Cody Poplin's attack on the safe haven myth article could have served as a corrective, but his own counter piece was equally flawed. I think the underlying problem is identifying our adversaries as terrorists, and how that paradigm limits our view of the various movements associated with al-Qaeda (directly or indirectly). I agree al-Qaeda did not need Afghanistan to plan and conduct 9/11, but on the other hand at that stage of the movement they did need a safe haven to organize their global network (now it is probably robust enough to survive without a designated safe haven, since there are adequate safe havens (smaller scale) in many large cities and remote areas around the world.Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Cody cited the Management of Savagery
Point taken, but they're not talking about planning external attacks from these locations, though they certainly can and do. They're talking about unconventional warfare where AQ as an external sponsor exploits (and creates) conditions to establish their base. If you read about the theory on "competitive control" it is clear that both the communists and al-Qaeda do this better than the U.S. We have a difficult time understanding why it works, since it runs counter to our deeply held worldview based on "The End of History."“The Management of Savagery,” which is currently the homework of aspiring jihadis of the Islamic State, suggests that groups must establish safe havens, or regions where they can administer savagery. Key factors for site selection include “the presence of geographical depth;” the weakness of the ruling regime and the weakness of the centralization of its power in the peripheries of the borders of its state;” and the prior “distribution of weapons in the region.” Based on this criteria, Naji suggests Pakistan, Nigeria, Libya, and Yemen are all suitable places from which to spark the fire of jihad, concluding: “Before its submission to the administration, the region of savagery will be in a situation resembling the situation of Afghanistan before the control of the Taliban, a region submitting to the law of the jungle in its primitive form, whose good people and even the wise among the evildoers yearn for someone to manage this savagery.”
Cody made several good points, but the biggest shortfall in his argument was what he didn't cover. Al-Qaeda wanted us to invade Afghanistan. We certainly fought better than they expected, and it could have the end game if we were successful in killing their senior leadership before the movement went global. Instead it became a quagmire where we ended up wasting billions of dollars while AQ expanded elsewhere. Al-Qaeda's current strategy (articulated years ago, but most recently in their latest version of Inspire) is to get the West to over extend.
I think the correct answer is somewhere between these two arguments. We can't afford to pursue ineffective COIN approaches to eliminate safe havens. This approach has reduced our focus on the larger strategic picture and narrowed it down to one geographical spot that we look at through the lens of counterterrorism instead of strategically. This approach is simply unsustainable, yet these safe havens can't be ignored. Cody is right they must addressed, but we need a new sustainable approach for doing so. To be more provocative, even if we invested another five years of surge level effort in Afghanistan and actually stabilized the country (we would have to assume an enduring fight along their border with Pakistan) so what? How many countries can we afford to do this in? While we compressed our strategic world view to a tactical problem centered on Afghanistan (once again the failure of the center of gravity concept), the rest of the world continued to evolve in ways not beneficial to U.S. interests. A few examples of other problems include, Russia's aggression in Ukraine, China's aggression in the South China Sea, and AQ expanding through much of the Middle East and North Africa.
We need to take two steps back and look at the larger picture and have a more informed discussion on feasibility and strategic risk. In some ways I think the authors' are talking past one another and could come to a mutual agreement if they were sitting at a table discussing it.
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