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Thread: The Search for Strategic Intelligence

  1. #41
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    Default If

    If War is just Diplomacy at a different stage, in these particularl brands of civil/military adventures, what is the intelligence set needed to win the war if the war is only won after the civilian system is stabilized?

    Maybe, we are just dealing with a corollary to the modern penchant for systemic approaches (Comprehensive Shock Trauma Centers) vs. Hospitals and Doctors, but, it seems that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan fit any bills of what used to be war, and what used to be needed to win them.

    So what is strategic intelligence? The big picture stuff?

    Steve

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    .....but, it seems that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan fit any bills of what used to be war, and what used to be needed to win them.
    Huh? WTF? Are you saying that Iraq and A'Stan are somehow unique types of conflict? Well all conflicts have unique aspects to them, but both Iraq and A'Stan have produced NOTHING new in either war or warfare.

    You "win" them the same way you win all wars. - Either by negotiating a peace acceptable to YOU! - not the Afghans - or by forcing military defeat upon them, by breaking their will to endure. - maybe not possible, given the US's inability to use force in the effective ways, and thus their search for strategic snake oil, which will take all the pain away......
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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  3. #43
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    Default Maybe

    Maybe that is the point.

    No "national level" capitulation, imposition of will (We are liberating, not occupying!???), and no civilian administrative follow-up except an "expeditionary" repair crew.

    What does it mean when clear, hold and build might actually mean clear, then pass the hot potato? When the Romans took over, they brought stability, trade, civic improvements, etc.. that, at the worst, co-opted their enemies, and at the best, brought something substantive---a major change in society, economy and possibilities.

    We are, in these countries, replacing vicious dictatorial governments, in eternally treacherous multi-national conflict zones. Afterwards, can we really expect instant New England style-self-governance and all the historical external conflicts to flake-off?

    Assuming we have a long-run interest in these places, they will require years to evolve to some better stage. No matter how much I want Iraq to quickly attain peace, stability and prosperity, the situation may remain a challenge for many years to come, even with (or despite) Iraq's substantial underlying oil resources. Certainly, it is rapidly becoming Iraq's problem to define it's future, but there are substantial internal and external challenges that will remain to challenge their possibilities.

    But what to make of Afghanistan??

    What is the "strategic" objective, and are we aligned, resourced and trained to deliver it? Does it fit the landscape?


    Steve

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Huh? WTF? Are you saying that Iraq and A'Stan are somehow unique types of conflict? Well all conflicts have unique aspects to them, but both Iraq and A'Stan have produced NOTHING new in either war or warfare.
    I've always thought our approach to Iraq showed echoes of the days when a war ended when you rolled down the main street of the other side's capitol city. Never quite understood why some seemed unable to understand why the war didn't stop at that point. Sort of a chessboard approach - when the king falls the game is over - but hardly consistent with today's realities.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    You "win" them the same way you win all wars. - Either by negotiating a peace acceptable to YOU! - not the Afghans - or by forcing military defeat upon them, by breaking their will to endure.
    Curious about those ideas.... who would be "them" in your view of A'stan? The Afghans? The Taliban? Wouldn't a negotiated peace have to be acceptable to all major parties if it's to have any chance of producing peace?

    I suspect that the military's lack of emphasis on "strategic intelligence" may have something to do with the overlap between "strategic intelligence" and "political analysis", the latter being possibly seen as more the province of the State Dept and the non-government analytical community.

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    Default Dorronsorro, Semple, Nathan, Exum

    Went to a Center for American Progress conference today.

    Gilles Dorronsoro, Micheal Semple and Joanne Nathan (corrected), all non-US experts who have been in Afghanistan since before 2001.

    Each had a presentation on their field. Most of you have heard some of this: Dorronsorro (secure the cities first, etc..), and Semple's work with the Taliban are pretty well known.

    Nathan, an Australian, asked: What's this COIN thing about? I read the manual and it said Clear-Hold-Build, but all you ever do is Clear, Clear, Clear. No administrative purpose or capability. Why are you clearing unless you have civilian capacity to Hold and Build? Where has this strategy ever been applied?

    Even Andrew Exum didn't take a stab at answering that.

