One of the things thaty continues to trouble me is the deep lack of knowledge, insight of Afghanistan as a whole.
I think Andrew Exum did a great job last week of asking, in the Hoh context, for Gilles Dorronsorro, Micheal Semple and Joanne Nathan (deep experts, not generalists) to comment on the concept that someone could take knowledge from one province or district and validly project that to knowledge of Afghanistan or the Region. They were clear that the entire environment was just too complicated and variable to do that---it was not about nuances of differences, but whole measures of different politics, circumstances, relationships, and drivers.
Here, as I understand it, we stand on the brink of a radical change in US focus, from chasing bad guys around the desolate and foreboding eastern rural border to "protecting the population" in large urban areas, each with it's own hugely different and complex politics, socio-economics, and needs.
The deep consequences of such a change is so far removed from a simple road march. Everything about urban deployments requires totally unique challenges, risks, tools, training and approaches.
Alone, the strategic consequences for a military re-deployment from rural to urban is huge, especially where, as Joanne Nathan indicated, we are only good at the military clear part, but with huge impediments to hold and build. The difference between Southern Helmand and Kunduz are more than just geographic, and not to be measured and planned only by the amount of fuel it takes to get there. Even more so as Tajikistan's economy and society continue to collapse, with bleed over to Afghanistan.
Strategy is just not the sum of multiple tactics. Somebody has to set the big course, and provide the training, resources and direction to connect the dots.
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