have to be organized the same.

It was definitely not all or nothing - the students had not yet done all the math to figure out the scale of sequential versus simultaneous effort.

[Eden]

I have some sympathy for the President. He appears to be digging deeper into Afghanistan, trying to make sense of what is happening there - that's why he has now asked for a province-by-province analysis. I'm guessing that he is, with a mounting sensation of dread, coming to the realization that there is no strategy that can reasonably hope to 'dismantle the Taliban'. Not with the resources that we can reasonably devote to the task.

We can, I believe, achieve a certain equilibrium, but at the cost of conceding large parts of the country as ungovernable and providing a huge morale boost to our Afghan enemies. Tragically, I think this will be the option chosen in the end - do less with more for a very long time.

[MikeF]

I have some sympathy for the President. He appears to be digging deeper into Afghanistan, trying to make sense of what is happening there - that's why he has now asked for a province-by-province analysis. I'm guessing that he is, with a mounting sensation of dread, coming to the realization that there is no strategy that can reasonably hope to 'dismantle the Taliban'. Not with the resources that we can reasonably devote to the task.

We can, I believe, achieve a certain equilibrium, but at the cost of conceding large parts of the country as ungovernable and providing a huge morale boost to our Afghan enemies. Tragically, I think this will be the option chosen in the end - do less with more for a very long time.

This COA reminds me of Iraq circa 2005. As we consolidated in the cities, we gave up a lot of battlespace. The various insurgents groups established training camps in those areas and the borders were open for trafficking weapons, money, and fighters. That was not a good thing.

It was very costly to have to reclear those camps and seal the borders in 2007.

Mike

[wm]

In general though, the discussions indicated at local governance would look like whatever they want it to look like although we'd be driving to some sort of order. What does the village need? A sheriff? A magistrate? Basically, we would be promoting self organization, letting the village elders decide what works best for them- after all, every village doesn't have to be organized the same.

It was definitely not all or nothing - the students had not yet done all the math to figure out the scale of sequential versus simultaneous effort.

This is exactly the effort that needs to be going on in the hinterland of the two enclaves/bridgeheads I proposed. What is most important is to recognize that we cannot adopt plans for helping those villages that use a one-size-fits-all approach. Without it, the benefit of interior lines that the enclaves could provide will not exist. Our folks will be sitting on Hadrian's (or is that Humpty Dumpty's) wall, getting shot at by foes on each side of it.

The expansion occurs in bite-sized chunks--the size being dictated by how many resources are available to do the village self-organization support in the latest bite just taken. Someone once advised me never to try to eat anything bigger than my head. The current plan and the decision to just hold a few key cities both seem to violate that advice.

[CitadelSix]

But the question remains, even if we plus up by 40k in additional to the 60k already there, is that enough to sustain a village-centric strategy?

Can we build good governance at the local village level if we can't even get it in the cities? Shouldn't we try to build some capacity where the GiROA at least can recruit officials?

I totally agree that we cannot just abandon the villages to Predators and Taliban, but if we can't at least secure Kandahar, what good is it to plant Marines in a few dozen Helmand villages?

I think you can create good governance at the local village level - in fact, those villages have been self-governed for centuries. The concept was to help facilitate this through development and security to improve their capacity and to then help them reach upward to the central government for additional support. In some ways, central government doesn't work because the job is too big and there is nothing below upon which it is built. If all politics is local, then governance has to start (and be allowed to flourish) at the local level first. Then let the local bodies collectively develop regional bodies and so on.

[CitadelSix]

CitadelSix,

Welcome aboard and another current thread discusses the rural -v- urban population in Afghanistan: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8797

I am wary of a strategy that reduces even further the Allied role in rural areas and seems to be a return to the Soviet option. Cities and main roads, with frequent expeditions and raids into the rural 'Chaos Country'.

What did your studies conclude about Allied and Afghan government in the non-Pashtun areas? A cities first strategy needs to be balanced with retaining those areas, just look at recent events around Kunduz (with a Pathan minority).

What about those areas where we have tried to intervene, from a UK perspective Helmand Province, can we pullback to campaign in more important areas? The eastern mountain valleys e.g. Korengal now appear to be a "valley too far".

All from a faraway "armchair".

davidbfpo

davidbfpo -

Their planning effort unfortunately did not go on long enough to delve into great detail, but the broad approach was a combined effort between the Allies, Afghans, and US to focus security efforts initially in the border regions while weighting developmental efforts in first the north, then west and working into secured border regions last. ISAF was to focus externally (drumming up allied and regional support) and at the national level while the IJC focused internally on day-to-day operations.