    The big question that all were asked to comment on: What do you think of these people who see one small part of the country, then try to exprapolte what they saw there to a bigger picture about the country? (Obviously, the Hoh question).

    They were pretty devastating in explaining just a snippet of what they know about the whole country, and why that kind of speculation is not useful.

    Like Exum said, DC is usually full of generalists, and it was a rare opportunity to have three leading specialists in one place.

    Certainly worth hearing every word yourself to build or assess strategy.

    http://www.americanprogress.org/even...streaming.html

    Steve
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-06-2009 at 09:02 AM. Reason: name correction and copied to Wiining the Afghan War thread as appropriate

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    Default Oops, Typo

    Joanne Nathan, not Joanne Semple. (Typo) Correction just made.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-06-2009 at 08:59 AM. Reason: Updated.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Clear-hold-build is a good tactic (It worked great for the US as we implemented a strategy of "manifest destiny" to build this nation), but it is not a "strategy" in of itself.

    Similarly, when I speak of what we are lacking in terms of strategic intelligence, it is not a quest for a country-wide perspective, or even a geographic combatant command -wide perspective, but rather a perspective that takes into account and places into context seemingly unrelated factors as they in fact do interact and interrelate globally.

    So, in persuit of tactical victory in Afghanistan, what effect to US National security as a whole if the approach chosen (say, clear-hold-build; that is short on hold and build as described above) provokes the hell out of muslim populaces in 12 other countries and actually builds the base of support for AQ globally? How could the approach be tailored to mitigate those undesired and unintended effects? Is "victory" even necessary to secure US national interests?

    We all crowd around the campfires our tactical comanders are tending to so that we can stare at the same flames. Then, when our butts start smoking from a flame behind us we proclaim "Black Swan! no one could have predicted that!" Perhaps. But then again, if some would have been held to task to look in other directions in the first place, perhaps not.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Bob:

    As a dumbass tank commander from the old black boot army, one to the front, one to the rear, and the rest at the sides.

    Nathan's point was that, without admin activity to hold and build, COIN is not being applied---just a piece of it.

    Their broader points as to how and where to engage Afghanistan (with detailed differences area by area) are pretty extensive, and highly detailed. They are not about defeating the "bad guys" but how to hold on to the good guys, to later engage the bad guys more effectively.

    I think I agree with their general posture that the sum of many tactics don't equal strategy, and it is the strategy that must be addressed first, and the tactics to followed it.

    Interesting perspectives.

    Steve

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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    I've always thought our approach to Iraq showed echoes of the days when a war ended when you rolled down the main street of the other side's capitol city. Never quite understood why some seemed unable to understand why the war didn't stop at that point. Sort of a chessboard approach - when the king falls the game is over - but hardly consistent with today's realities.
    The very fact that view exists shows how bad our teaching of strategy is. Napoleon occupied and burnt Moscow. He lost the war! The Idiot Hannibal won victory after victory and never attacked the one thing most likely to allow him to win - Rome!

    Curious about those ideas.... who would be "them" in your view of A'stan? The Afghans? The Taliban? Wouldn't a negotiated peace have to be acceptable to all major parties if it's to have any chance of producing peace?
    Them is context specific. Negotiated with those who you can talk to. Bribe those you can kill if required and kill those who will not talk. - or some combination of the above. Point being that unless you get WHAT YOU WANT, then you have failed. - as the US seems unable to articulate what it wants in Afghanistan, I am not optimistic!

    I suspect that the military's lack of emphasis on "strategic intelligence" may have something to do with the overlap between "strategic intelligence" and "political analysis", the latter being possibly seen as more the province of the State Dept and the non-government analytical community.
    Yep. No one will understand the dissonance of "strategic intelligence" until someone actually teaches strategy!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Similarly, when I speak of what we are lacking in terms of strategic intelligence, it is not a quest for a country-wide perspective, or even a geographic combatant command -wide perspective, but rather a perspective that takes into account and places into context seemingly unrelated factors as they in fact do interact and interrelate globally.

    So, in pursuit of tactical victory in Afghanistan, what effect to US National security as a whole if the approach chosen (say, clear-hold-build; that is short on hold and build as described above) provokes the hell out of muslim populaces in 12 other countries and actually builds the base of support for AQ globally? How could the approach be tailored to mitigate those undesired and unintended effects? Is "victory" even necessary to secure US national interests?
    I don't think it's possible to answer your questions since future effects will NOT be determined solely, or even - one might argue - primarily, by a particular tactical strategy. It's more likely that other unknown and unpredictable factors will have a bigger effective impact on your question than clear-hold-build vs something else. There's also the definitional problem in that "clear-hold-build" can be implemented in a variety of ways. How such a strategy is implemented is likely to have just as big an effect (if not more so) than the strategy itself. What assumptions should a strategic intel analyst make? That's a critically important question because the assumptions will determine the results of the analysis. Who decides what the assumptions are?

    For example, let's set the wayback machine to before OIF and try to ask similar questions. With the benefit of hindsight, is it possible to determine if a different operational ground campaign would have affected Muslim populaces any differently? Suppose we did what Saddam expected - a long air campaign followed by a ground invasion. How would things be different? What effect would that different approach have on Muslim populations and support for AQ? Maybe with a long air campaign we might have killed Saddam before the ground invasion. Maybe with a long air campaign we would have killed a ton of civilians with errant bombs, inciting even more world and Muslim hostility than already existed. Even with hindsight and knowing how one path turned out, it's impossible to know how things would be different today if another path was taken.

    Of course, some effects of the invasion surely were predictable and were predicted (and ignored), but some of the biggest effects resulted from events that were not anticipated or planned for - Abu Ghraib is the most obvious and perhaps most far-reaching as an event that provoked Muslim populaces (and continues to do so). An assessment of the strategic effects without accounting for unknowables like Abu Ghraib and other incidents would turn out to be wrong. How useful would such analysis be to you since it would have to be heavily caveated?

    In short, I don't believe there is a predictive method or any means, short of being lucky and correctly guessing, that can account for such vagaries, so I have to question the utility of that kind of far-reaching strategic analysis. Since the analysis would be reliant on an extraordinary number of assumptions, it is likely to prove wrong and would provide leaders and policymakers with a false sense of security about the effects of potential actions and policies. Policymakers want the path paved for them. They want intelligence to lift the fog from the future, but Intelligence has limits as a predictive art and science. Intelligence which makes the future only appear less certain is worse than useless - it's dangerous.

    Finally, I think there is a general problem when attempting to do analysis across the tactical/strategic divide. What I mean is that it's extremely difficult to predict what will happen at the tactical level based on an analysis of differing strategic alternatives. The reverse is also true - it's extremely difficult to estimate the strategic effect of one tactical course of action vs another. Hope that makes sense.

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    One of the things thaty continues to trouble me is the deep lack of knowledge, insight of Afghanistan as a whole.

    I think Andrew Exum did a great job last week of asking, in the Hoh context, for Gilles Dorronsorro, Micheal Semple and Joanne Nathan (deep experts, not generalists) to comment on the concept that someone could take knowledge from one province or district and validly project that to knowledge of Afghanistan or the Region. They were clear that the entire environment was just too complicated and variable to do that---it was not about nuances of differences, but whole measures of different politics, circumstances, relationships, and drivers.

    Here, as I understand it, we stand on the brink of a radical change in US focus, from chasing bad guys around the desolate and foreboding eastern rural border to "protecting the population" in large urban areas, each with it's own hugely different and complex politics, socio-economics, and needs.

    The deep consequences of such a change is so far removed from a simple road march. Everything about urban deployments requires totally unique challenges, risks, tools, training and approaches.

    Alone, the strategic consequences for a military re-deployment from rural to urban is huge, especially where, as Joanne Nathan indicated, we are only good at the military clear part, but with huge impediments to hold and build. The difference between Southern Helmand and Kunduz are more than just geographic, and not to be measured and planned only by the amount of fuel it takes to get there. Even more so as Tajikistan's economy and society continue to collapse, with bleed over to Afghanistan.

    Strategy is just not the sum of multiple tactics. Somebody has to set the big course, and provide the training, resources and direction to connect the dots.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-07-2009 at 09:58 PM. Reason: to became too and top became to. Aboiut to about.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve the Planner View Post
    Strategy is just not the sum of multiple tactics. Somebody has to set the big course, and provide the training, resources and direction to connect the dots.
    Sorry, that is exactly what strategy is, as concerns the mechanics of how it is applied. Callwell noted (and I agree with him) that strategy should be limited to what was tactically feasible. Hamley made much the point.

    Now, I think what you are trying to say is that tactical success does not equate to strategic success. This is true, with Hannibal the Idiot being the primary example - win most battles, and still loose the war. I agree.

    The problem is that we do not teach strategy properly. Tactics are the cogs and levers of strategy. Winning at the tactical level is not the be all and end all, IF you can keep fighting long enough to exhaust your opponent.
    It requires tactical skill to avoid decisive defeat. Where the Taliban are wining tactically is in their ability to infiltrate forces into the areas they wish to contest, and to keep doing it. That is tactics. The Taliban have substantial freedom of action. That is tactics. The Taliban can initiate attacks mostly when and where they want. That is tactics. The Strategy is to exhaust US/NATO - and they know they can do that because "we" are not going to take the actions that would hurt them. - and I mean "hurt" the Taliban, not "protect the population."

    Is "protecting the population" tactically feasible?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Default Treading careful

    Wilf asked:
    Is "protecting the population" tactically feasible?
    Mindful of comments on another thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=7128&page=26

    In the Afghan context an element of protection is possible in large swathes of the countryside, especially where Pashtuns are a minority so sympathy for the Taliban is less. With urban growth protecting city populations is possible, but very different tactically. Where our strategy has gone wrong is trying to protect an un-willing or neutral rural Pashtun population; why is Helmand Province so vital? Before 2006 there was a tiny ISAF presence and some Afghan government presence.

    I am mindful of this thread on Strateic Intelligence duplicating, rightly maybe, other threads.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-08-2009 at 12:47 PM. Reason: Add link

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    So, here is my question: WHAT exactly is strategic intelligence? and why is it so rarely asked for, and even more rarely provided?
    I'm new here so let me know if I'm totally off haha.

    I think strategic intelligence is so rarely asked for because there is so little strategic decision-making made by policymakers in the U.S. government - especially regarding the GWOT, Afghanistan and Iraq - and therefore the intelligence community has gotten tactically heavy in critical areas of U.S. interests. We have been identifying our strategic post-Cold War national interests now for three administrations (terrorism, human rights, proliferation, etc ) but never are there consistent linkages of these interests to a strategic concept.

    While George Kennan’s concept of “Containment” became the fundamental strategy that defined U.S. policies for most of the Cold War; it seems no similar strategic concept can define U.S. policies for the last eight years in the War on Terrorism. U.S. strategy must, but has not so far, be able survive the daily partisan jostling of security politics in Washington and the constantly changing political temperatures in the White House and on Capitol Hill. Short-term operational/tactical policies like killing terrorist leaders, seizing financial resources, deposing state sponsors and destroying training camps have been successful. However, I feel eight years of war and certainly more ahead have shown that these operational and tactical policies are not translating into any strategy. aka what the hell are we going to do in the long-term? We overthrew the Taliban and Saddam and the immediate political and military operations were rather brilliantly conducted - but what were the long-term strategic vision and policies for their new governments? We still have not decided what we want in Afghanistan despite the overwhelming existence of "serious threats to U.S. Interests" - terrorism, human rights violations, drug trafficking, extremism, etc.

    I feel this is because policymakers are generally inclined to think in the short-term as they hop from crisis to crisis and deal with politics and election cycles - strategic intelligence of long-term threats and opportunities therefore does them little good compared to short-term policy prescriptions.

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    bellz:

    I think that is what Wilf is saying. We don't teach or do strategic-level work---just tactics, the some of which, by default become the accidental strategy.

    I continue to scratch my head on Afghanistan.

    Here is a country twice the size of Iraq, with huge and highly differentiated geography, resources, peoples, resources and conflicts.

    My area of expertise is civilian planning, geography, transportation and demographics. Based on that, I would immediately recognize Afghanistan as part of the basket of Centcom/Africom countries where serious trouble always brews at or below the surface. The kind that warrants significant monitoring, engagement, and, sometimes, intervention.

    The demographics of the country, in terms of poverty, health care, life expectancies and birth rates places it at the bottom rungs of the countries of the world (common to the Africom bottom countries).

    Looking to just the history of interventions, war, civil war, and intrigues over the past 40 years, it is Megido-like cauldron of instability, irrespective of Al-Qaeda and 9/11. Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all play into the mix.

    Of course, the fact that it is the No. 1 heroin source for Europe, and elsewhere, creates a unique and singular justification for NATO, and possibly US engagement, on many levels.

    Setting aside the Al-Qaeda issue, it seems that this place warrants an active and continuing strategy period. And that US interests of some sort will always be here.

    Today, we wrestle with what some argue is a failed "mission-creep" into nation-building gone amuck, while, at the same time, we may have stumbled across or into a civil war grounded in a deeper conflict between urban elites in one part of the country vs. the traditional rural folks (like the (Pashtuns) who, because of history, politics, resource issues, demographics and other factors, simply may have exceeded the option to simply live quietly and alone. (Something like the Cherokees facing the settlers, although these folks definitely have less diplomatic skills, not that it may matter).

    My theory is that, regardless of 9/11/Al-Qaeda, US interest is continuous and important. But, what is that bigger interest, and its objectives, and the strategy.

    Perhaps, in some ways, I see the current situation as a some-what long-running but interim action within a, perhaps, 100 year picture in which periods of war and civil war have and may continue to occur. Over that span, maybe, Pashtunistan becomes a reality, or, as in previous empire carve-ups, Helmand connects to the sea. Who knows?

    Similarly, in the current action, our focus was on Pashtun eastern border areas with Pakistan. Lots of tribal and rural. Perhaps now we shift to more urban north and east where much of the tribal lessons are muted, but whole new issues and challenges arise.

    Regardless of the tactics, I think there should come a point (if not already passed) where the US is able to define and state its long-run strategic interests with enough clarity to survive the winds of short-term change and develop tactics, as needed, to respond to the overall goal with some basic level of consistency.

    Fifty or 100 years, one year at a time, does not seem to be all that productive.

    But, that's me.

    Steve

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    Looking back at the original post, I'd say there's a lack of clarity over the levels of strategy, which may be one factor in the reluctance of military intelligence agencies to provide strategic intelligence and the reluctance of military leaders to ask for it.

    The setting of political goals and the development of a political strategy to achieve those goals is generally seen as the province of civilian leadership, and I suspect that it's assumed that "strategic intelligence" has already come into play at this level. Military strategy is one component of an overall political strategy, and even here the goals of military strategy tend to be set (or ignored) at the civilian leadership level. If we assume this, it's natural for the military apparatusd to focus on the tactical means by which strategies established at the civilian leadership can be achieved.

    I agree with Wilf that uncertain or excessive goals represent a major problem: somewhere along the line the goal in Afghanistan seems to have changed form eliminating the AQ presence to reconstructing Afghanistan. The first goal may have been achievable, the second... I have my doubts.

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    ...I would immediately recognize Afghanistan as part of the basket of Centcom/Africom countries where serious trouble always brews at or below the surface. The kind that warrants significant monitoring, engagement, and, sometimes, intervention...[I]t seems that this place warrants an active and continuing strategy period. And that US interests of some sort will always be here.
    I agree. I get very confused today when critics of the COIN Afghanistan strategy constantly repeat something along the line of, "What are we going to do in other trouble areas like Yemen and Somalia where al-Qaeda networks are active? Do we go there as well? We can't put 150,000 troops on the ground and rebuild those countries too!"

    Well, wherever al-Qaeda or international terrorists go... so should we - even if its Somalia, Yemen or the dam arctic circle.

    Its really a straw man argument - NO ONE is proposing we do this because there are plenty of other productive and less costly ways to engage these areas. However, there is really no strategy to deal with these countries - just short term policies. I guess its hard to glean strategic intelligence from areas of such instability since projections can't really go that far without some sort of stable power structure to build analysis on.

    Political leaders are usually risk adverse about committing political capital and/or resources to engagement in areas/conflicts they don't understand and "seem" peripheral. Just like how Afghanistan seemed like a backwater in 1992.

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